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The study examines the records of the Nigerian party
systems in creating a propitious or volatile political
environment for political campaigns and elections. It
brings together the literature and cross-sectional survey
data on individual and group political attitudes and
behavior, and on the effect of the Nigeria party system on
political attitudes of the electorate.
Why is party competition in Nigeria strongly associated
with ethnic belonging and why is it accompanied with so much
violence? This study explores the question by illuminating
and probing the motivations and incentives of the party
systems, their patterns of political socialization and
mobilization, as well as their impact on the electorate. It
also approaches the question by focusing on political
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culture which defines the context in which changes occur and
the style they take.
In the final analysis, the study argues that party
identification or loyalty and political behavior are
influenced and shaped not just by political culture but
also, and perhaps more importantly, by the nature of the
party system. It provides cross-sectional data with which
to develop or test a causal model of relationships between
political structure (such as party system, civic culture of
the Nigeria public) on the one hand and variability in the
incidence of violence accompanying political campaigns and
elections and the variability of the effect of ethnicity and
religion on political campaigns and elections.
The findings are compatible with the theories on two-
party systems. While the multiplicity of parties in the
First and Second Republics had a destabilizing and weakening
effect on the political system, the two party framework did
not have such an impact. The membership of the two parties
in the Third republic cut across ethnic and religious lines
and created some political ties that connected individuals
and communities in Nigeria and increased their shared
interests. All these helped to reduce the incidences of
political violence and the effect of ethnicity in political
campaigns and voting behavior. They also helped in the
resolution or insulation of political conflicts and
disputes.
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During the last three decades a question has been
raised concerning the ability of traditional governing
parties and the party systems to deal with a range of
problems. Another important unresolved question is whether
the attitudes of the Nigerian public have a major causal
effect on the establishment of favorable democratic
behaviors such as voting across ethnic, regional, and
religious lines, avoiding the use of voilence and
intimidation of political opponents as a vital weapon for
a successful political campaigns and elections?
This work examines the records of the Nigerian party
systems in creating a propitious political environment for
political campaigns and elections. In essence, what is the
relationship between the party systems and the establishment
of democratic attitudes that are favorable to orderly
political campaigns and elections in Nigeria? To what
extent did the two-party framework reduce the incidence of
ethnicity, violence, and inter- and intra-party squabbles
that often triggered off riots and destruction of lives and
property during election campaigns? In other words, did it
succeed in the creation of a more favorable democratic
1
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culture and the resocialization of Nigerians into the new
values and norms devoid of divisive, disruptive and
centrifugal tendencies?
But why is it that political/constitutional stability
and orderly (peaceful) political campaigns and elections are
achieved in some countries, in spite of governmental crises,
while a mere permission to form political parties in Nigeria
constitutes a major threat to its corporate existence. This
study approaches this question by focusing on political
culture (political values and norms) which defines the
context and style in which change takes place.
Nigeria has become a testing ground for different
theories of government and politics and a "guinea pig" of
social scientists and political philosophers. It is facing
a number of serious problems. Some are leftovers from
British colonialism in Nigeria, some originated from inter-
ethnic transactions before British colonialism. Others are
still in the future but looming ever closer. It seems that
how the political actors choose to resolve those problems
will go a long way in determining whether they will worsen
or improve.
Nigeria has been politically shaken to its foundation
by the traumatic experiences of the First and Second
Republics' party politics and a thirty-month civil war.
Violence, political thuggery, the use of state power for
assassination and repression of opposition groups became
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endemic and corruption and political patronage were
ubiquitous. The mistrust and frustrations which had been
brewing and building up exploded in the 1962 western
regional crisis that polarized the Action Group (A.G.) into
two hostile factions and led to a state of emergency and
treasonable felony trials and convictions of the A.G.
leaders. *
The federal government (a coalition of Northern
People's Congress and the National Congress of Nigerian
Citizens) declared a state of emergency in the West when the
Awolowo faction of the A.G. had succeeded in deposing Chief
Akintola as Premier of the western region.2 This precluded
the assumption of power by the Awolowo faction and led to
the reinstatement of Chief Akintola as premier in control of
a new party, the United People's Party (UPP) after six
months of selective application of a substantially biased
state of emergency rule. At this point, the A.G. was no
longer a big political force in Nigeria. K.W. J. Post and
Michael Vickers contend that "the crisis not only alienated
a large segment of the Nigerian youth and intelligentsia who
had been attracted to Awolowo's radical egalitarian appeals,
^.A.E. Skurnik, "Nigeria in Crisis," Current History
52, no. 307 (March 1967): 142.
2Larry Diamond, "Introduction: Roots of Failure, Seeds
of Hope" in Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset
(eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa 2
(Boulder, Colo.: Lynn Rinner Publishers, 1988), 40.
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but it also left the Yoruba feeling victimized as a
people."3 The impact of this was clearly seen in party
formation and membership in the Second Republic.
Another major crisis which the parties of the First
Republic failed to resolve was the 1962 census. The census
had become so politicized and the object of bitter political
competition in Nigeria because of its primary function in
the distribution of revenues and power. The Northern
majority in Nigeria politics was heavily threatened by the
initial results released in the South after the 1962 census.
The East was accused of inflating its population figures,
while the North claimed to have discovered eight million
more people in a verification exercise within the region.
The importance of the census cannot be overemphasized,
especially in the 1964 general election, but suffice it to
say that there were accusations and counter-accusations
among the major political parties and none of them wanted to
be outwitted because such outcome would obviously reduce the
party's power and strength in inter-party and ethnic
negotiations, transactions and political competitions.
Similarly, Larry Diamond succinctly points out that
"...census had been blatantly established as an instrument
of ethnic and regional competition, mass political
3K.W.J. Post and Michael Vickers, Structure and
Conflict in Nigeria (London: Heinemann, 1973), 88, 90.
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mobilization was even more intense and mutual suspicion even
more profound."4
The already tense political situation was exacerbated
by both the Northern aristocracy and its political party
(NPC) and Eastern Igbos who indicated that they were no
longer satisfied with their alliance at the federal level.
David J. Murray after evaluating the nature of the political
relationship between the NPC and the NCNC at the federal
level rightly concludes that "each saw the other as
committed to finding a way of excluding the other or
establishing a firmer grip over the federal government.5
Both the NPC and the NCNC seemed to be fishing in troubled
waters and were fighting tooth and nail to establish a
strong political base and dependable allies in the western
region which had become the sick child of Nigeria.
Similarly, "by 1964-1965, the NPC government of the North
and the NCNC government of the East were financing and
furthering what amounted to a near civil war in their
attempt to establish an ally in control of the regional
government."6
4Diamond, Linz and Lipset, 41.
5David J. Murray, "Nigeria After Biafra," Current
History 58, no. 343 (March 1970): 136.
6Ibid. For a detailed account of politics in Nigeria
during the Nigeria's First Republic see F.A.O. Schwarz Jr.,
Nigeria—The Tribesf the Nation, or a the Race (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1965).
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It is important to note that the major political
parties, especially the two that formed a coalition at
independence in 1960, were only concerned with the well-
being of their parties, their members, their interests, and
their regions rather than establishing a successful
parliamentary democracy and a stable federal republic.
The 1964 general elections made a mockery of
parliamentary democracy. The manner in which the elections
were manipulated in most parts of the country was, to say
the least, despicable. Alexander A. Madiebo condemns the
elections and political campaigns of 1964 in very strong
terms.7 "Some political parties were prevented from
campaigning in parts of the country only to make it possible
for candidates of the ruling party to be returned
unopposed."8 The East boycotted the elections to show its
resentment of the manner in which the campaigns and
elections were conducted.
Before 1964 elections, alliances and new alignments of
political forces which were different from what had
prevailed in 1959 had emerged. On March 10, 1964, Chief
Akintola's UPP which had flirted with the N.P.C. was
committed to good relations and cooperation with the federal
'Alexander A. Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and t




government formed a new political grouping called the
Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) with a small
number of maverick members of the NCNC who held seats in the
Western Region House of Assembly and Southern People's
Congress (SPC). Akintola's N.N.D.P. and the Sardauna's
N.P.C. formed an alliance in order to control the federal
parliament. In what may be considered an act of
desperation, the Awolowo faction of the Action Group, led by
Chief Adegbenro, and the N.C.N.C. who were left with no
other option consummated a marriage of convenience which
gave birth to an alliance named United Progressive Grand
Alliance (UPGA).9 Minority political groups from the North
such as the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) and Malam
Aminu Kanu's Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU)
joined UPGA.
The UPGA supporters who had lost trust and confidence
in the federal government's ability to conduct free and fair
elections were shocked by the October 1965 elections which
ended in a fiasco and seemed to attract the attention of the
army. They rejected the results and Alhaji Adegbenro,
deputy leader of AG and leader of UPGA in the West formed a
ten-man "interim government" when Governor Fadatunsi called
on Chief Akintola to form a government. Adegbenro was
arrested and charged with unlawful assumption of power even
9Ibid., 7.
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though he assured the governor that he would pursue his goal
constitutionally.
The disorders, looting, lawlessness, brigandage, and
the unrest that followed the election in Western Nigeria
were monumental and reached such alarming proportions that
the federal authorities advised legislators to avoid using
road transportation on their way to the federal territory of
Lagos.10 Ironically, the federal Prime Minister, Sir
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who had declared a state of
emergency in 1962 refused to make any concrete effort to
resolve the 1965 crisis which was several times bigger than
that of 1962. Instead, he insisted that "force can't bring
peace to peoples' hearts."11 Balewa seemed to be right in
this regard because force cannot inculcate the much-desired
positive attitude conducive to compromise, accommodation,
and national cohesion. Moreover, cohesion by coercion in a
multi-ethnic society like Nigeria cannot withstand the test
of time. But one may ask why did the federal government
refuse to grant the UPGA's requests—declaring a state of
emergency in the Western Region and arranging for another
election? A state of emergency stood a chance of unseating
Sardauna's satellite and ally in the West. Instead, Balewa




there was a complete breakdown of law and order. This paved
the way for the army takeover on January 15, 1966.
In 1978, after 12 years of military rule, the military
Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo lifted the ban on
partisan party politics. Immediately after the ban was
lifted, many ethnic-based political associations emerged
despite the electoral decree that required the establishment
of offices in each of at least two-thirds of the states in
the federation. This decree was intended to nip the problem
of Nigerian party politics in the bud by forestalling and
precluding the emergence of ethnic-based political parties
which characterized and destroyed the First Republic. In
addition, this electoral decree was believed to be an
institutional framework through which political parties
would acquire a more national character. It performed the
function of national integration and nurtured political
stability.
Unfortunately, the five and later six registered
political parties became the reincarnation of the First
Republic's political parties: the National Party of Nigeria
(NPN)/NPC; the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN)/Action Group;
the National People's Party (NPP)/NCNC, and People's
Redemption Party (PRP)/NEPU and each was led, as before by a
member of the three dominant ethnic groups Hausa/Fulani,
Yoruba, and Igbo. In the final analysis, the same political
environment, circumstances, and people were bound to produce
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results similar to that of the First Republic. As Chikendu
puts it, "In the end Nigerian politics rewound to square
one."12
On December 31, 1983, senior ranking military officers
overthrew Shagari's government and set the political ball of
the Third Republic rolling when the Babangida's
administration established a Political Bureau charged with
finding a new and viable political order. In his inaugural
address, President Babangida asked the Political Bureau to
"review the Nigeria's political history and identify the
basic problems which had led to our failure in the past and
suggest ways of resolving and coping with these problems."13
The Political Bureau, in its report, pointed an
accusing finger at Nigeria's party-system and identified it
as one of the Achilles heels of Nigeria's politics. It also
recommended a two-party system as the panacea for numerous
political problems plaguing Nigeria, a socialist ideology
upon which the party-system was to be anchored or based, and
a new political orientation. Babangida's administration
quickly accepted a two-party system and rejected the
12Patrick Chikendu, "Toward Evolving a Two-Party System
in Nigeria: Issues and Problems." A paper presented at a
national workshop held at Awala Hotel Bauchi, February 16-
17, 1989, 4. *
13From President Babangida's inaugural address to the
Political Bureau, quoted in the Newswai-rh (Nigeria) , April
13, 1987, 15.
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socialist ideology. The question at this juncture is
whether the two-party framework did a better job (more
effective) in remolding and reshaping the values and
attitudes of both the Nigerian masses and the elites,
thereby producing a conducive political environment for
stability?
Statement of the Problem
This study is an exploration of the relation between a
set of events (variables), namely, party systems (number of
political parties and the relationships between them) and
the pattern of political mobilization and socialization. It
examines the effect of the two-party framework on political
violence, intimidation of political opponents, ethnicization
of politics, and political integration during political
campaigns and elections. Moreover, it explores the relative
effectiveness of the two-party framework as compared with
that of the multi-party system in reducing or eliminating
disruptive activities during political campaigns and
elections. It raises the question about the impacts of this
formula or pattern on the electorate's perception of the two
political parties during campaigns and elections in Nigeria.
In addition, it evaluates the relationship between the party
systems and the development of favorable democratic
attitudes.
There is no doubt that the pattern of political
mobilization, socialization, and electoral campaigns by the
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major parties in the First and Second Republics limited the
development of a national party system and the mobilization
of the electorate around national issues. Nigeria has
multiple social cleavages--by region, religion, language,
and to a certain extent, social class. This encouraged the
political parties to appeal to specific regional or ethnic
interests with hope of electoral success at the regional
level and confusion and gridlock at the federal level. In
the midst of the confusion, a fragile coalition of parties
which would eventually destabilize the political system and
bring it to a standstill. Did the two party framework solve
this problem?
Therefore, the multiparty system as practiced in the
First and Second Republics did not accentuate a national
party system that was very critical or essential for the
integration of the Nigerian society. Regardless of the
constitutional requirements for party formation, it was easy
for the transformation of parties into more narrowly defined
tools and vehicles for promoting ethnic, religious or
regional ambition culminating or leading to a failure in the
party system. This reinforces the role of the Nigeria
political culture in shaping the political behavior of the
political elite class. It will be recalled that Babangida
gave aspiring politicians an opportunity in 1988 to form two
broad-based parties in the national interest (political
stability). Instead they came up with 13 parties with
13
ethnic affiliation. The Nigerian political culture then
supported the idea of appealing and using ethnic sentiments
as far as acquisition of political power was concerned.
Purpose of the Study
The assumption is that the multi-party system has led
to violent political campaigns, destructive polarization,
ethnic/religious conflicts, and political instability in
Nigeria.
The purpose is to help in the establishment of
empirical generalizations (statements that communicate
general knowledge) through which a causal model of
relationships between party systems, attitudes of the
Nigerian electorate, and change in the level of violence,
ethnicity, and religion during electoral campaigns and
elections in Nigeria can be tested or further explored. In
essence, they will help to show the relationships between
individual facts or variables.
The study looks into the effects of using two-party
framework on the attitudes of the Nigerian electorate
towards political campaigns and elections. It is also a
simultaneous exploration of how the society is conditioned
by the political parties and their pattern of campaign and
the parties conditioned by the society.
Another objective is to look into political campaign
experiences, institutions, behavior, and processes not
necessarily in terms of cause and effect, but the
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desirability (utility) or undesirability (futility) in the
establishment of a stale political order. It examines the
records and patterns of political campaigns during the
periods of multipartism and two-party framework in Nigeria
in order to predict which party system is more likely to
integrate the Nigerian society and produce national
political parties. In essence, it will ultimately attempt
to evaluate events, trends, and consequences.
The criteria for evaluating the affects of both party
systems entail comparing the levels of violence,
fragmentation or, polarization of the electorate, ethnicity,
integration, trust, religious politics, level of consensus,
character, and the pattern of party membership and political
campaigns in all the republics.
Significance of this Study
The essence of this study is to see how organizational/
constitutional engineering device can positively contribute
in solving the chronic pathology of political instability at
the time when Africa, like the rest of the world, is seeking
to embrace representative democracy. It is necessary to
identify relevant kinds of political structures most
conducive to promoting stable democracy. Africa had also in
the past believed that the best approach to political and
socioeconomic development was the one-party system, which
was believed to be a centripetal force that would integrate
the political community rather than fragment it. The
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results of the last three decades have shown that one-party
systems in Africa degenerated into the monopoly of political
power by an oligarchy. The two-party system is believed by
President Babangida to have a high probability of
stabilizing political competition and inter-ethnic
transactions.
The study sets out to supply the material necessary for
comparative considerations relating to the patterns of
electoral campaigns, integration, and elections in Nigeria
under different party systems. It provides a particularly
good opportunity to gather data at a particular point in
time (before and after the 1993 presidential election in
Nigeria). These data will help to evaluate different party
systems in Nigeria. In addition to being timely and
relating to a practical political problem in Nigeria, it
will attempt to explain what often happens under certain
conditions, and this knowledge will be used to choose the
ends and means Nigeria prefers especially party systems. In
essence, the answers to the questions in this study may be
quite valuable in the making of practical decisions.
Finally, the propositions developed in this study will
help to make generalizations about political behavior,
impact of party systems on Nigerian-type societies, and help
to invite the replication and testing of these propositions
in other contexts.
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In the final analysis, this study will try to identify
the social forces at work in Nigerian party politics and to
establish the link between them, and chart or predict their
course in the new party-system. An understanding of these
forces inevitably advances the knowledge of social relations
shared by Nigerians. This knwoledge is necessary for the
political transformation of Nigerian society.
This study cannot be definitive but can be suggestive.
Thus, it will be a contribution to the current heated debate
regarding the best solution to the Nigerian political
quagmire and the impact of the two party framework on the
Nigerian political process.
Operational Definitions
Words or concepts have become so elastic that they can
be stretched up or down to mean different things to
different people at different times. Therefore it is
necessary in a study like this to operationalize concepts
and variables in this work and put them in forms that allow
and facilitate some kind of measurement.
Tribalism--A discrimination in favor of or against a
person or thing based on his/her or its state of origin
rather than merit. It is also a strong commitment and
loyalty to one's party or ethnic group at the expense of the
nation and other groups.
Federal Character--This is the idea of distributing,
spreading or sharing of national resources among all states
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so that each state should receive an equitable number of
portions. Similarly, it is the idea that "national
amenities should be spread equitably over all states of the
federation."14
Political Stability—As used in this study refers to
continuity of a government until the end of its
constitutional tenure, infrequent changes in top public
officials, political leadership, absence or low incidence of
disruptive events in the system such as political riots,
coups, legitimacy problems, intimidation of political
opponents, false imprisonment of political dissenters,
rigging elections, above all, the maintenance of the same
constitutional forms and processes over a long period of
time (about ten-fifteen years). This does not preclude
effecting minor changes by the appropriate authority or
authorities.
Research Questions
The main questions guiding the study are the following:
To what extent did the two-party framework, as an agent
or instrument of political socialization, succeed in the re-
socialization of the Nigerian communities and their leaders
14Peter P. Ekeh and Eghosa E. Osaghae (eds.) Federal
Character and Federalism in Ninpria (Ibadan, Nigeria:
Heinemann Educational Books Limited, 1989), 52.
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toward a new political culture devoid of divisive,
disruptive and centrifugal tendencies?
To what extent did the two-party framework reduce the
incidence of ethnicity and primordial loyalties during
political campaigns? In other words, to what extent did it
bring about the replacement of alignments based on ethnic,
religious, and regional affiliation with issue-oriented
ones?
To what extent did the two-party framework reduce or
contain inter-party squabbles and factional strife within
the parties that fueled the passion that touched off riots
and destruction of lives and property during election
campaigns?
Was the two-party system in Nigeria able to engineer
and propagate a consensual political culture in place of a
fragmented one?
Finally, to what extent, therefore, did the two-party
system promote stability than the multi-party system?
Theoretical Framework
As this study searches or looks for facts, events, and
explanations that are intertwined and interrelated many
theoretical perspectives that help to draw or show
relations, build connections, and state linkages come to
mind. Political scientists have not reached any agreement
on the theoretical approach to be regarded as the best as
far as explanatory and predictive strengths are concerned.
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In other words, as far as confirmation of the existing
hypothesis and the development of new hypotheses are
concerned, the search for the most appropriate theoretical
approach becomes an endless or at least at preliminary
stages toward a solution, or what may be referred to as the
"ultimate political science theory" just like Newtonian
theory in Physics.
This study uses a political culture approach as a point
of departure because it seems to be the most relevant and
promising approach in investigating, understanding, and
explaining the relationship among variables such as party
system, pattern of political campaign, and political
culture. The political culture approach shows both the
cause and effect of the type of political orientations and
to a degree, of behavior. Once the political culture of a
given polity is investigated and understood, the unifying
and diverging values and beliefs can be conjectured.
Elgin F. Hunt and David C. Colander give an interesting
anecdote that depicts the importance of culture to society.15
They were taught in high school that electrons, protons, and
neutrons made up atoms, atoms made up elements and elements
made up matters. As time went on, physicists discovered the
existence of smaller particles called building blocks of all
15Elgin F. Hunt and David C. Colander, Social Science;
An Introduction to the Study of Society,. 7th edition (New
York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990), 119.
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matters. "These building blocks include quarks, leptons,
and ghostly particles, bosons, whose existence is assumed by
physicists because they need to hold matter together.
Quarks and leptons make up matter; bosons hold it
together."16 Culture holds society together the way bosons
hold matter. Absence of bosons would lead to the
disintegration of quarks and leptons and the world as we
know it today would not exist. Society will be subjected to
the same fate if that force (culture) that holds it together
is destroyed or distorted. The political science bosons
equivalent is political culture which was popularized as a
concept by Gabriel Almond in his 1956 article, "Comparative
Political Systems."17
As most other concepts in political science, the
precise definition of political culture is a controversial
one, focusing as it does on the cognitive, affective, and
evaluational aspects found in the seminal works of Almond,
Verba, and Pye.18 The concept as Verba explains, does not
only apply to events or activities within the political
16Ibid.
17Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems,"
Journal of Pol it:ins 18 (1956) : 391-409.
18Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture:
Political Attitude and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963); Lucian Pye
and Sidney Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political
Development (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1965) .
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sphere, but to "the system of beliefs about the patterns of
political interactions and political institutions."19 This
system of attitudes, beliefs, and ideals is self-reinforcing
and comes from a society's history--its traditions, the
spirit of its public organizations, the reasoning of its
citizens, the style and ethical code of its leaders.20
"Political culture colors a people's expectations about the
realities of politics and instills in them shared ideals as
to what their public life might be."21
There are many different definitions of political
culture. One consensus or rather characteristic that runs
through these definitions is the idea that political culture
is concerned with the fundamental orientations and beliefs
of a people. However, there are disagreements about what
exactly constitute the components of these fundamental
beliefs. As far as the definition of political culture is
concerned, this work focuses on Walter A. Rosenbaum's work,
Political Culture and Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils1
Toward a General Theory of Action.22 The three "core
19Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Pye
and Verba (eds.), 516.
20Pye, in Pye and Verba, 7.
21Ibid., 9.
22Walter A. Rosenbaum, Political Culture (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975), 6-7; Talcott Parsons and
Edward Shils, Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1951), 58-60.
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components" which Rosenbaum believes are common to all
definitions of political culture are orientations toward
political structures, orientations toward others in the
political system, and orientations toward one's political
activities.23 Parsons and Shils contend that political
orientations involve cognitive element which deals with
perception, the cathectic (affective) deals with feeling,
through which the object is endowed with affective
importance, and evaluative component relates to combining
and using cognitive and catechetical orientations in making
choice and judgment about the object.24
Almond and Verba expand the above frame of reference
into three types of political orientation:
(1) "cognitive orientation," concerns the knowledge of
the political system, the role of the political actors who
occupy different structures and institutions, and inputs and
outputs of the political system.
(2) "affective orientation," relates to feelings about
the political system, its role, political actors, and
performance, and
(3) "evaluational orientation," deals with the
judgments and opinions about political objects based on the
23Rosenbaum, 6-7.
24Parsons and Shils, 58-60.
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combination of value standards and criteria with knowledge
(information) and feeling.25
Jay Stevens and Ndiva Kofele-Kale propose two
definitions of political culture based on macro (mass) and
micro (individual) levels. On the mass (macro) level, they
define it as the "collective orientation of groups of people
toward the political system—derived from history and
traditions help shape mass political behavior."26 On the
individual (micro) level, political culture is defined as
the "subjective way a person thinks and feels about the
symbols, institutions, and rules that constitute the basic
and fundamental parts of civic life."27 Imbedded in the
above definitions of political culture is the assumption
that people's political behavior is directly linked to their
feelings and beliefs about government and politics. To see
how political culture links national history and individual
political orientations, see Figure 1.
25James A. Bill and Robert L. Hardgrave Jr., Comparative
Politics: The Quest for Theory (Lanham, Md.: University
Press of America), 87..
26Jay Stevens and Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Comparative
Political Culture and Social! zai-.i on (Washington, D.C.: The












Fig. 1. Political Culture as a Linkage Between National
History and Individual Political Orientations
Source: Adapted from Jay Stevens and Ndiva Kofele-Kale,
Comparative Political Culture and Socialism
(Washington, D.C.: The American Political
Association, 1976), p. 3.
The pattern of mass or collective orientations of groups of
people also has direct link with the feelings and beliefs of
individuals. In essence, a pattern of political orientation
that emphasizes division, distinctiveness, or ethnic
differences can adversely affect the political attitude of
the individuals. A case in point is the pattern of
political parties' campaigns in Nigeria's First, Second, and
to certain extent, Third Republics. Each political party
constantly told and reminded the ethnic group or groups it
represented that the other opposing parties belonged to
different ethnic groups and they had perfected a master plan
to marginalize and deprive other ethnic groups of their
rights and fair share of the country's resources. In the
process, these political parties and their leaders influence
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the feelings and beliefs of individuals in different ethnic
groups in Nigeria.
The violently cruel and ferocious character of the
political campaign was followed by the ostensible
distribution of government positions and national resources
in favor of the ethnic group or groups whose party won the
election. This institutionalized a system of rewards in
which political parties and their leaders perceived
themselves, not as national apparati but as the champions
and vanguards of their ethnic groups in the struggle for
rewards and patronage. The nature of crises emanating from
inter-ethnic transactions in the process of the struggle for
rewards tended to make leaders so rigid and unwilling to
sacrifice any primordial interest for that of the nation.
This tendency exacerbates the tension in the system and
compounds irreconcilable policy postures of the leading
ethnic groups' elites. This accelerated the formation of a
multitude of ethnic based parties and their commitment to
massive changes in favor of their respective ethnic groups,
and increased both the volume and intensity of pressure on
the system. The superordinate/subordinate nature of
Nigerian politics has a negative impact on the relations
among ethnic groups. Minority ethnic based parties regarded
themselves as the subordinates and the resulting antagonism
had an adverse impact on the centrifugal and centripetal
trends in Nigerian political and civil societies.
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"As people communicate with each other, mass beliefs
become more widely shared and act to reinforce individual
political orientations."28 A successful foundation of a
nation involves the establishment of political institutions
and processes for settlement of disputes and authoritative
allocation of value (distribution of available resources).
The stability of a nation is largely dependent on the
legitimacy, to a significant degree, on national
integration, and acceptability of those political
institutions and processes by the majority of the people or
groups that make up that nation. For a nation to endure for
any length of time, a large proportion of the population
must view the political structure and procedures as
legitimate.29
There is no gainsaying that high national integration
makes the processes of governance easy. As Stevens and
Kofele-Kale rightly observe,
A nation that is highly integrated politically is
one in which citizens have a strong sense of
identification with the nation and feel that their
obligations and loyalty to the nation take
precedence over any obligations they may have to
28Ibid., 2.
29William Nesbit Chambers, "Party Development and the
American Mainstream," in William Nesbit Chambers and Walter
Dean Burnham (eds.), The American Party System: Stages of
Development 2nd edition (New York: Oxford, 1975), 17.
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their social classes, their religion, or other
parochial loyalties.30
National integration also indicates that consensus has been
attained on wide ranging issues such as civil procedures,
appropriate methods of dissent or political opposition,
support, and political action, and other issues that are not
within the realm of government and politics. Other
characteristics of good national integration include minimal
occurrence of political violence and the display of sense of
loyalty by citizens toward the symbols and officials of the
government.31 Trust among different groups and in government
is also one of the indicators of a well integrated nation.
Conversely, Nigeria furnishes a good example of a
country where people owe great allegiance and feel stronger
attachment to parochial loyalties other than their nation.
There is no love lost among the ethnic groups, political
actors from one group are very suspicious of other
counterparts from different ethnic groups. These
characteristics of Nigerian politics tend to weaken the
political processes because people that often feel
marginalized are less likely to view the political process
as a legitimate means of allocating scarce resources, more
likely to reject government decisions that are supposed to
be binding upon them, and above all, are more likely to
30Stevens and Kofele-Kale, 3-4.
31Rosenbaum, 52-55.
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resort to use of violence as a legitimate method of
achieving their parochial goals. "Such psychological
orientations may promote feelings of personal alienation
from the regime, which may in turn encourage political
fragmentation or disintegration."32
The Nigeria's chequered history is littered with such
sad occurrences and instances which have contributed
substantially to instability and may even lead to a final
political disintegration of the country should a weak regime
come to power and yield to the violence and parochial
pressures. To what extent did the application of social
engineering, using the two-party system as a major tool,
reverse the trends of events in Nigeria by inculcating new
national political culture that nurture and paved the way
for stability in Nigeria?
Almond and Verba, in their book, The Civic Culture,
classify political culture into three major types.33 These
32Stevens and Kofele-Kale, 4.
33Almond and Verba, 17-19. They conclude that "open and
moderate partisanships are essential to a stable democracy.
They are the "feeling correlates" of responsible majority
and loyal opposition, p. 86. Their analysis classify
partisans into four types: (1) the open partisan, who is
involved in politics but not so much as to cut oneself off
from members of the opposing party; (2) the apathetic
partisan, who professed little involvement in politics; (3)
the intense partisan, who is emotionally involved in
politics to the point of disapproving the marriage across
party lines; and (4) parochial partisan, who is concerned
about interparty marriage but indifferent about election
campaigns. See also p. 85. As the study progresses, the one
that applies to Nigerian situation will be determined.
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include parochial, subject, and participant political
cultures. Parochial political culture's two major
characteristics are absence of specialized political roles
and little expectations on the part of the members of a
parochial political community that noticeable changes in
their lives can be achieved or made through politics or by
the government. In other words, absence of specialized
political role means that the chief, or village head or
headman or leader carries out a religious and economic
function as well as a political one. In essence, the socio-
economic or religious systems are not differentiated from
that of political. Since the members of the parochial
political community nurture little expectation on their part
that major changes in their lives can be achieved through
government, they are reluctant to participate in it
(government). As Elone Nwabuzor and Martha Mueller put it:
"a parochial citizen does not expect anything from the
political system; he makes no demands on it."34 According to
Almond and Verba, African "tribal" societies exhibited this
type of political culture.35
The next type is a subject political culture. The
orientation here is basically a passive one. The citizen
34Elone J. Nwabuzor and Martha Mueller, An Introduction
to Political Science For African Students (London: Macmillan
Publishers Ltd., 1987), 61.
35Almond and Verba, p.
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knows what is going on in the political system, for example,
new welfare eligibility rules, new policy on alcohol sales
and consumption, erosion of Miranda warning, coercive
measures or tax legislation, but plays no role in the inputs
because he or she feels that, even if he/she does, it will
be inconsequential and in fact, with no influence.
The last type is a participant political culture which
is characterized by a citizenry that has knowledge or is
aware of both the inputs and outputs of the government and
believes that its own pressure or participation can effect
the policies of the government. In essence, political
activism seems to be the major political characteristic of
the political community whether it is pro- or anti-
government .
Nigerian political culture does not perfectly fit in
any of the Almond and Verbas types. Instead, it is a
mixture of all. The proportions of parochial, subject and
participant citizens and attitudes may be determined with
the help of the questionnaire as the study progresses.
However, it is important to point out that the relative
dominance or prevalence of each type determines the kind and
character of the political culture.
An average Onitsha urban resident is often aware of
government policy on smuggling goods across the border (it
used to be the predominant trade of Onitsha urban residents)
but feels there is no point to influence it. As Nwabuzor
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and Mueller point out that "an urban Nigerian is often well
aware of government policies and programmes, but he may
equally well feel that there is no point in his trying to
influence them."36 However, it will be erroneous to say that
subject political culture is relatively prevalence in
Nigeria because of the above observations. This trend is
fast changing in Nigeria because some Nigerian urban
residents formed political associations and sponsored
political candidates for different offices when two
political parties were introduced in 1989 hoping to achieve
favorable policies that would help their respective
businesses.
It is also erroneous to say that a parochial political
culture is mainly characterized by undifferentiated or
unspecialized political roles or that differentiated
political systems are not predominantly parochial. It is
possible, however, that parochial political culture can be
predominant in differentiated political systems if the
majority of the population live in rural and remote areas.
"People living in remote areas of largely rural nation may
have a dim awareness of the national political system, but
they may take no part in it and expect nothing from it."37
36Nwabuzor and Mueller, 61.
37Ibid.
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It is important to point out here that one of the
problems Nigeria encounters is not how to transform its
political culture from a predominantly parochial or subject
orientation into a predominantly participant one, but how to
build a predominant political culture with little or no
deviant subcultures. Major ethnic groups in Nigeria exhibit
cohesive political cultures of their own that are different
from each other and which resist amalgamation into a
Nigerian whole.38
Like Almond and Verba,39 this study basically assumes
that political culture affects the performance or
functioning of the political system and one of the prime
objectives of this study is to determine what particular
patterns of orientation nurture and promote stability and
the extent the two-party framework had gone as a political
socialization agent in promoting these patterns of
orientation and their impact on the political process. How
did Nigerian political subcultures integrate under two
political parties?
One of the major weaknesses of the political culture
approach besides its ethnocentric character is that its
focus is "almost wholly on the input side of the political
system--on the determinants of political behavior rather
38Ibid., 64.
39Bill and Hardgrave Jr., 115.
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than on political behavior as such."40 Similarly, it uses
and emphasizes political culture as an independent variable
which affects, shapes, molds or determines the political
behavior of the citizens. From analytic standpoint, the way
in which political structure and behavior shape the pattern
of political culture is frequently ignored.41
The political culture approach does not take class into
consideration. It seems to be the class interest that
determines the behavior of the elites, therefore, it does
not precisely explain politics because of its inability to
satisfactorily account for elite behavior and why this class
emphasizes ethnicity in order to achieve its political
goals. However, the fragmentation of political culture in
Nigeria makes this approach more attractive than others.
Data Collection
Relevant data was collected from the Clark Atlanta
University and Emory University libraries. The books and
scholarly journals collected from these universities helped
mainly in the introductory part of this study. They did not
address any specific research question. Other sources
include but are not limited to some of the Nigerian
magazines such as The News, Tellr Newswatch, Concord and
40Ibid., 115-116.
41B.O. Nwabueze, Constitutionalism in The Emerged States
(London: H.C. Hurst and Company, 1973), 150.
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some newspapers such as the Daily Timesr the New Nigeria,
the Daily Star, and the Concord were used. The Concord
magazine and newspaper, owned by M.K.O. Abiola, published
the results of all the 30 states and the federal capital
Territory, Abuja after the June 12, 1993 presidential
election in Nigeria. The comments and editorials of these
magazines and newspapers helped in the evaluation of the
level of political violence, "ethnicization," and
regionalization of politics during the electioneering
campaigns and election in the aborted Third Republic. The
Report of the Political Bureau set up by General Babangida
was available. It showed the arguments that informed its
decision to recommend the two-party system for Nigeria.
This study is primarily based on the data gathered by
survey method. The questionnaire contained forty-five
closed-ended questions which helped in the researcher's
attempt to determine the people's attitude towards the two
political parties and political actors. A stratified sample
was drawn from Nigeria on semi-regional basis, namely, the
North, the West, the East, the Northern and the Southern
minorities. Attempts were also made to ensure that no major
subgroup in these geographical divisions were left out.
Five hundred and twenty questionnaires were returned out of
the one thousand, five hundred administered. The
questionnaire was structured or closed form and contained
questions and alternative answers that were mutually
35
exclusive to them. At this point, readers desiring a more
detailed discussions or information on the methodology of
the study are urged to turn to the section titled "Some
Methodological Considerations." This section discusses the
questionnaire, sample design, the interview schedule, and
other pertinent methodological details. It must be stated
here that the direct interviews were merely for the
validation of the responses of randomly selected respondents
from all the groups in the five geo-political divisions.
The writer attended workshops, seminars and lectures
that related to party systems and political resocialization
in Nigeria. These seminars and lectures took place in
Nigerian universities and colleges during Obasanjo's and
Babangida's transition programs. The researcher also
attended political meetings and campaign rallies in all the
regions and collected some documents and copies of these
lectures. Finally, the writer observed the pattern of
electioneering campaigns in Nigeria and synthesized the
experiences with other available resource materials.
Some Research Methodological Considerations
Some aspects of this research project use historical/
analytical and exploratory approaches. Historical
investigation into the evolution of Nigerian political
culture and the competitive and cooperative nature of the
Nigeria's First and Second Republics' multipartyism makes
this approach indispensable in this study.
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Additionally, this dissertation employs a survey
research method which involves the construction and
administration of questionnaires. Though the two-party
system in Nigeria did not operate long enough, a modest
attempt was made to measure and evaluate the impacts of the
system on the political process and people. Questions that
reflect the respondent's attitude, opinion and orientations
toward people and political campaigners outside his or her
ethnic group, the government, the political parties, and
campaigning.
The Type and Selection of the Sample
The sample of respondents in this study was selected on
semi-regional basis in Nigeria. Stratified sampling was
used in the administration of the questionnaires and
interviews. This choice is informed by the nature of the
Nigerian population which consists of a number of subgroups
or strata that differ in the characteristics being studied.
In order to assess the attitude and opinion on certain
political issues, the Nigerian population is divided into
five groups based, to a large extent, on ethnic/regional
affiliations or considerations, namely the North
(Hausa/Fulani), the West (Yoruba), the East (Ibo), the
Northern (Tiv, Igala, Kanuri) and the Southern (Edo, Efik,
Anam, I jaw) minorities. The population is further
subdivided into groups on the basis of age (young and old),
gender (males and females), income, religion, and education.
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Some of these groups (units) include illitrate farmers in
villages, illiterate and literate traders in the rural and
the urban areas, civil servants (educated and uneducated)
college and univesrity professors and lecturers, and
different religious groups. Afterwards, a random (or
systematic) sample was drawn within each subgroup. This
study is not merely interested in surveying the attitudes of
the Nigerian electorate toward campaigners, campaigning,and
the political parties, but in comparing attitudes of the
young and the old male and female electorates who reside in
small regions/ethnic groups with those who live in medium-
size and large ones (including urban areas).
The study avoided proportional stratified sampling
since the emphasis is also on the type of differences among
the groups. In essence, an equal number of samples/
respondents were selected from each group regardless of the
size of that group in the larger population using a random
(or systematic) sampling techniques.
The questionnaire was structured (closed-ended) and
contained the questions and alternative answers to them.
The answers provided for each question were exhaustive of
all possible responses and at the same time mutually
exclusive. The information and responses generated were
very easy to process, code, and analyze.
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Rate of Return
Out of one thousand, five hundred questionnaires, five
hundred and twenty responses were returned. The percentage
of returns in the questionnaire was good (34.7 percent).
However, 62 out of 64 individuals contacted agreed to a
direct interview. Therefore, a 96.9 percent rate of return
was achieved. There were no broken appointments, and this
is amazing especially in Nigeria where appointments for
research interviews are not taken seriously. Most
interviewees exhibited first-rate cooperation and
punctuality. The method of interviewee selection or what
determined who was asked to submit to an interview is
discussed in the last paragraph of the subtitle "The
Interview."
Coding Responses
The response of each question is coded according to a
scale ranging from agree (1) and disagree (2) to no opinion
(3). In essence, rather than punch an "agree," a "disagree"
or "no" response on a computer card (in most cases in
calculator), each answer is assigned a number. For example,
an agree response is equal to 1, disagree is equal to 2, and
no opinion equals 3. After this was done, an appropriate
number is punched on the card and calculator.
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Statistical Tests
This study did not make use of statistical tests of
significance or estimation procedures because the study is
exploratory and the sample size seems to be small by
statistical standards. However, this does not mean that the
findings will be discarded. Perhaps this is why it is more
useful to simply state the results in percentage tables,
generalize on the basis of them concerning party systems
that had operated in Nigeria, invite replication (the
repetition of this investigation in exactly the same way)
under different conditions. It is necessary to repeat here
that casting the net wide is in this case more important
than statistical significance since the study is
exploratory. Again, tests of significance are inappropriate
in this study because they are designed for hypothesis-
testing. Finally, the research decision to avoid
statistical tests was academic (the nature of the study and
the data) and not as a result of considerable disagreement
among social scientists over significance testing.
Validation of the Questionnaires
After the responses were obtained by means of the
questionnaires, a stratified sample of the respondents were
interviewed and their views and opinions on the same topics
covered in the questionnaires were obtained. This procedure
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was adopted in order to verify whether the instrument is
appropriate for measuring what it is intended to measure.
Therefore, the specific purpose of interviews in this
study is to cross-validate questionnaires and findings. It
helps the researcher in determining how adequately the
questionnaire has measured or achieved its objective.
However, one may raise the question of the suitability of
the interview data as criteria for the validity of
responses. The answer to this is to exercise caution.
After all, no procedure is fool-proof in social sciences.
The Interview
Although this personal interview (direct) was merely
for questionnaire validation, a brief discussion of its
procedure is necessary. This study used a schedule-
structured interview, with the same question asked of each
respondent in the same order. Even though standard ways of
rephrasing questions when necessary were developed and used
on rare occasions, the substance of the questions remained
the same. This technique helped the investigator to compare
one respondent with another with some degree of assurance
that their responses were elicited by the same stimulus.
Moreover, this helps to make sure that any variations that
occur between the responses can be attributed to the actual
differences between the respondents and not to the
variations in the interview or changes in the wording of the
questions.
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The interviewees were randomly selected from the
stratified sample of the entire Nigerian population where
the questionnaire respondents were drawn—the North, the
West, the East, the Northern and Southern minorities. A
half of the interviewees were randomly drawn from all the
subgroups within each of the five main groups and the rest
were systematically selected from every fifth questionnaire
respondent whose identity was revealed in one way or
another. All the subgroups in the five groups were equally
represented.
It is important to note that there are no significant
variations in the responses of both the interviewees and the
questionnaire respondents. These comparable responses show
that the instrument is effective and useful in evaluating
the impact of the two-party framework and in achieving the
entire goal or raison d'etre of the survey methods. There
are no differences in the responses of different subgroups
in each division or region. This shows that people feel or
reason according to their geographical location. Genger is
an exception.
Recording
Since most of the questions were closed-ended, the
researcher opted to record responses properly ranging from
agree to no opinion. The responses of the two open-ended
questions were recorded as nearly verbatim as possible
without making the respondents wait for uncomfortably long
42
periods. The purpose was to obtain the required information
in a complete and accurate form, and make the respondents
feel as relaxed as possible as well.
Interviewing Conditions
Interviews were held in all the five regions in which
the country was divided for the purpose of this study. With
the exceptions of few telephone calls and spausal
interjections, typical interviews which were held in
offices, colleges, bars, homes, market stores and places,
were uninterrupted. The desire of the researcher to be more
accommodating and to adapt to an interview situation in
which the respondent would be most comfortable informed the
decision to conduct these interviews under less than
desirable conditions. However, it must be quickly added
that most of these interviews were held under nearly ideal
circumstances with few interruptions, and with no one else
present except a translator when it was absolutely
necessary. Conditions for these interviews were comparable
to that of the questionnaire.
Almost without exception, the respondents were friendly
and cooperative regardless of the circumstances. Apart from
being generous with their time they also seemed pleased to
answer and discuss the questions openly and completely. The
mean amount of time spent in the interview was approximately




The questionnaire and interview schedule were pretested
on ten Nigerian visitors in the Atlanta areas. The visitors
were drawn from the five regions. This offered the
researcher an opportunity for free experimentation with the
questionnaire and the interview, exploration of various
orders and wordings of the questions, ways of approaching
respondents, and methods of recording their answers.
The researcher took two questionnaires and interviews,
revised them, took two more, and so forth, until a most
satisfactory questionnaire was assembled or developed.
Timing
The questionnaires and interviews were conducted
immediately after the presidential election on June 12,
1993. The post-election timing allowed the respondents to
reflect a bit on the pattern of political campaigns before
and during the presidential election in particular and the
level of violence, ethnicity, and political integration
throughout the Babangida's transition period. This helped
the respondents to recall their experiences and events
vividly. Additionally, the respondents were more at their
leisure and more relaxed than they would have been during
the electioneering campaigns and elections. However, it
must be added that the annullment of the June 12 1993,
presidential election on June 23, created a tense period
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which slightly affected the researcher's traveling schedules
and the mood of some interviewees.
Summary
Chapter I discussed the nature of the problem, specific
and substantive research questions, construction of social
explanations which go beyond telling what happened
(descriptive), but why or how it happened. It also dealt
with research methodology and strategies for achieving the
goal or raison d'etre of the study.
However, an important unresolved question in this
chapter is whether the attitudes of the Nigerian public have
a major causal effect on the establishment of favorable
democratic behavior such as voting across ethnic, regional
and religious lines, avoiding the use of political violence
and intimidation of political opponents as a vital
instrument for electoral success?
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
It is often said that research does not occur in a
vacuum. Since researches are built upon the works of
others, a review of literature automatically becomes an
integral part of the general setting of the problem under
investigation.
The Political Bureau simply noted the main arguments of
those in favor of the one-party system, namely that (1) it
does not dissipate energy, (ii) it provides avenue for
dissent without fear, (iii) its African version has
attracted respect in most African states, and above all,
(iv) it is inexpensive to operate.1 However, it reasoned
that the inherent dictatorial nature or tendencies of the
system (one-party system) would make it appear as "an
attempt by the military to perpetuate itself in power."2
The idea of one-party system was thrown overboard because it
could not accommodate the diverse socio-economic structures
of Nigeria. The Political Bureau's ground for the rejection
xThe Third Republic: White Paper for 1987-1992 (Enugu,




seems to be inadequate. To be precise, it is not convincing
since the two-party system it recommended, in the final
analysis, is not likely to accommodate this diversity. As
C.A. Leads has argued, "if the opinions of the people cannot
be adequately expressed through only one party, they cannot
be any more adequately expressed through two."3
One of the important questions posed about the
political structure in African countries is: "How can you
have democracy with a one-party system?" The answers are in
variety of forms but they follow two major patterns. They
include African defenders that argue it is possible and
Western and non-Western critics or antagonists who say it is
not possible.
The arguments used by African leaders and protagonists
in favor of the one-party system are based on both
theoretical, pragmatic, and historical grounds.4
Theoretically, protagonists claim that one political party
represents the will of all the people and encourages the
development of a sense of personal responsibility in
government by allowing mass participating in decision-making
process. In addition, it claims that "since it doesn't
3Quoted in Chikendu, 5. See also C.A. Leeds, Political
Studies (London: Macdonald and Evans, 1975), 128.
4Rupert Emerson and Martin Kilson (eds.), The Political
Awakening of Africa (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall
Inc., 1967), 105-106.
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represent only the interest of a particular group of
economic strata in the populace, it is basically more
democratic than the two party system."5 Madeira Keita puts
the point vividly in his article by stating that:
In the present historical situation in Africa
there is no need to multiply parties nor to
indulge in the luxury of a sterile and fratricidal
opposition. Since we were agreed on the
essentials and were pursuing the same objectives,
was there any reason to remain divided and split
into parties that rough one another.6
However, on the pragmatic side of the argument,
justification for the single-party system is derived from
the idea of an urgent need for a strong government to handle
the crisis that accompanied independence and wield the
nation together.7 The needs of economic development for the
well being of the populace are imperative and evident.
Since there is no dispute or argument about the goals,
African leaders claim, therefore the political parties
representing different points of view are superfluous.8 It
5Hanes Walton Jr., "Toward a Theory of Proving One-
Party Systems in Africa As Democratic: The Case of TANU,"
The Savannah State CoIIpop Bulletin, Faculty Research
Edition, Savannah, Ga., vol. 24, no. 2 (December 1970)- 55
See also Martin Kilson, "Authoritarian and Single-Party
Tendencies in African Politics," World Pol it-irs 25, 1963.
6Paul Sigmund (ed.), The Ideologies nf Developing
Nation (New York: Praeger, 1963), 170-82.
7Emerson, 105.
8Julius K. Nyerere, Democracy and the Party System (Dar
es Salaam: Tanganyika Standard Ltd., n.d.), 25-26.
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is important to point out here that people in a particular
country can have a consensus of opinion on goals but have
bitter disagreement on ways or methods of achieving them.
Finally, from a historical standpoint, it is asserted
that in traditional African society, politics was a
reflection of the communal interest as a whole and that most
African pre-colonial political systems provided methods for
limited popular participation in governance and political
decision-making.9 It is claimed that few African rulers, if
any, governed as autocrats; they were usually surrounded by
councils (sometimes referred to as Council of Ministers or
Elders) whose consent must be sought before any important
decisions could be made.10 The Oyo and Benin kingdoms1
political organizations in the nineteenth century provide
very good cases in point. Hanes Walton Jr. observes that
"in many instances, formal provisions were made for an
expression of popular opinion concerning the replacement of
a chief, or members of his council, who transgressed tribal
mores seriously."11 Alafin of Oyo empire is expected to
resign or commit suicide if he is presented with an empty
9M. Fortes and E. Evans-Pritchard, African Political




calabash to put his head. This signifies that his authority
is no longer recognized.
The proponents of one-party claim that in African
culture and traditions, the people sit and talk till they
agree.12 One anthropologist states that
I have never found it recorded...that the Council
of Elders or clan leaders settle important issues
by formal votes, with the will of the majority
prevailing. Evidently, the idea of basing a group
decision on a vote is not as self evident as we
usually assume or else it is incompatible with
other values in African cultures which are more
deeply entrenched.13
The African leaders (protagonists of one-party system)
therefore argue that Western-style two or multi-party and
parliamentary structure is basically a Western phenomenon
which conforms to its (Western) culture and traditions
without any roots in African society.14 In furtherance of
the above idea Julius Nyerere stated that it was imperative,
for the promotion of national unity, that the citizens
understand the institutions of the government in the new
state.15
12Nyerere, 1-2.
13Robert Grey, "Political Parties in New African
Nations: Anthropological View," Comparative Studies and
History 4, no. 4 (July 19, 1963): 451-2.
14Julius Nyerere, "Democracy and the Party System," in
Emerson and Kilson (eds.), 122-123.
15Julius Nyerere, Africa Report (July 1962): 5.
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On the contrary, Western critics of the one-party
system in Africa argue, that it does not promote democracy
and has given rise to dictatorships that proscribe the
formation and development of an opposition party.16
Furthermore they assert that democracy is not possible or
viable without a two or multi-party system.17 Taking this
point further, they argue that opposition parties in Africa,
where allowed to exist at all, are denied the opportunity to
play its traditional or rightful role as the continuing
critic of government policy.18 Therefore, be that as it may,
they hold single party in Africa responsible for the growing
political instability and disorder in Africa. Furthermore,
overthrowing the government by force is the avenue through
which the dissatisfied, disgruntled, and frustrated citizens
can vent their grievances each time the main party fails or
refuses to satisfy all sectors of the populace.19
16Martin Kilson, "Authoritarian and Single Party
Tendencies in Africa Politics," World Politics (January
1963): 263-294. This article isolates and analyzes five
causes of single party rule in Africa. Also see Hanes Walton
Jr.
17Ibid. For Herring's argument that democracy cannot
survive or thrive without two parties, see Pendleton
Herring, The Politics of Democracy (New York: W.W. Norton




The observations and arguments of both Western critics
and their African counterparts suffer from problems of
validity, objectivity, weak methodology, coherent and
systematic logic because their approaches are essentially
normative, value oriented, and superficial. In addition,
both approaches lack some type of general theory which is
sine quo non for any meaningful or fundamental understanding
of comparative politics. It is obvious that their
justifications and approaches leave the problem unresolved
and are not even directed to developing some type of general
theory of comparative politics in the first place.
Taking the African leaders' argument further, Samuel
Decalo in his article, "The Process, Prospects and
Constraints of Democratization in Africa" states that the
prime rationale for constraining political choice
to the day they were forced to concede
multipartyism is that competitive politics is an
imported luxury neither needed nor affordable in
developing countries, that in any case devise
other equally democratic structures (notably one-
party democracy), more suitable to their unique
circumstances.20
Samuel Decalo further pointed out that
a multiplicity of political parties merely
mirrors, even politicizes, existing social
cleavages (ethnic, clan, regional, religious)
since these are the most easily mobilizable
sources of political support and power in Africa,
while countries actually need unity and rapid
20Samuel Decalo, "The Process, Prospects and Constraints
of Democratization in Africa," African Aff.ir. 19, no. 362
(January 1992): 9. See also Kilson, p.
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development rather than Western-style liberal
democracy.21
The former president of Sierra Leone, Siaka Stevens once
referred to the multi-party system as "a system of...
institutionalized tribal and ethnic quintennial warfare
euphemistically known as elections (which) contributes an
open invitation to anarchy and disunity."22 As pointed out
earlier, Julius Nyerere holds and endorses the above view.
To him (Nyerere)
where there is one party, and that party is
identified with the nation as a whole, the
foundations of democracy are firmer than they can
ever be where you have two or more parties, each
representing only a section of the community.23
The extent of enthusiasm for the one-party system by
some African leaders was dramatized by Zimbabwe's president
Robert Mugabe, when he recommended the one-party system for
America to an incredulous United States Congress during a
state visit in early 1990s.24 This suggestion was made out
21Ibid., 9-10.
22West Africa. April 26, 1982. President Stevens
believed that economic and social development in Sierra
Leone had been slowed down by political problems and that
elimination of the "distraction of multi-party politics
would lead to progress." Stevens' All People's Congress
(APC) which entered office in 1968 overshadowed the Sierra
Leone People's Party (SLPP) and had been a de facto one-
party state since the early 1970s.
23Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity (Dar-es-Salaam,
Tanzania: Oxford University Press, 1966), 196.
24Decalo, p. 10.
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of his own conviction regarding the strengths of one party
system. But what he did not tell the American people was
the weaknesses of the system and whether it was in conflict
with their political culture that had worked for them
successfully since two hundred years ago. The major
function of opposition party seems to be a check on
arbitrary rule and possibly the replacement of that rule.
In discussing "types of party configurations in competitive
systems" Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner observe that
in competitive systems, parties struggle to maintain power
in a competitive atmosphere given what is theoretically and
legally possible.25 The "ins" struggle to maintain power
while the "outs" struggle to replace them and win power
without resorting to violence.26
The president of Malawi, Kamuzu Banda dismissed the
idea and objective of an opposition party on a false or at
least questionable religious premise that "there is no
opposition in Heaven. God himself does not want opposition—
that is why he chased Satan away. Why should Kamuzu
[President Banda] have opposition?"27 Banda's quasi-
25Joseph La-Palombra and Myron Weiner (eds.), Political
Parties and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1966), chapter 1.
26Ibid.
"Malawi News (Blantyre), December 20, 1964.
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theological rationale has collapsed under the present
political dispensation in Malawi.
Legitimate programmatic differences of opinion can
be accommodated within the single "national" party
where all streams of opinion and social groups are
represented. And even if a developmental-oriented
authoritarian system does ensue, the basis would
be laid for a better-endowed future generation
that could then partake of the current generations
forbidden fruits."28
Decalo observes that Julius Nyerere of Tanzania,
Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Felix Houphouet Boigny of Cote
d'lvoire have used the single party system as the means to
rule relatively benevolently; more harshly but still
responsibly by Kamuzu Banda of Malawi and Thomas Sankara of
Burkina Faso, and venally loot and plunder it as in the
cases of Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Samuel Doe of Liberia
and finally as a camouflage for personal or class tyranny
during the reign of Jean-Bedel Bokassa of Central Africa
Republic, Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia, and Macias
Nguema of Equatorial Guinea.29 Chudi P. Uwazurike rightly
observes in his article, "Confronting Potential Breakdown in
Africa: The Nigerian Re-Democratization Process in Critical
Perspective" that the single party system has almost
universally "degenerated into a form of oligarchic




Africa."30 This seems to contradict claims made by some
African defenders of the single-party system such as Julius
Nyerere that it is not only democratic but also congruent
with African traditions.
It is important to note here that Julius Nyerere, one
of the greatest champions of the one-party system modified
his views on political parties in early 1990 when there was
hardly any opposition to single party in Tanzania. In
January 1990, he pointed out that "Tanzanians should not be
dogmatic and think that a single party is God's wish"
especially one that "was not close to the people,
stagnating, losing vitality, and therefore needing
competition...to re-invigorate it."31 If one of the
functions of political party systems is to organize,
mobilize and educate the majority of all politically
relevant sectors of the population with the aim of nation-
building and democracy, the single-party system has achieved
little. But a pertinent question may be posed here--has the
multi-party system recorded more achievement in Africa? The
answer, of course, will not be in the affirmative. This
brings another question into focus, namely: which party-
30Chudi P. Uwazurike, "Confronting Potential Breakdown
in Africa: The Nigerian Re-Democratization Process in
Critical Perspective," Journal of Modern African Studies,
no. 28 (1990): 67.
31The New York Timpq, January 27, 1990.
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system possesses the greatest chance of achieving the goals
of political party? The answer will emerge as the study
progresses. But suffice it to say, at this stage that the
political party system in Africa is more or less an
instrument through which political actors realize their
personal goal of acquisition of wealth, prestige, power, and
access to the control of state's instrument of violence and
political structures. Nzongola-Ntalaja in his article "The
African Crisis: The Way Out," correctly observes that "...in
reality that party is everywhere a network through which
ambitious individuals strive to maximize their access to
state resources."32 In fact, since the 1980s most Africans
had started to regard one-party polity as a facade for
tyranny, dictatorship, above all a catalyst for private
enrichment.
Instead of making a positive contribution to the art of
democratic governance, the
hegemonic party-State became an autocratic
patrimonial state...that whether in military or in
civilian guise, whether capitalist or socialist in
official ideology seems detached from the vital
creative energies of African people and their
societies.33
32Nzongola-Ntalaja, "The African Crisis: The Way Out,"
African Studies Review, no. 32 (1989): 121-2. See also
"Africa: The Roots of Reform," African Confidential (July
27, 1990): 3.
33Quoted in "Needed: More Glasnost, " West Africa.
November 3, 1989.
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As authors continue to delve into the impact of one-party
system on African societies, authoritarianism seems to be
the common denominator and feature of most, if not all, one-
party states in Africa.
It produced presidential authoritarianism of
varying degrees of repression, and defacto
domination by whatever ethnic group possesses the
Presidency; it has been instrumental in plundering
the economy, directly or indirectly; it resulted
in disdain for civic and human rights, and with
few exceptions has paid minimal attention to
agrarian/rural populations; and the guiding party
has often to be an atrophied non-entity (Zaire,
CAR), a control mechanism (Benin, Congo), a
debating society (Malawi, Zambia) or a source of
patronage for lesser influentials (Kenya, Cote
d'lvoire, Togo). Presidential family cliques and
regional political barons--at times joined by
trusted soothsayers (Niger, Benin, Gabon, CAR,
Zaire) have often decided policies options
priorities.34
The single-party system has often been blamed for permitting
a small cabal of influential people to erode and destroy all
relics and semblance of accountability, legitimacy,
democracy, and justice in all the societies where it
operates. The multi-party system is also guilty of similar
charges. Nigeria's Second Republic is a case in point.
The Babangida's Political Bureau's reasons for the
choice of the two party system are rather scanty and not
compelling. It simply points out the main argument of the
34Decalo, 12. See also Peter Anyang Nyongo, "State and
Society in Kenya: The Disintegration of the Nationalist
Coalitions and the Rise of Presidential Authoritarianism,"
Africa Affair.^ no. 88 (1989) .
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proponents of a multi-party system such as making provision
for "freedom of association of groups and individuals in a
truly democratic society."35 The Bureau refuses to draw a
sharp distinction between a multi-party system and a two-
party system as an exercise in futility arguing that
"strictly speaking, a two-party system is a multi-party
system."36 However, its assertion that all favorable
arguments for multi-partyism also apply to two-partyism is
highly debatable.
The Bureau further notes, whatever the case may be, the
1976 Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) that made a
distinction between the two systems and opted for a multi
party system, "did concede that a two-party system would be
ideal for Nigeria and hoped that with time a two-party
system would emerge."37 However, the CDC did not support any
idea of imposing two-partyism on the country by
constitutional legislation. Rather, it would be allowed to
emerge through evolution and other historical processes just
as it did in most countries that operate the system. It
will be pointed out that two-partyism almost emerged in 1983
35Report of the Political Bureau, 126.
36Ibid.
37M.O. Maduegwu, "Democratic Mobilization: Problems and
Prospects of the Implementation of A Two-Party System in
Nigeria." A paper delivered at the 198 8 National Conference
of the Nigeria Political Science Association held at Ibadan
(Nigeria), June 26 to July 1, 1988, 6.
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when the progressive forces of the Unity Party of Nigeria
(UPN), the Nigerian People's Party (NPP), the People's
Redemption Party (PRP), and the Great Nigerian People's
Party (GNPP) united to form a political party, the People's
Progressive Party (PPP) that would contest that year's
general elections and wrestle the political power away from
the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). The idea was
jettisoned later. The question then why did it fail to
materialize? The reason is partly attributable to the
leadership tussle between the leader of the UPN, Chief
Obafemi Awolowo and that of the NPP, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe.
Additionally NPN committed a lot of energy to forestall the
emergence of such political force.
Babangida's administration constantly referred to the
ideology of left and right. In forming and decreeing the
two political parties he said "a little to the right and
little to the left." It seems that President Babangida's
decision to introduce two party system was informed by
Maurice Duverger's ideas in his book, Politiral p3rfip.q.
This author examines the effects of number of political
parties on the political system and writes:
Nonetheless the two-party system seems to
correspond to the nature of things, that is to say
that political choice usually takes the form of
the choice between two alternatives. A duality of
parties does not always exist, but almost always
there is a duality of tendencies. Every policy
implies a choice between two kinds of solutions:
the so-called compromise solutions lean one way or
the other. This is equivalent to saying that
center does not exist in politics. There may be
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well be a center party, but there is no center
tendency, no spot at which the moderates of
opposed tendencies meet: moderates of the right
and moderates of the left.38
It can be deduced that Duverger's ideas in the above
statements presuppose that competition is already
ideological, hence he speaks of parties in the sense of
"right" or "left." Is it appropriate to view the choice of
parties in terms of "right" or "left" in the Nigerian
society where the main distinction or tendency is between
Christian, Muslim and traditional religions and the major
ethnic groups that are differently motivated on the one
hand, and minority groups that are conscious of other ideas?
This does not thoroughly address the Nigerian situation.
However, this may apply to the societies, such as the United
States of America and Britain where there is an appreciable
size of informed middle class population on whom much of the
political activities devolve. This condition does not exist
or at least is not as developed as the societies mentioned
above, therefore it seems to be a square peg in a round
hole.
38Quoted in Orizu Nwokeji, "Two-Party System and
Political Mobilization in the Third Republic." A paper
delivered at the Nigeria Political Science Associations
Annual Conference held at University of Ibadan (Nigeria),
June 26 to July 1, 1988, 15. See also Maurice Duverger,
Political Parties. Their Organization and Activity in the
Modern State,, translated by Barbara and Robert North with
foreword by D.W. Brogan (London: New York, 1954), 215.
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Moreover, Duverger's universalization and assertion
that "every policy implies a choice between two kinds of
solution" obviously involves the logical fallacy of
excluding the "middle" or "center." This seems to view the
world as a black or white issue when in fact, especially in
Nigeria, it is not all black or white and other
possibilities are excluded. As Nwokeji points out "even if
ideology was to dominate politics, there can still be
genuine centerists, i.e. people who have choices clearly
different from the right or left."39 Aaron B. Wildavsky
writes a list of nine points of logical difficulties with
Duverger's theory in Political Parties.40
It is necessary to look at one example of the
fallacious problems in Duverger's method from Aaron
Wildavsky since Nigeria is a single-ballot simple-majority
country. He points out that the cases of Sweden and Denmark
where the dualism is not in existence or does not happen is
treated by Duverger as "deviations" from the general law.41
From Duverger's so-called general law, Nigeria would seem to
be one of the exceptions since its First and Second
39Nwokeji, 16.
40See Robert A. Dahl and Deane E. Neubauer (eds.),
Readings in Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1968), 44-48. See also David Apter




Republics could not produce two party system or dual
tendency. Rather it multiplied the tendencies to form more
political parties despite stringent conditions put in place
to forestall such occurrence. "Duverger even saw the same
party could be different in idea in different areas of the
same country."42 The above vitiated Duverger's proposition
badly and he queries: "How can a state in which the national
ideology differs in the same parties in different localities
convert back into the same uniform ideology nationally?
There seems to exist a strange problem here."43
Furthermore, it seems that where two ideologically
opposed political parties exist and no third "centrist"
possibility is permitted could nurture conditions for
"centrifugal" political drives and destroy the conditions
for "centripetal" tendency.44 According to Giovanni
Sartori's typology, the availability of centrist parties to
hold loyalties of centrists compel parties to the extremes
of right and left to moderate their policies to increase





45Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A
Framework for Analy^i? (London: Cambridge University Press,
1976), vol. 1, chapter 6, 131ff. Also see Ibid.
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On the other hand, the absence of centrist party or its
possibility makes it unnecessary for the two "left" and
"right" political parties to care about or look for
centrists since everyone must choose between "Red"
(Socialist-Communist) or "blue" (Capitalist-Conservative).
The argument that centrist party produces a moderating
influence on the political competition, while its absence in
the political system renders moderation unnecessary and
extreme tendencies more attractive. This submission is
informed by reasonings in Satori's analysis of "Polarised
Pluralisms."46 Two ideological poles without a center can
polarize the society that even the moderate citizen has no
way out and this appears to be a matter of great concern.
Before the imposition of the two-party system in 1989,
the apparent impossibility of crystalizing public opinion on
the various national issues into only two parties cast some
doubt about the prospects and efficacy of the two-party
system in Nigeria. However, the fear and doubt were removed
after the registration of party members and local government
elections in August and December, 1990, respectively, in the
then twenty-one states of the federation and Federal Capital
Territory. The two political parties appeared to be very
strong in representing all the ethnic groups, regions or
states, and religions. For electoral strengths of the two
46Ibid.
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strengths of the two political parties (See Table 2). The
President, Ibrahim Babangida who was so excited over the
results of the 1990 local government elections (according to
him), said that they had proved that the Nigerian dream of
establishing a stable democratic order was realizable.47
TABLE 1
CLAIMED PARTY MEMBERSHIP IN THE 21 STATES





































































Source: Daily Timpsr August 11, 1990, 1-2
47Paily Timq.s (Nigeria), December 14, 1990, 1.
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TABLE 2
LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION RESULTS IN




















































































































Total 206 2,562 231 2,934
Source: Daily Times, December 14, 1990, 1.
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To Giovanni Sartori a "dichotomous Gestalt" (using the
model essentially based on paired alternatives: Left-Right,
majority-opposition, movement-status-quo, and the like) is
no longer adequate to account for the case of extreme
pluralism.48 He uses another model and employs terms such as
bipolar, multipolar with an illustrative table (see Table 3
below).
TABLE 3
TYPES OF EUROPEAN PARTY SYSTEMS AND CRITERIA OF ANALYSIS
Party Systems Poles Polarity Drives
Simple Pluralism bipolar none centripetal
Moderate Pluralism bipolar small centripetal
Extreme Pluralism multipolar polarized centrifugal
Source: Robert A. Dahl and Deane E. Neubauer (eds.),
Readings in Modern Political Analysis (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1968), 117.
Bipolar means that the actual working of the party
system pivots around two poles (no matter whether the
parties are two, three, or four); for in this case the
system has no "center," no center pole. By multipolar I
mean that the party system pivots upon more than two poles,
48Giovanni Sartori, "European Political Parties: The
Case of Polarized Pluralism," in Robert Dahl and Deane E.
Neubauer (eds.), Readings in Modern Political Analysis
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1968), 116.
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for in this case the system has a center.49 In essence, the
poles and the distance between them are of paramount
importance. The system has a polarity when the spectrum of
political opinion is crystalized into two extremes (left and
right) that are literally "two poles apart." In such a
situation, the political system is confronted with
"polarized" party system. This is contrary to Duverger's
use of "polarization." To him (Duverger) it means
"bipolar."50 Sartori views and uses "polarized" as an
indicator of distance between the poles and further narrows
it down as an indicator of a
situation of lack of basic consensus in which the
distribution of opinions covers the maximum
conceivable distance and that the term does not
necessarily imply that the cleavage is
particularly intense for the intensity of the
cleavage may decrease and the cleavage (i.e., the
distance between the poles) remain: there is no
necessary synchronism between the two
occurrences .51
49Ibid., 117.
50Maurce Duverger, Les Partis Politiques (Paris: Armand
Colin, 1954), 279.
51Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of
Polarized Pluralism," p. 117. Sartori also employs
"polarity" and "polarized" to mean the idea of two things
that are symmetrically opposed or have opposite properties--
implying an idea of either strong opposition or extreme
distance. These qualities and properties do not belong to
two-party systems which are bipolar but not polarized.
Consensus at the level of government (or authorities)
is not basic consensus. Basic consensus is the congruence of
basic orientations such as values and attitudes at the level
of regime and/or of the political community.
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The drives of the polity must be taken into
consideration when analyzing party systems from this angle.
From Sartori's analysis, the bipolar systems are centripetal
and converge toward the center while multipolar are
centrifugal with a center pole but no centrality and
centripetal drive. "If a polity, besides lacking
centrality, also displays centrifugal trend--i.e., a process
which is one of the growing radicalization—then we may say
that polarization prevails over depolarization."52 In
essence, centripetal drive in a political system generates
moderate politics while immoderate or extremist politics is
a reflection of the prevalence of centrifugal drives. In
analyzing party systems, Sartori focuses on the number of
poles, the distance between their poles, and the centripetal
or centrifugal drives that emanate from their interactions.
Therefore, bipolar and multipolar tend to show how many are
the "pivotal points of the system."53 "Polarity" and
"polarized" are used as indicators of strong distance; and
"polarization" and "depolarization" are defined dynamically
to mean a centrifugal process towards disruption of basic
See also R.D. Hess, "Youth and Political System," in
Lipset and Lowenthal (eds.), Culture and Social Character




consensus and vice versa, a centripetal process toward
reunification of basic "consensus."
Using reasonings in Satori's analysis of extreme
pluralism one may argue that Nigeria's First and even Second
Republics qualify as multipolarized systems with centrifugal
drives and extreme pluralism. It is obvious that over the
course of time, centrifugal drives and forces have dominated
and as a matter of fact, prevailed over the centripetal
ones.
Many scholars in political science have written much in
support of the argument that number of the parties in a
polity determines the stability of that system. At prima
facie level, it seems that the most successful and effective
democratic governments have until recently had two-party
systems. As J.A. Corry points out in Elements of Democratic
Government, "The multiplicity of parties had a weakening
effect on the democracies of continental Europe and it is
not at all clear that democratic government will work
permanently where there are numerous parties of roughly
equal strength."54 Ferdinand A. Hermans' proposition of a
simple causal linear relationship between electoral systems
and the number of parties seems to constitute a sweeping
54J.A. Corry, Elements of Democratic Government (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 137-138.
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generalization.55 He seems to ignore or overlook the so-
called deviant cases of Sweden and Norway in his proposition
that election by proportional representation causes
instability.56 To take this point further, Mayer puts it
this way:
Simply stated, any of the commonly used forms of
proportional representation causes a multi-party
system which in turn causes political instability
in a parliamentary democracy. When the extent of
such instability reaches some unspecified level,
the political process becomes immobilized and
unable in Almondian terminology, to convert
demands into outputs. The resulting unrelieved
stress on the system is likely to bring about the
replacement of that system with one that is able
to act.57
If the electoral system could substantially lead to a
success or failure of a democratic government, instability
in Nigeria will be under control through social engineering
and manipulations. However, instability in Nigeria involves
more than that. The complex social cultural, and historical
factors are relatively less susceptible to conscious change.
In essence, the proposition that proportional
representation causes multiparty systems which, in turn
cause instability seems to withstand prima facie scrutiny on
55Ferdinand A. Hermans, Europe Under Democracy or
Anarchy (South Bend, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press,
1940). See also Lawrence C. Mayer, Comparative Political





a logical level. However, on empirical level the
relationships between number of parties and electoral system
on one hand and the stability and the number of parties on
the other starts to bump into methodological difficulty. It
is true that examples such as Weimar Germany, pre-war Italy,
and Third and Fourth French Republics support the
relationship but other successful democracies in Europe,
with multi-party system such as Denmark, Sweden, and Norway
are not accounted for. Other examples or "exceptions," to
borrow Duverger's word, exist in Europe. Moreover, it
should be noted that an increase in the number of parties is
not necessarily a result of proportional representation.
While the number of parties has remained stable and
manageable (only five parties) since the introduction of
proportional representation in Sweden, Canada that uses
Anglo-American electoral system has had four to five
important national political parties.
To Leslie Lipson, the two-party system in Britain is
not a product or function of specific procedural
arrangements or institutions but as a result of broader
socio-economic tendencies that cannot be consciously
designed or engineered.58 However, Professor Robert Fishman
58Leslie Lipson, "The Two Party System in Britain," The
American Political Science Review 47, no. 2 (June 1953) :
337-58. See also Leon Epstein, Political Parties in Western
Democracies (New York: Praeger, 1967), 60-61.
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observed in one of the seminars that "in Britain, the Social
Democrats/Liberal coalition would do far better in getting
representation in the House of Commons under P.R."59 In
essence, P.R. would assist the coalition in turning its
votes into more parliamentary seats.
Historically... reinforcing socioeconomic and
religious cleavages tended to bifurcate into
dichotomous alternatives. Thus, rather than
causing the two-party alignment, the plurality
electoral system reflects a tendency toward a
dichotomous cleavage that already existed in
British society.60
The above view is anchored on the already existing
dichotomous alignment on issues in Britain such as Cavaliers
versus Roundheads, monarch versus aristocracy, aristocracy
versus middle class, Anglicans versus dissenters before the
electoral system was institutionalized. While this
dichotomy in Britain, it would seem, strengthens Duverger's
idea of dualism, it is illogical to say that it was a
consequence or a function of the electoral system which came
after fact.
It seems that the degree of compromise necessary
to aggregate the diverse interests of a nation
into two parties is a function of social,
cultural, and historical circumstances. If there
exist minority interests that are so intensely
felt that they demand minority representation,
interests that are discriminated against by a
plurality system, then it is possible that either
59Robert Fishman, "Views on Electoral Systems and Party
Systems." This is his comment on the subject in the




the electoral system or the political system will
undergo substantial changes in response to the
stress generated by such repressed demands.61
The pertinent question at this juncture is whether a
political system with more than two segmental and intensely
felt cleavages would necessarily give rise to two-party
system if a plurality system is imposed or introduced? The
social, cultural and historical circumstances seem, to a
large extent, to be responsible for the provision of the
degree of compromise or consensus necessary or required to
aggregate the diverse interests of a nation into two
political parties or two channels of political
communication. Although Nigeria had used a plurality system
since independence its political system did neither
aggregate the diverse interests of its citizen into two
political parties nor crystalize their opinions into two.
Rather, it produced many antagonistic political parties in
defiance of the stringent measures and conditions put in
place to forestall such ugly development. However, as
pointed out earlier, efforts that were made to form two
political parties for electoral competition in 1965 and 1983
did not yield any meaningful results that endured for some
time. In essence, the electoral system did not determine
the number of political parties.
61 Ibid.
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After studying Norway, Harry Eckstein asserts that the
presence of strongly felt segmental cleavages that are so
resistant to aggregation that any particular party that
wants to reach a wide and diverse audience becomes one of
the weakest parties.62 One views with reservation and doubt
the ability of an electoral system alone to force these
cleavages to aggregate into two ideological amorphous
parties. Hermans finds it comfortable and reasonable to
reach an inference that proportional representation allows
and even nurtures existing cleavages in a society to the
extent that they are expressed in party system and will not
lead to development of more cleavages than already in
existence.63 Mayer concludes that "a proportional system
will faithfully reflect the existing cleavages, while a
plurality system will encourage a greater aggregation of
existing cleavages."64
Proportionality tends to radicalize parties.65
Under a plurality system a party must aggregate a
diverse body of followers to achieve any electoral
success, the party must moderate its platform to
62Harry Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), chapter 3,
especially p. 56.
"Ferdinand Hermans, "Democracy or Anarchy," The Review





appeal to this wider audience. However under the
proportional system a party is not faced with this
necessity. On contrary, such party is encouraged
to emphasize the small differences between it and
those parties ideologically adjacent to it."66
In a similar vein, Anthony Downs' reasoning:
attributes this tendency to the fact that since
parties cannot move ideologically past one another
nor attract votes from an adjacent party on one
side without losing just as many votes to the
party on the other side, their rational self-
interests lie in more completely mobilizing their
own faithful but narrow group of adherents.67
Logically, parties in proportional system are not forced to
aggregate diverse interests or points of view, therefore,
are more likely to keep their ideology pure and rigid.
The proposition that elections by proportional
representation causes instability is anchored, to a great
extent on the assumption that it (proportionality) leads to
proliferation of number of political parties to such an
extent that no party can get a majority. The support of a
stable majority in the lower house of legislature is the
basis of a stable parliamentary system of government. In
Nigeria's First Republic, no party obtained the required
majority to form the government. For pragmatic reasons, the
NPC and the NCNC formed a coalition government in order to
secure the majority in the parliament. This "marriage of
66Ibid., 222-223.
67Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New
York: Harper and Row, 1957), 126-27. See also Ibid.
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convenience" was so fragile that a crack developed in the
alliance soon after its formation. The intra-party crisis
within AG in 1962 and subsequent massive defection of AG
parliamenterians offered NPC a good opportunity to obtain
the absolute majority in the Federal House. This reduced
the importance of NCNC because NPC had no use anymore of its
coalition partner, the NCNC. To cut a long story short, the
majority in a parliament is a sine qua non of stability in
parliamentary system of government. It is rightly observed
that:
a stable parliamentary government clearly requires
the support of a stable majority in the lower
house of legislature inasmuch as the cabinet only
continues to govern at the sufferance of such
majority. Such majority must be sufficiently
disciplined to insulate the prime minister or
premier and his cabinet (thereafter referred to as
the government) from accountability to the
shifting day-to-day currents of public opinion,
thus affording them the discretion inherent in the
function of governing.68
The experience of Nigeria has shown that a government
formed by coalition of relatively autonomous political
parties was not always capable of securing or insuring the
majority support on which the government relied upon in
order to remain stable. From issue to issue, coalition
partners changed their allegiance and support. In essence,
support on which government depends in order to remain
stable or even successful in the business of interest
68Mayer, 223.
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articulation and aggregation, policy formulation and
execution is more reliable when one political party controls
a majority of seats in the legislature. This seems to imply
that there is a relationship between a government formed by
one political party that has secured a legislative majority
or dominated by a party that won a near majority in the
legislature and political stability in a parliamentary
system of government. If such relationship is empirically
tested and validated, the logic of two-party system would
obviously apply. However, this does not always mean that
political stability is guaranteed in two-party system devoid
of coalition or where one political party obtained
legislative majority. A case in point is Austria that
practiced largely a two-party system in its first Republic
(1919-1934) and failed to maintain political stability.
Moreover, political stability can equally exist in a
multi-party system that has a coalition of political parties
of relatively equal strength and importance in government.
To avoid contradiction and ensure clarity of direction, this
work will regard political stability in such a situation as
an exception rather than the rule. Cases in point are
Germany (1966-1969) and post-war Austria. In Germany, a
successful coalition existed from late 1966 until 1969
between the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Social
Democrats (SPD) which represented eighty to ninety percent
of German electorate. Similarly, Austria has been governed
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since 1947 by a coalition of Austrian Peoples Party and the
Socialists (SPO), which represent eighty-three to eighty-
nine percent of Austrian electorate.
The tendency for a stable coalition is stronger when
coalition parties are relatively equal in strength and
importance. This is so because it reduces the tendency and
temptation to label one coalition partner junior.
Naturally, unequal treatment tends to generate friction and
conflicts.
The important question at this juncture is not whether
obtaining a legislative majority enhances political
stability but whether the right type of political attitudes
that allow the political party leadership to play by the
rule are in existence in Nigeria-type political system where
political parties are regarded as the vanguards of different
ethnic groups and not as instruments of national integration
and unity. Therefore, it is difficult to say whether
Nigeria's First Republic would have been more stable if NPC
or any other political party had obtained a legislative
majority.
It is worthwhile to state here that the multi-party
system as practiced in Nigeria during the period [1960-1966]
was responsible for the inability of the political parties
to obtain legislative majority. There is no empirical
evidence that multipartyism or proportionality precludes the
possibility that one political party may, as a matter of
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fact, secure a legislative majority in a general election.
To be precise, in Sweden and Norway, the Social Democratic
Party and Labor Party respectively have won such legislative
majorities on several occasions.
It appears reasonable to tentatively infer that
compromises among large numbers of parties of
relatively weak but relatively equal strength will
be more unstable than coalitions among fewer
strong parties or coalitions dominated by one
party. This is a long way from stating with
Hermans that proportional representation
inexorably creates instability.69
It will be pointed out that Switzerland, which is governed
by a coalition of numerous small political parties, without
any dominant one portrays Switzerland as an exception to the
above proposition. Disagreement over how to process
divisive issues tend to weaken such cabinet in multi-party
system. Although fundamental differences may manifest
themselves in different forms, suffice it to say tentatively
or that it is likely that smaller nations have relatively
fewer divisive issues to process than bigger nations.
Therefore, smaller number of such issues to process offers
them the opportunity to be relatively stable with the luxury
of less efficient political structures.™ However, reverse
is the case in Nigeria where such divisive issues are so
numerous and deep-rooted in the hearts of Nigeria's
69Ibid., 224.
I"ultiPartVis™ ^ often associated with
^?"^181"is regarded as a
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Constitution Drafting Committee members. The sharing issue
disrupted the proceedings of the CDC in 1977 and the
weakness of multiparty legislature manifested itself in
paralysis and disagreement over how to process the divisive
issue of revenue allocation formulae. The issue of the
national question still pester pus and wound in the
Nigeria's body-politic.
Multi-party system in Nigeria, especially in the First
Republic when ethnic based political parties did not aim at
winning a majority. Because their main concern was to seek
and win the greatest electoral support from their limited
bases, they always accentuated the cleavages and interests
which made them different from other groups in the society.
This negated the party's function as an instrument of
national integration and nation-building. In this type of
situation, the role of a political party as a representative
of a particular group is set apart from the role of
integration of that group into the body-politic which
requires an emphasis on the similarities with other groups
and commitment to them.71
As Seymour Martin Lipset, a professor of Sociology at
Harvard University puts it:
71Ferdinand A. Hermans, The Representative Republic
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1958),
201.
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The small size of many parties and the absence of
a need in most multi-party systems for compromise
at the electoral level enhances the ideological
content of the conflict. This divisiveness
encouraged by a multi-party system is perpetuated
by a tendency of most parties to attack most
virulently those with whom they have most in
common and with whom they compete for a similar
vote. Thus magnifying the differences between
them.72
As far as multipartism is concerned in Nigeria, Lipset's
statement above is a square peg in a square hole, even
though one does not need the knowledge of an expert in
sociology or political science to know it. The names of the
political parties in First and Second Republic give a vivid
picture of their goals and aspirations. For example, names
like the Northern People's Congress, the Northern Elements
Progressive Union, and the United Middle Belt Congress say
their objective loud and clear.
On the contrary, he asserts that
the two-party system helps to maintain the
commitment of the entire electorate to the system
itself, rather than to particular party, since it
enables the discontented elector to impute
responsibility to the governing majority rather
than to the regime and to devote his efforts to
the quite legitimate task of replacing the
incumbents by their traditional opponents.. The
two party system works best where it is based on
an elaborate, cross-cutting solidarity structure,
72Seymour Martin Lipset, "Party Systems and the
Neub^r1(?nHOf,SOCial.GrOUpS'" in Robert DahlNeubauer (eds.), Readings in MnriPrn Pniitir,i
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc., 1968), 106.
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in which men and groups are pulled in different
directions by their diverse roles and interests.73
However, there are conditions that can hinder the operation
of two-partyism or at least, make it less conducive for the
preservation of democratic order and stability than a multi
party system. Rather than integrate the society, the two-
party system may intensify and magnify internal conflict if
the solidarity structure is polarized by religion, race,
class, and the political lines follow those of social
cleavages.74 The above proposition is debatable since such
conditions exist in Nigeria, yet election results and the
attitude of the electorate on election day did show those
danger signals that always accompanied elections in the
First and Second Republics. Even the conflicts in the
national and state assemblies that led to the impeachment of
their speakers had nothing to do with cleavages. The two
political parties did not appear to openly or officially
represent any cultural or ethnic unit or cleavage as
predicted by pundits.
Lipset attributes the failure of first Austrian
Republic to a two-party system and notes that
the first Austrian republic was largely a two-
party system, but one which was divided along the
interrelated lines of religion, class, and region.
The parties represented two almost completely




followed was a nearly inevitable consequence of
the system.75
In a similar vein, he asserts that Italy in the 1950s
contained conditions that were not conducive to democratic
order because the lines of division between Christian
Democrats and the left Socialist-Communist opposition are
more likely to decimate consensus than enhance it.76
Similarly, Gwendolen M. Carter observes that South African's
political parties, the Afrikaner Nationalists and English
United Party that are largely based on two ethnic groups are
destructive of national unity and democratic norms.77
In general, where the class struggle is superimposed
upon a conflict between religion and atheism, or between
different ethnic groups--wherever opposing groups see
elections as a fight between good and evil, so that
conversion from one political ideology to another is almost
impossible--a two-party system is more destructive of
75Ibid. See also Charles Gulick, Austria: From Habsburg
to Hitler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1948).
76Ibid.
77Gwendolen M. Carter, "The Commonwealth Overseas:
Variations on a British Theme," in S. Newmann (ed.), Modern
Political Parties (Chicago, 111.: University of Chicago
Press), 104. See also Gwendolen M. Carter, The Politics of
Inequality in South Africa Since 1948 (New York: Frederick
A. Praeger Inc., 1958). Also Lipset, 107.
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political stability than one in which center parties can
mediate between extreme opponents.78
Legitimacy is very important for party government,
national unity and democratic norms. Opposition parties
tend to be more constructive when they accord a certain
degree of legitimacy to the political party in power.
Similarly, the party in power must also be willing to regard
or at least view the other party as an acceptable
alternative government. Political parties under a two-party
system are more likely, because of their number to accord
each other a required degree of legitimacy and are more
likely to see each other an acceptable alternative
government than their counterparts in multiparty system.
Logically, then, one may argue strongly that the two-party
system nurtures good conditions for a more stable and
effective democratic polity than a multi-party one.
Political parties and their leaders have been bitterly
criticized for different reasons since their inception by
different political leaders in different political systems
at different periods. Yet all their criticisms share common
characteristics and themes which were most cogently and
eloquently expressed by the first United States of America's
president Washington when he warned of "the baneful effects
of the Spirit of Party" in the American-type political
78Lipset, 107.
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system. A political party, as far as George Washington is
concerned,
serves always to distract the Public Councils, and
enfeeble the Public administration. It agitates
the community with ill-founded jealousies and
false alarms, kindles the animosity of one part
against another, foments occasionally riot and
insurrection. It opens the doors to foreign
influence and corruption, which finds a
facilitated access to the Government itself
through the channels of party passions. Thus the
policy and will of one country are subjected to
the policy and will of another.79
As far as major charges levelled against political parties
in Nigeria today are concerned, Washington's remarks and
claims are perfectly in order. Political parties in
Nigeria's First, Second, and even "still-birth" Third
Republics pitted groups against one another and this split
the society against itself, sowed and nurtured seeds of
discord and magnified minor conflicts that could have been
easily insulated and absolved. As Ayub Khan observes
political parties "divide and confuse the people."80
Moreover, they have promoted and elevated corruption and
administrative inefficiency to virtuous status. Parties do
not only encourage political weakness and instability they
make the state very vulnerable to the penetration of foreign
powers and influence. As one leader in modernizing country
79Quoted in William J. Crotty and Others (eds.),
Political Parties and Political Behaviorr 2nd ed. (Boston:
Allyn and Bacon Inc.,1971), 103.
80Ibid.
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once said, "if freedom is given to party development, at
least one party will become the instrument of the CIA."81
Although above criticisms and observations are fair
characterizations of Nigerian political parties but they
seem to betray their objectives and the circumstances
surrounding their historical origin especially in early
phases of political party development and nationalism. In
1933, Dr. James Churchill Vaughan, Ernest Sisei Ikoli,
Samuel A. Akinsanya (Odemo of Ishara) bought Professor Eyo
Ita's ideas and formed the Lagos Youth Movement (LYM) and
changed its name in 1937 to Nigeria Youth Movement and
stated its mission to be
the development of a united nation out of the
conglomeration of the people who inhabit Nigeria.
It shall be our endeavor to encourage the fullest
play of all such forces as will serve to promote
understanding and a sense of common nationality
among the different elements in the country. We
will combat vigorously all such tendencies as
would jeopardize the unifying process.82
In essence, the early phases of political party activities
were aimed at eliminating colonialism and unifying different
groups in Nigeria. However, the extent of their
accomplishments in this regard is debatable.
Contrary to George Washington's charges against
parties, Samuel P. Huntington asserts that there are less




parties and that corruption, division, instability, and
susceptibility to outside influence are features,
characteristics, and symptoms of weak party system.83 This
does not in any way mean absence of corruption and other
banes. Rather,
parties may indeed furnish incentives to
corruption, but the development of a strong party
substitutes an institutionalized public interest
for fragmented private ones. In their early
stages of development parties appear as factions
and seemingly exacerbate conflict and disunion,
but as they develop strength parties become the
buckle which binds one social force to another and
which creates a basis for loyalty and identity
transcending more parochial groupings.84
Again, he (Huntington) argues that
by regularizing the procedures for leadership
succession and for the assimilation of new groups
into the political system, parties provide the
basis for stability and orderly change rather than
for instability.85
The reasoning seems to suggest that weak parties may
not only be susceptible to foreign powers but may indeed
become their tools and instruments, while strong political
parties furnish, to a large extent, the institutional
mechanisms or devices and defenses that shield and insulate
the political system against such external forces. To him,
"Samuel P. Huntington, PoliMrai nrder in
!tafia (New Haven' Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968),




the evils attributed to party are, in reality, the
attributes of a disorganized and fragmented
politics of clique and faction which prevails when
parties are nonexistent or still very weak. Their
cure lies in political organization; and in a
modernizing state political organization means
party organization.86
Strong political parties seem to be a very big asset to
political systems. A quick glance at the history of Nigeria
reveals that military dictators assumed the mantle of
leadership and outlawed political parties only when they had
become weakened or fragmented. Inter-party and intra-party
conflicts fragmented Nigerian society and paralyzed the
Nigerian republics, especially the First Republic.
President Shagari, Second Republic President, was gripped by
the fear of inter-party conflicts and lack of cooperation
among political parties. In calling for the cooperation of
legislators, he said, among other things that the First
Republic collapsed "largely as a result of the incongenial
atmosphere engendered by the uncompromising stance adopted
by the political parties of the First Republic."87 He
therefore urged the legislators to subjugate their
"political and other differences to the unrelenting pursuit
of peace, unity and progress of our northerland.88
86Ibid., 406.
87J. B. Olawale, Topics on Government Constitutions:




It will be noted here that it is very fashionable for
Nigerian party leaders to say one thing and do the opposite.
After the controversial NPN victory in 1979, President
Shagari invited other political parties to join what may be
called an all-party coalition. While the Unity Party of
Nigeria, the Great Nigerian People's Party, and the People's
Redemption Party declined, the Nigeria People's Party
accepted the offer. Ladipo Ademokelun claims that the
National Party of Nigeria made the offer because it was in
search of "consensus politics."89 The Nigerian experience of
political party coalitions, namely NPC/NCNC (1959-64), the
NPC/UPP (1964-66), and the NPN/NPP (1979-82) were all grand
designs and pragmatic moves to gain power, legitimacy, gain
a firmer hold on power, and weaken other political parties.
The coalition period that most agreed with Ademoleku's
thesis of search for consensus politics is the NPN/NPP
(1979-82) era. However, subsequent utterances of NPN
leaders manifested the NPN's ulterior motives of weakening
or even destroying other party or parties. Nwokeji points
out that Shagari's statement that he preferred a development
in which his party grew progressively stronger while others
grew progressively weaker makes it seem as if the proposed
consensus was a veil behind which the autonomy of the other
89Ladipo Ademokelun, The Fall of the Second Republic
(Ibadan, Nigeria: Spectrum Books, 1985), 11.
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parties could be held in check. Certainly, neither the NPN,
nor other parties behaved like consensus political parties
during the 1983 election.90
The political behavior of party leaders in government
tends to exacerbate inter-party and intra-party conflicts.
In essence, the intimidation of political parties by the
party in power is very destructive to the political system
because it sends the danger and warning signals to other
parties that access to legitimate means of power acquisition
is only granted to party in power. To be precise, the
suppression of political parties increases the fragility of
civilian regimes in Nigeria, especially when processes of
modernization are progressing. When the political party in
power intimidates and blocks the access to the legitimate
means of gaining political power and other opportunity
structures of the society, the oppressed opposition parties
are likely to resort to violence and other extra-legal
means. This means that the rate of deviant and disruptive
political behavior is higher in situations where opponents
have little chance of achieving their political ambitions
through legitimate means and when other conforming
opportunities are not available. As Huntington points out
the more hostile a government is toward political
parties in a modernizing society, however, the
greater the probably future instability of that
society. Military coups are far more frequent in
90Nwokeji, 11.
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no-party states than in any other type of
political system. A partyless regime is a
conservative regime; an antiparty regime is a
reactionary regime.91
Generally speaking, it is true that the character and
nature of relationship among political parties impact the
susceptibility of political system to military intervention
and level of stability but it is important to note that, as
the events in Nigeria have shown, the stability of Nigeria
is, to a certain degree, dependent on the strength of the
political parties. The strength of the party is measured
here by the extent it has attained in the
institutionalization of mass support across ethnic and
regional lines. Therefore, the strength of political
parties must reflect the degree of such support and the
scope of institutionalization. A quick look at some
relatively stable modernizing societies will reveal the
importance of, at least, one strong party in a political
system (see Table 4).
91Huntington, 407-408. See also Robert K. Merton, Social
Theory and Social Structure, rev. and enl. ed. (New York:
Free Press, 1968), Chapters 6 and 7. Merton explains that
the discrepancy between what people want and what they can





















































(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), 421.
The modernizing countries which achieve high
levels of actual and presumptive political
stability possess at least one strong political
party. Congress, Neo-Destour, Acci6n Democratica,
Partido Revolucionario Institucional, Mapai,
Pardido Popular Democratico, Republican People's
Party, Tanu: each was at one time a model of
effective political organization in a modernizing
society.92
To strengthen and lend credence to the thesis that the
stability of a modernizing political system is dependent on




the differences in political stability between
India and Pakistan in the 1950s were measured by
the differences in organizational strength between
the Congress Party and the Moslem League. The
differences in political stability between North
and South Vietnam during the decade after Geneva
were measured by the differences in organizational
strength between the Lao Dong Party, on the one
hand, and the Dai Viet, VNQDD, and Can Lao on the
other hand. The differences in Arab World between
Tunisia, on the one hand, and the eastern
Mediterranean, on the other, were in large measure
the difference between the broad scope and high
institutionalization of Neo-Destour and the high
institutionalization but narrow scope of the
Ba'ath.93
The incidence of military involvement in the politics
of Turkey and Mexico seemed to decline when they (Turkey and
Mexico) developed strong political parties. A quick look at
each political situation in which the Nigerian army took
over power from the civilian will reveal a decline in party
strength and mass support, and the fragmentation of the
leadership characterized by proliferation of political
splinter groups, leadership tussle, and large scale intra-
and inter-party conflicts. This type of political situation
had always provided the opportunity for the army to say "let
us nip the problem in the bud and sanitize, revamp the
economy, and rescue the down-trodden masses." The most
recent case in point was the period after the nullification
of the June 12 election in Nigeria. The leadership of the
parties was fragmented and cliques that developed within the
parties (some opposed and some supported the annulment of
93Ibid.
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June 12 election) weakened the parties and their "grass-
root" support.
During the 1992 presidential nomination exercise, the
leadership of the parties was in such disarray that most
"losing" candidates came together and begged President
Babangida to intervene and nullify the results of the
nomination. In the SDP, twenty-two out of the twenty-three
presidential candidates were not ready to accept the
results. President Babangida's intervention and subsequent
nullification of the result and postponement of the hand
over date was, in essence, a reflection of the wishes of the
majority of the presidential candidates and the
deterioration which they engineered. The weakness of the
political parties always diminish their ability to challenge
the armed forces and the police. The refusal of some
senators and members of the House of Representatives to
vacate the National Assembly building could not be regarded
as an adequate challenge that would have aborted the
November 17, 1993 coup led by General Sani Abacha.
Samuel Huntington has strongly argued that
the decline in party strength, the fragmentation
of leadership, the evaporation of mass support,
the decay of organizational structure, the shift
of political leaders from party to bureaucracy,
the rise of personalism, all herald the moment
when colonels occupy the capitol.94
94Ibid., 409.
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To him, military coups are not responsible for the
destruction of political parties, rather "they ratify the
deterioration which has already occurred."95 Another case in
point was the decline in Juan Bosch's party strength after
the elections in which he emerged as a president. The
party, which started to disintegrate immediately after the
election, could not offer any resistance or challenge to the
armed forces and policy. Additionally, Edwin Lieuwen in his
book, General vs. Presidents, observes that most of the PRD
leaders, it seems, had become bureaucrats, occupying
themselves with technical and administrative functions
essential to the reform program.96
Political systems without strong political parties are
less likely to control and contain social forces which are
capable of generating symptoms of political instability such
as violence and rioting than political systems with strong
political parties.
After World War II, most modernizing societies, with
the exception of the communist ones, lacked both strong
party systems and strong political parties. With major
exceptions of several Latin American parties and the
Congress Party in India, most other political parties could
95Ibid.
96Edwin Lieuwen, Generals vs. Presidents (New York:
Praeger, 1964), 61.
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not demonstrate any real adaptability and institutionaliza-
tion because they were not only too young but also were then
led by their founders who more often than not claimed both
the ownership and leadership. This seemed to be responsible
for the inabilities of the parties to perform and attract
followers on a nationwide basis especially in Nigeria.
The ability of political parties to survive their
founders or charismatic leaders who first led or brought
them to power is one of the principal ways of measuring
their institutional strength. The institutional strength of
a party can also be measured by its ability to survive or
withstand desertion of the principal members and their
opposition. A case in point was Mapai after the desertion
and active opposition of Ben Gurion. Therefore, the Mapai's
institutional strength at that point, could be measured by
the fact that it survived and withstood the desertion and
active opposition of Ben Gurion. This was a classical case
where a political party was stronger than its leader.
Conversely, Munoz Marin of Puerto Rico who had wanted
to promote the institutional growth of PPD consciously chose
making public utterances that were capable of strengthening
the party. This was in contrast to what Ben Gurion did in
Israel. Marin also retired from the leadership of the PPD.
The New York Times quotes him as saying:
the election was a beginning.... I've begun to
prove that the island can get along without me.
The people will get used to the idea of an
institutionalized party and they will learn to
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work with Sanchez just as they have worked with
me.97
In contrast, weak political parties are often dependent
on their leaders for success and longevity. While the
deaths of Patel and Gandhi did not give any deadly blow to
the success and longevity of Congress Party, the deaths of
Senanayake in Sri Lanka (Ceylon), of Jinnah and Ali Khan in
Pakistan, and of Aung San in Burma hastened the
disintegration of their political parties. Similarly, the
imprisonment of Obafemi Awolowo and the death of Aminu Kano
in Nigeria in 1963 and 1982 respectively had such effect on
their political parties. However, it will be pointed out
here that Barkin Zuwo narrowly won the 1983 gubernatorial
election in 1983 under PRP in Kano state that was supposed
to be PRP stronghold. On the other hand, the
adaptability of the Congress Party was reflected
in its changing leadership from Banerjea and
Besant to Gokhale and Tifak to Gandhi and Nehru.
Similarly, the shift in leadership from Calles to
Cardenas set the National Revolutionary Party on
the road to successful institutionalization,
signaled by its subsequent change in name to the
Institutional Revolutionary Party.98
97Luis Munoz Marin, New York Times, Dec. 27, 1964, 43.
98Huntington, 609. He includes the depth and complexity
of party organization as shown by linkages between the party
and socio-economic organizations such as peasant associa
tions and labor unions. Such linkages broaden the appeal and
bolster the organization of the major political parties. The
countries where such linkages can be found include: Tunisia,
Morocco, Venezuela, India, Israel, Mexico, Jamaica, Peru and
Chile. To him, another aspect of party strength relates to
the extent power seekers and political activists identify
98
A negative correlation seems to exist between the
strength of political parties (independent variable) and
political stability and the susceptibility of the political
system to disruptive activity such as military intervention
(dependent variable). It is so because a rise or an
increase in the strength of party (.A) is accompanied by a
decrease in political instability .B or .A (strength) is
inversely proportional to .B (instability or military coup)
which means that when the quantity and quality (values) of
.A increase, that of .B will go in opposite direction. This
can be mathematically
represented by law of inverse variation: A a 1 which is the
B
with the party and the degree to which they regard the party
as an instrument through which other ends can be achieved.
However, it should be noted Huntington's second aspect
of party strength, that is, party's organizational
complexity and depth as revealed by the linkages between the
party and socio-economic organizations are weak attributes
of party strength. By his standard, major Nigerian political
parties met that requirement. William J. Foltz makes this
observation about nationalist party in most African
countries: The party "was generally well organized. The
conditions of the political struggle and dedication of the
top elite to the party as the prime instrument of political
change led the elite to give the major portion of their
energies and resources to building a solid, responsive
organization capable of disciplined action in response to
directives from the top and able to ferret out and exploit
feelings of dissatisfaction among the masses for political
ends." See William J. Foltz, "Building the Newest Nations:
Short-Run Strategies and Long-Run Problems," in Karl W.
Deutsh and William J. Foltz (eds.), Nation-Building (New
York: Atherton Press, 1963), 121. However, an argument can
be made that dominant political parties were weakened after
independence by competing demands on organizational
resources.
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same thing as A is equal to K where k is constant. Assuming
values are assigned to political parties according to their
strength ranging from high to low levels as follow:
1. High level strength (HLS) = 16
2. Middle level strength (MLS) =10
3. Low level strength (LLS) = 4
A represents the three levels and 4 is the value of K which
is constant. The values .25, .4, and 1 represent high,






































From the above, one can deduce that as the strength of
parties decreases, the incidence of political instability
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increases. HLS gives .25, MLS gives .4, and LLS gives 1.
Although Samuel Huntington does not quantify his
variables with the type of precision that makes measurement
and evaluation more accurate, his analysis and examples
above suggest there is a strong relationship between the
variables (strong political parties and political
stability), therefore, it should be very close to -1.0
(negative correlation). However, negative correlation
should never be taken as a proof of cause-and-effeet
relationship because another meticulous or conscientious
researcher may look for other variables such as world
opinion or attitudes toward democracy, dictatorship, and
military intervention in the relationship. It may turn out
that the unfavorable world opinion and attitude toward
military regimes which in turn affect the willingness of the
military to intervene in the governance even when the
political parties are not strong to present any meaningful
challenge and resistance to the police and armed forces.
Since this affects the rate at which military intervene in
politics, the cause-and-effeet relationship between
independent variable .A (strength of political parties) and
dependent variable .B (instability and military intervention
in politics) when variable .C (world opinion and attitude
against military intervention) is introduced may no longer
reach -1.0.
101
It should be pointed out that in a unipolar world, the
whole idea of a causal relationship between strong party and
political stability, however valuable it may be for
understanding past politics has only a limited predictive
value. After all, human behavior is so complex that it is
always difficult to pinpoint cause and effect precisely.
However, it may still be used or proposed as a useful tool
or guide for the analysis of earlier modernizing societies.
Suffice it to say, that at the very least, the growing
understanding of the political process should admonish
political historians, that particular elections or stability
must be understood in terms of their place in a gradually
fluctuating balance of party strength, pattern of party
identifications, and the focus of attention on the processes
by which party identifications are molded and by which they
are changed during realignment phases or stages, the impact
of world opinion or attitude and the level of economic
development or the rate at which the regimes help meet the
aspirations of the entire population.
One important aspect of democracy is popular
participation—a cornerstone of democracy. To be precise,
participation is an essential and indispensable element of
democratic politics even though it has to be combined with
representation because decision makers will, by necessity
always be few. Nevertheless, through representation and
citizen participation in the political process, the diverse
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views of political community can and do become inputs into
the decision-making machinery. Moderate diffusion of power
in a political community is also necessary for
representation and citizen's participation in a modern
democratic political setting. Therefore, party-systems
should aspire to expand the citizen political participation
and recognize and accept new groups.
It has been observed that:
a strong political party system has the
capability, first, to expand participation through
the system and thus to preempt or to divert anomic
or revolutionary political activity, and second,
to moderate and channel the participation of newly
mobilized groups in such a manner as not to
disrupt the system."
In essence, any party system that provides avenues,
procedures and institutionalized organizations for the
assimilation and accommodation of new groups into the system
can be regarded as strong. In terms of political
development, the strength and adaptability of the party
system count rather than the number of parties and the
precondition or prerequisite of political stability is the
capability of party system in assimilating the new social
forces which arose as a result of modernization processes.100
"Huntington, 412.
100Ibid., 412-413. Huntington also measures the
adaptability of a party system with the average age of its
constituent parties. This means that the higher the average
age of the parties, presumably the more institutionalized
and stable the party system is. Generally, under a multipaty
system, the average age of the principal parties is lower
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It should be stated clearly here that assimilation that
is not accompanied with equal access to the opportunity
structures of the party or society is bound to decimate the
strength and adaptability of the party system rather than
enhance them. A party system may accept or admit new social
groups or forces but systematically or subtly deny them the
access to vital opportunity structures of the society.
Therefore, it is not entirely true that party systems
capability in assimilating new social forces and groups is
the precondition for political stability.
It is now clear, by Huntington's viewpoint, measurement
and evaluation that what counts is the strength and
adaptability of the system rather than the number of
political parties in modfrnizing societies. This brings an
important question of possible relationships, if any,
between party strength and number of political parties in
modernizing societies into focus. Huntington's table shows
that weak and strong parties may exist in different party
system on global basis and Table 4 is a good illustration.101
In essence, a minimal relationship seems to exist between
party number and party strength.
Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor's Table on party
stability and party number (see Table 5) apparently confirms




the impressionistic classification of Table 4 above by
showing the impact of the party number on party stability.102
The political dispensation and military coups that
accompanied some African states immediately after their
independence in 1960s appear to weaken their tables and
their validity because of the absence of unstable one-party
systems.
Although, at least at this stage, there is no visible
and obvious evidence of important correlation between party
number and party strength, the result may change when
another variable (degree of modernization) is introduced.
While any number of party may be compatible with strong
parties at high levels of modernization, one-party systems
may be weak or strong at lower levels of modernization and
multiparty systems are invariably weak.103 Banks and Textor
table depicts eleven stable multiparty systems such as
Israel and ten Western European countries and Costa Rica and
Italy are the two moderately stable multiparty systems. One
country each from the Middle East and Africa, nine from
Latin America, and two from Asia represent the thirteen
unstable multiparty systems. This shows that multiparty
systems do not produce political stability in any
102Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, A Cross-Polity
Survey (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1963), 97-87, 101.
103Huntington, 421-422.
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modernizing societies with the questionable exception of
Israel.
All the tables tend to point in one direction: that
one-party systems tend to be more stable in modernizing
societies than pluralistic party systems and that multiparty
systems are much more susceptible to military intervention
in modernizing societies with one party or with two parties
(see Tables 5 and 6) .10*
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Source: Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, A Croa.-PnH
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The figures in Table 6 also tend to confirm the inverse
relationship between number of parties and political
stability even though a one-party system is no guarantee
against a military intervention. See also Table 7.
It should be noted that the stability of a one-party
system sometimes is traced to its origins rather than its
character.
It is usually the product of nationalist or
revolutionary struggle which stimulates extensive
mobilization and institutionalization. Once the
struggle is won, however, the strong party which
emerges creates a one-party system, which in turn,
removes or eliminates the conditions for its own
success. The continuing stability of the system
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Source: Fred R. von der Mehden, Politics of the Developing
Nations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1964), p. 65.
As the struggle for power intensifies and prolongs, the
ideological commitment becomes deeper and this increases the
political stability of the one party system which is
subsequently created.106 Revolution tends to produce a more
stable one-party system that is derived from a prolonged
nationalist movement and struggle and is more stable than
the one produced by nationalist struggles movements that are
brief and easy. As Huntington puts it, "in general, indeed,
the longer a nationalist party fought for independence, the
106Ibid.
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longer it was able to enjoy the power that came with
independence."107 TANU and its predecessor had a 32-year
history when Tanganyika became independent, the Congress
Party was 62 years only when India became independent, Mapai
was 18 years old when the state of Israel was created, and
these parties were able to enjoy some vitality years after
independence. On the contrary, as Emerson has pointed out
that many African countries got their independence so easily
and that were "cheated of their revolution."108 In essence,
it means that they (Africans) were denied the benefits that
accrue from revolution.
The political party, as one of the agents, of political
socialization, is supposed to play a vital role in promoting
national integration especially in a Nigerian-type society
where many diverse ethnic and religious groups were brought
together by British colonialism and the difficulty has been
to find a means of binding them together to form a cohesive
nation. In these circumstances, the nationalist parties
that were formed to wrestle power away from the colonial
masters would have logically provided good leadership in
merging the discordant elements into a coherent whole with a
predominant political culture with little or no deviant




to satisfy certain cultural aspirations.109 Unfortunately,
Nigerian political parties especially in the First and
Second Republics failed in this respect and served instead
as the vanguards for their ethnic groups.
Rupert Emerson points out that:
on several counts the task of African parties in
promoting national integration in particular is
both more difficult and more necessary than it
would be in any other major part of the world.
Achieving independence with a lower and less
stable level of national integration within the
existing political units than is generally to be
found elsewhere, all the African countries south
of the Sahara area in grave need of forces which
can actively promote their unit. In a number of
these countries, political parties have played a
central and invaluable role in speeding and
consolidating the processes of political
integration, although it must also be recorded
that in some instances parties have impeded rather
than advanced integration, notably where their
guiding star was tribalism rather than
nationalism--a term whose specific meaning is
always to be examined with a skeptical eye in the
African context.110
The intractable problems of ethnicity and ethnic
politics are the most evident and omnipresent divisive
forces in Nigeria. Even though some Nigerian leaders use
them as instruments for achieving individual political
ambition, they are still regarded as a double threat to the
kind of nation they seek to build. Additionally,
109Ibid., 425.
110Rupert Emerson, "Nation Building in Africa," in Karl
W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz (eds.), Nation Building (New
York: Atherton Press, 1963), 110-111.
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where the new dominant elites want to modernize
their societies in order to establish nations on
terms of equality with those of the advanced world
the pressures of tribalism and of the chiefs tend
to be in the direction of a defense and
perpetuation of the traditional order.111
When the above situation is understood, the political
behavior and electoral outcomes in Africa can be easily
conjectured. After surveying the African elections in
detail, W.J.M. Mackenzie concludes that all African
political parties tend to become "tribal" parties and that
"if tribalism is the enemy, elections are partly responsible
for encouraging it."112 Taking this point further, Donald L.
Horowitz contends that various generations of party systems
in Africa starting from independence to date have tended to
reflect the pressures towards the ethnicization,
regionalization, and patrimonialization of power.113 The net
result, with a few exceptions has been that
political parties have generally been fragile,
shallow, and weak, subsequently prone to
factionalization; and even where parties have
elicited greater popular involvement, they have
tended to reflect ethnic and regional
niNigeria seeks a national integration which rests upon
the continuing and basic fact of ethnic diversity or what is
often referred to as "unity in diversity."
112W.J.M. Mackenzie and Kenneth E. Robinson (eds.), Five
Elections in Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), 484.
113 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 291 and
312. See also Crawford Young, "Beyond Patrimonial Autocracy:
The African Challenge" in Beyond Autocracy in Africa
(Atlanta: The Carter Center, 1989), 23-24.
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particularities too closely to provide a fresh,
cross cutting basis for political conflict.114
In Nigeria's situation, these tendencies have been
exacerbated by rash military interventions which started on
January 15, 1966. As things are, one does not need an
expert in social sciences to know that such coups and
counter-coups have considerably depreciated and squandered
the political infra-structure leading to redemocratiza-
tion.115 The method of recruitment into such regime reflects
narrow ethnic, regional, and religious constituencies. This
exacerbates the primordial cleavages and jeopardizes the
social bases of the emerging democratic process.116 How will
the problem of ethnicization of power, party and politics be
solved? Can truly multi-ethnic political parties ever
emerged in Nigeria? What happened in Nigeria during the
short period two-partyism was practiced shows that the above
goals are probably realizable if the army is patient enough
114Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, 19.
115Oyeleye Oyediran and Adigun Agbaje, "Two-Partyism and
Democratic Transition in Nigeria," Journal of Modern African
Studies 29, no. 2 (1991): 217. See also S.E. Finer, The Man
on Horseback (London: Allen Lane, 1962) and J. B. Londregan
and K. Poole, "Poverty, the Coup Trap and the Seizure of
State Power," World Politics (January 1990): 152.
116See Adigun Agbaje, "Travails of the Secular State:
Religion, Politics and the Outlook on Nigeria's Third
Republic," Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics
(London) 28, no. 3 (November 1990): 288-308.
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to allow the process of political evolution to take its full
course.
In a similar vein Diamond has rightly observed that
Nigeria's Second Republic, and even to a limited degree,
First Republic had started gradually to evolve truly multi
ethnic political organizations through the process of
bargaining and haggling between and within political parties
when military intervention terminated the process and
progress.117 To appropriate Claude Ake's argument in a
different although in related context the relationship
between democracy and party plurality on the one hand and
existence of deep cultural and social cleavages on the other
is not necessarily antithetical:
the whole question of democracy implies precisely
the assumption of differences to be negotiated, to
be conciliated, to be moved into phases of higher
synthesis. If democracy means anything at all, as
a form of relationship that is precisely what it
means. If there is social pluralism, that is in
fact an argument for a democratic form of
governance.118
See a brief discussion on the political evolution process of
multi-ethnic political party in the Second Republic.
117Larry Diamond, "Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict," The
Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 21 (March 1987) :
127.
118Claude Ake, "The Case for Democracy" in African
Governance in the 1990s (Atlanta: The Carter Center, 1990),
4.
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As stated earlier, the extent of disillusionment with
party politics was so great that the former head of state,
Murtala Mohammed charged the CDC with the responsibility of
finding a means to form a government without political
parties.119 Nigerian party politics is in a profound
dilemma. It may be difficult for democracy to flourish
without political parties but it is becoming more difficult
for government to function well in Nigeria in presence of
ethnic-based parties because of their inability to get along
well. Lucian W. Pye has rightly pointed out that
"historically the introduction of political parties has
seemingly created as many problems as it has solved."120
In his determination, according to former Nigerian
president, General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, to leave for
posterity a New Nigeria of his dream, decreed into existence
two "grassroot-oriented" political parties under the legal
auspices of Decree 27 of 1989. The creation of the two
parties SDP and NRC in place of thirteen disqualified by the
AFRC attracted mixed reactions from Nigerians of all walks
of life, including a number of knowledgable critics who
maintained that such action (creation of two parties) could
119Report of the Constitution Drafting Committee, xiii.
120Lucian W. Pye, "Party Systems and National
Development in Asia" in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner
(eds.), Political Parties and Political Development
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), 369.
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jeopardize the overall search for sustainable democracy
during the transition and beyond.121 Fearing the negative
impact of extreme social engineering, Richard Joseph of
Emory University, an expert in Nigeria government and
politics, says that:
the twists and turns that President Babangida has
introduced during his five years in office have
left most observers unwilling to affirm that the
new two-party, fostered from above, has a
realistic chance of succeeding. Extreme political
engineering in Nigeria by a military junta is
beginning to raise doubts about whether it can
eventually lead to the creation of a stable and
democratic political system.122
While many non-partisan critics viewed it as a welcome
development and political innovation that could help put a
final stop to money politics and open fraternizaton between
newbreed and banned oldbreed politicians, others saw the
government action as nothing but an experiment that was
doomed to fail because of certain obvious handicaps that
would attend to its implementation.123 Many oldbreed
politicians predicated their opinion that the experiment
121Odia Ofeimun, "Democracy by Fiat," West Africa
(London) (December 18-24, 1989): 2091-3. See also Anthony A.
Akinola, "A Critique of Nigeria's Proposed Two-Party
System," Journal of Modern African Studies, no. 27 (March
1989): 109-23.
122Richard Joseph, "The Challenge of Democratization in
Africa," in African Governance in the 1990s (Atlanta: The
Carter Center, 1990), 18.
123Mike Ebonugwo, "Democracy According to IBB," Platform
(Nigeria) (October 1991): 12.
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would spell a dangerous trend in North-South politics on the
conviction that the creation of two parties would further
widen the North-South dichotomy as each region would be
tempted to pledge allegiance to one of the parties.124 It is
pertinent to note at this juncture that the composition and
inter-ethnic make-up of these two political parties allayed
the fears of the above critics even though some still say
that NRC was dominated by the Northern oligarchy. A quick
look at the results of the elections held between 1990 and
1993 (see Table 2 and other appropriate tables) will not
show any significant official web of ethnicity. Another
question to be asked here is: how did political parties and
elections differ in the Third Republic from those of the
First and Second Republics, and what differences are
important?
The second Nigerian party system was not only unique in
its origins, but also in its national comprehensiveness and
balance, and its creator introduced the fatal flaws that
brought about its early disruptions and demise.
Summary
This chapter has surveyed literature on party systems.
The proponents and the opponents (critics) have strong
arguments to support or defend their respective views. The
chapter has also given the analysis of the merits and
124Ibid.
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demerits of their various views. Many critics of multiparty
system have faulted it for increasing the tendency toward
ideological polarization and instability. However, many
recent studies downplay it. The Nigerian situation and
evidence support the original ideological polarization and




The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the
fetation and the development of Pre- and post-independence
pcliticai parties in Nigeria. It examines the patterns of
party competition in Nigerian regions and states to
determine whether poiitics was conducted on a one-, two- or
multi-party basis. It conducts a methodical investigation
of when, how, and under Khat clrcumstances ^ ^^
or development occurred in each region or state, together
-ith a description and appraisal of the nature of the
and the response of the electorate to party appeals.
Anally, it aiso inquires into what each party stood for.
Finding or providing answers to two broad questions has
been the usual concern and the preoccupation of the
historical investigations of the Nigerian political parties
These questions include what doctrines, ideologies (if any,
or programs did each party espouse. And what interests
Classes, ethnic groups, or sections were most strongly
represented in the composition of each party, what is the
relationship between party constituencies and the party
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itself? How much control did the party leadership have over
its elements? There will be no detailed discussions on
party organization, the overall pattern of interest
aggregation, and the character of the key players.
The political parties in the First and the Second
Republics which were generally ethnic based, fragile, weak
and shallow were looked upon as tools or instruments of
ethnic chauvinism, intimidation, and domination. The pre-
independence party such as the NCNC would have been an
exception to this rule or characterization but it could not
resist the pressures to join other parties in ethnicization,
regionalization, and patrimonialization of power and
leadership. All these limited their capabilities to
integrate the components of Nigerian society. Each party
espoused and propagated its ethnic ethoes, hatred and
agendas at the expense of the national ones. The leaders
and owners of these parties stamped them with their personal
biases and prejudices rather than with any grand
(meaningful) national ideological visions. All these were
reflected in their political campaign patterns which
degenerated into ethnic confrontations and emerged as the
exact anti-thesis of political integration and stability.
This culture of violence and hate attracted the army that
overthrows the civilian regimes.
The above characterization or the character of the
parties in Nigeria prior to the introduction of the two
Party framework in 1989 is primarily determined by interest
they served, their real and professed aims and principles,
the size and nature of their membership and relationship,
the main sources of their voters and other political
support, their main sources of money (funding), and
administrative machinery and internal bureaucracy that ran
them.
This study admits that its perspective on the Nigerian
political parties is unconventional and may well be
confusing or disappointing to those who perceive political
parties in terms of doctrines or constituent groups. This
study basically agrees and shares Professor Maurice
Duverger's view and the understanding that American parties
are above all electoral machines, engaged in nominating and
electing candidates, rather than, as Edmund Burke put it, "a
body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavors
the national interest upon some particular principle which
they all agreed....- TMs work agre£s tQ a ^^ ^ ^
structures and nature of the Nigerian political parties were
profoundly influenced by the constitutional, legal and
cultural environment within which they evolved but it has to
be noted here that political actors (men and women,, not
documents, form and make political parties operate
119
Quoted in Richard P. McCormick,
The s
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effectively or decline drastically. Constitutions are just
the means through which political and civil communities and
societies order their affairs and direct their efforts
towards self-perpetuation or self-preservation and are not
ends in themselves.
The first Nigerian political party, Nigerian Democratic
Party (NNDP) which had its origin in The Clifford's
Constitution, entered upon a stage of arrested development
as a result of the formation of the Lagos Youth Movement in
1938. By 1939 it had disintegrated and gave way to a more
viable dynamic, and radical political association. It will
be noted that one of the striking characteristics of the
1922 Clifford constitution was the allocation of four of the
forty-six seats to the Nigerians resident in Lagos and
Calabar. In essence the creation of this political party on
June 24, 1923 by Herbert Macaulay and his associates was
necessitated by this provision. The party confined its
activities to Lagos only and its main function was to
organize elections and contest for elections into the
Legislative Council's seats and into the Lagos Town Council.
Between 1929 and 1934, the political consciousness of
the Lagos elite was aroused by the controversial colonial
education policy which was perceived by the Nigerian
intelligensia and professionals as a ploy to impart and
bestow inferior education on Nigerians in order to keep and
make them suitable only for inferior government posts and
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prolong the European domination.2 while the NNDP was very
critical of the British officials, regarded as "political
usurpers," by the beginning of the 1930s, the more ambitious
and radical youths in the party had become impatient and
worried about the exceedingly slow pace the party and its
old members were taking. One of the complaints of the
members was that the activities of the party showed a lot of
"chronic conservatism" and they labeled its old members as
"compromisers" and British stooges.
However, one has to bear in mind that the financial and
human resources at the disposal of the party could not have
possibly allowed the party to perform above certain levels.
Therefore, there was no justification for such
characterization. Additionally, there was no empirical
evidence that British officials penetrated or bought over
the leadership of the party. The party was only being
realistic and pragmatic in its approach. Therefore, it was
improbable and unlikely to be true or to have happened as
alleged. Abiola refers to the youths' complaints as "far




best of its time was consumed in fighting for the
enhancement of the status of the Oba of Lagos.4
The establishment in 1934 of a youth movement (the
Lagos Youth Movement, renamed Nigerian Youth Movement in
1936), which was partly social and partly political was the
consequence of the youth's complaints. However, Maduagwu
seems to disagree and asserts that "to propagate their own
idea on education policy, some young Nigerians, mainly
students and graduates of King's College Lagos formed the
Lagos Youth Movement in 1934 and in 1936 was renamed the
Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM)."5
The establishment of the NYM contributed in no small
measure to the demise of the first political party (NNDP) in
Nigeria. It will be recalled that NYM became the major
political rivalry to Macaulay's NNDP immediately after its
formation in 1934. It broke the monopoly of NNDP in the
election into the Legislative Council and Lagos Town Council
since its inception in 1923 by winning all the elective
seats (three) in 1938.
The Movement seemed to meet most of the requirements
put in place during the Second and Third Nigerian Republics
in order to avoid the establishment of ethnic-based
political parties. In other words, it seemed to reflect the
4Awolowo, 114.
5Maduagwu,
federal character, it is interesting to point out at this
juncture that even though the executive membership of the
Movement was predominantly Yoruba, its branches were
established throughout Nigerian urban areas such as Ibadan,
I3ebu Ode, warri, Benin city in the West, Aba, Enugu, Port
Harcourt and Calabar in the East, and among southern
settlers in Jos, Kaduna, Zaria and Kano in the North.•
Awolowo points out that the
-tionalist
whloh
There is no doubt from the discussion so far that the
NYM was more Nigerian in scope and support, and the matters
it had handled were more national in all respects than the
Macaulays Party. AKOiowo further notes that "in content
the aims and objects of the Democratic Party were Nigerian
National; but territorially and in its membership, the party
was „ no way Nigerian or National.- By the end of 1938





twenty branches all over Nigeria. This strengthens the
claim that it was a national movement.
The Nigerian Youth Charter and Constitution embodies
the official program of the NYM and emphasizes the theme of
inter-ethnic cooperation and national unity. The main aim
of the NYM is the
development of a united nation out of the
conglomeration of peoples who inhabit Nigeria. It
shall be our endeavor to encourage the fullest
play of all such forces as will serve to promote
complete understanding and a sense of common
nationalism among different elements in the
country. We will combat vigorously all such
tendencies as would jeopardize the unifying
process. While pursuing this great principle with
consistency as its chief aim, the movement
declares itself, in its short range policy, as a
constructive critic of the Government as at
present constituted. That criticism it offers in
the spirit of constitutional opposition....9
The Youth Charter was divided into three sections,
namely, the Political Charter, the Economic Charter, and the
Cultural and Social Charter. The political section of the
charter describes the goal of its political activities as
...complete autonomy within the British Empire,
... a position of equal partnership with other
member states of British Commonwealth...and
complete independence in the local management of
our affairs.... Our movement accepts the
principle of trusteeship as the basis of co
operation with the British government in
Nigeria.10
9Quoted in Awolowo, 121. See also Nigerian Youth
Movement, Youth Charter and Constitution and Rules (Lagos:
n.d.), 15 ff. And Coleman, 225.
10Ibid.
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The inter-ethnic membership of the NYM was personified
by Nnamdi Azikiwe who returned and joined the political
band-wagon of the nationalists. He added a lot of
propensity to the activities of the old members.
Unfortunately Azikiwe who had become so popular among the
growing community of the non-Yoruba settlers in Lagos,
especially the Igbo, was alleged to be one of the political
actors and factors that contributed to the demise of the
NYM.11
Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (Or Zik, as he is popularly known)
founded his own newspaper, the West African Pilot in 1937
after he returned from Ghana where he had worked as the
editor of a daily newspaper, the African Morning Post. The
leadership of the NYM established an "official journal of
the NYM," the Daily Service in 1938 with Ernest Ikoli as the
publisher and editor and H.O. Davies as the business
manager. The West African Pilot, which was essentially a
commercial venture, better produced and better run, and
enjoyed much wider circulation than its predecessors and
forerunners the Nigerian Daily Telegraph, and the Lagos
Daily News. zik allegedly regarded the establishment of the
Daily Service as a move to undermine his business venture.12




following the establishment of the Daily .,»„,„■. 13 His
critics alleged that "he bitterly resented the competition
that adversely affected his own Journalistic enterprises,
in an editorial Ikoli rejected the suggestion and accused
Azikiwe of being a megalomaniac.""
The accusations and counter-accusations generated a lot
of disagreements among the leaders of the NYM that were
never resolved. He ,zik, resigned from the executive
committee of the NYM on the grounds of "preoccupation with
business affairs" and broke entirely wlth the NYM in 194!.-
The circumstance that furnished zik wlth the pretext
for the withdrawal of his membership from the NYM arose when
«. founding President, K. A. Abayomi resigned from the
Lagos Executive CouncU as a result of his appointment to
the Governor's Executive Council. The vacancy created by
Abayomi.s resignation precipitated and intensified the
struggle within the movement's leadership over the selection
Of his successor. The major contestants were the founding
fathers of the Nym, Ernest zkoli (Ijaw) and Samuel Akinsanya
Ujebu Yoruba,, the President and the Vice-President
respectively. The party supported and endorsed Ikoli but





not acceptable to Zik and Akinsanya who charged that the
party's support of Ikoli was a "manifestation of tribal
prejudice against Ijebus and Igbos."16 They further
maintained that the dominant group of Lagos Yoruba were
discriminating against an Ijebu Yoruba (Akinsanya).17
The question at this juncture is whether manifest
ethnic consideration was possible in this movement that was
given credit for providing a unique platform for the
unification of all the diverse primordial groups in Nigeria?
It is true that the movement embraced diverse ethnic groups
in Nigeria but it is a more fundamental truth that there has
been a propensity and a tendency on the part of the Lagos
elite to despise or look down on their brethren from the
provinces. However, it was rather preposterous and
ridiculous on the part of Zik and Akinsanya to suggest that
the party's support for Ikoli was anchored on ethnic
considerations. It will be recalled that Ikoli was
supported by another prominent Ijebu-Yoruba, Obafemi
Awolowa, then Secretary of the Ibadan branch of the
movement. On the issue of prejudice against the Ijebu
Yoruba, Coleman comments that
Because of certain historical factors Yorubas were
prejudiced against the Ijebu Yoruba. The Ijebu
had never come completely under the old Yoruba




nineteenth century the Ijebu controlled the main
trade routes into the interior, and they had
acquired the reputation of being the jews of
Yorubaland.... Yoruba from Oyo, Ibadan, and the
Egba Kingdom tended to look down upon or dislike
the Ijebu.18
Although it is very difficult to determine whether Zik
deserted the party because of ethnic antagonisms and hatred
or as a result of normal power tussle among political actors
and aspirants to political power or because he was not
satisfied or comfortable with the role he was playing in the
political game, suffice it to say that the resentment he
exhibited when the NYM Daily Service appeared to compete and
challenge his own newspaper is sufficient to reach a
conclusion that he quit the NYM because of his journalistic
enterprises rather than the issue of ethnicity. Maduagwu
opines that perhaps "when Zik saw that his chances to rise
to the top in a Yoruba-dominated NYM was slim, he looked for
other avenues to achieve his political ambition."19 Perhaps
the leadership vacuum among the Igbo in Lagos attracted
Zik's attention and compelled him to withdraw from the
universalist and non-ethnic views he had espoused.20
Awolowo observes that the
fact that in the leadership of Nigerian Youth
Movement there were more Yorubas than those
18Coleman, 228.
19Maduagwu, 9.
20Ibid. For Zik's universalist views and thoughts of
Africa see Coleman, 222.
129
belonging to the other ethnic groups was an
accident; and it was in fact not noticed as a
strange or undesirable phenomenon until 1941.21
Coleman, who seems to hold a slightly different view on
the issue, asserts that
Akinsanya crisis was the first major manifestation
of a tribal tension that affected all subsequent
efforts to achieve unity. From the beginning the
mass membership of the Youth Movement was
predominantly Yoruba in origin.22
It will be erroneous for anyone to assign this label to
the NYM on the basis of its membership. The most important
thing to consider is the distribution of Nigerian educated
elites. A quick glance at this will reveal that the
Yorubas, particularly the Lagos Yoruba, had the benefit of
western education due to their geographical location and
their early contacts with the Europeans. This factor gave
them an edge over other groups who were and are still
struggling to catch up. Therefore, their dominant
membership position role did not necessarily translate into
ethnicity as Coleman seems to suggest. In essence, ethnic
factor did not play any significant role, as far as the NYM
was concerned. It only looked like an ethnic-based party
after Zik had withdrawn with his lieutenants. In fact, to
say that the NYM was the maiden attempt at a genuinely




accurate characterization. Hence, this paper agreed with
Sklar's observation that
Azikiwe's defection virtually destroyed the multi-
tribal character of Lagos section of the Nigerian
Youth Movement as most of the Igbos and many of
the Ijebu Yorubas turned to the NNDP. His break
with the Yoruba elites set the stage for the
political fusion of the Igbo and Yoruba masses of
Lagos, which took organizational form in 1944.23
The Formation of the National Hounci1 of Nigeria
and the Cameroons (NCNC)
It has been stated earlier that Azikiwe (a dynamic
Igbo) strengthened and revitalized the Nigerian Youth
Movement when he returned to Nigeria after his studies in
America and a short stay in Ghana. As pointed out earlier,
the NYM won the Lagos Town Council and Legislative Council
elections in 1938 defeating the Macaulay's Nigerian National
Democratic Party. This ended the political monopoly of NNDP
in Nigeria.
However, in 1941, while NYM was enjoying the greatest
support from the majority of Nigerians, Azikiwe and almost
all the Igbo members in Lagos who constituted the voting
strength of the party and many Ijebu-Yoruba deserted the NYM
over the selection of an opponent to a vacant legislative
council seat and joined the Macaulay's NNDP. This incident,
in the meantime, virtually rendered the NYM in Lagos
23Sklar, 55.
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moribund,24 and only continued in Ibadan under the leadership
of Chief Obafemi Awolowo who kept the flag of the Ibadan
branch of NYM flying until the birth of the Action Group.
Zik seized the initiative of the nationalist struggle
for independence to organize the Nigerian Reconstruction
Group (a small study group of fourteen people predominantly
non-Yoruba) with the objective of forging and building a
united front among all the partisan political groups, in
order to fight for independence.25 Zik led a delegation of
West African Press to London in 1943, under the auspices of
the British Council. The purpose of this as to request the
Secretary of State for colonies to initiate a fifteen-year
program for independence in West Africa. The activities of
the Nigerian Youth, under the umbrella of the Nigerian Union
of Students, were actively supported by Zik and his
newspaper, the West African Pilot. One of the moves it (the
Nigerian Union of Students) initiated culminated in the
inauguration of what eventually became NCNC on August 26,
1944. Perhaps it is more appropriate to say that Azikiwe
and Macaulay founded the NCNC on the initiative of the
24The incident was very disastrous because Dr. Abayomi,
the president, resigned and joined the governor's Executive
Council in 1943, H.O. Davies who accepted government
appointment as a markting officer withdrew from the party,
Akinsanya went home to become his village chief, and
"others" as Coleman puts it "drifted away through
indifference or dissatisfaction, or were otherwise
distracted by wartime changes." See Coleman, 228.
25Sklar, 56. See also Coleman, 262.
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Nigerian Union of Students." Prlor to thls, the students
had taken the initiative to canvass for the establishment of
a political party during the crisis that arose as a result
of the expulsion of some boys from King's College who were
protesting against the use of their college facilities by
the British soldiers.- Many organizations (over forty, such
as political parties, ethnic unions, professiona!
associations, literary associations, religious groups,
social clubs, and women organizations were represented at
the inauguration of the NCNC- The NYM was invited for this
conference that was intended to organize a national council
to weld the heterogeneous masses of Nigeria into a solid
block. Unfortunately, it (the NYM) declined to send its
representatives. The conspicuous absence of the NYM at the
inauguration of the NCNC was attributed to the fact that the
«M leadership was still nursing so.e grievances for Zik
The affUiation of the Macaulays nndp to the NCNC gave the
impression and as a matter of fact convinced the NYM
leadership that the formation of the National Council was a
strategy and grand design by Zik and Macaulay to seize or
h^ac* the control of the nationalist movement, whether the
Mw^ndsomeTigirlTYo
Glover Memorial Hall? lagol
2701awole, 242.
28Sklar, 57.
" Confe«nce summoned by
°" Auqust 26' 19«. held in
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NYM was right or not may not be given a fair hearing at this
juncture, but suffice it to say that the election of
Macaulay and Zik as the President and the General Secretary
seems to support and justify the fears and allegation of the
NYM leadership. Provisional officers for the NCNC that were
elected at the third meeting declined to serve. The final
list of officers included Herbert Macaulay, president;
Nnamdi Azikiwe, general secretary; Oyeshile Omage, financial
secretary; Dr. Abu Bakr Olorun-Nimbe, treasurer; L. A.
Onojobi and A. Ogedegbe, auditors; and E.A. Akerele and
Ladipo Odunsi, legal advisers.29
The conference adopted among other things, a resolution
to the effect that the members were binding themselves
together to form the Nigerian Council "For the realization
of our ultimate goal of self-government within the British
Empire."30 The NCNC was strongly in support of religious
toleration and freedom of worship according to conscience.
The NCNC's membership was by association and until
1952, membership was restricted to organizations only.
Interestingly, it had about eighty-seven associations
affiliated to it by 1945. It will be observed that three
Cameroonian groups joined the party and this was what
29See Nnamdi Azikiwe, The Development of Political




informed the party's decision to adopt the title, National
Council of Nigeria and Cameroon and it remained so until the
excision of the latter from Nigeria. After this, it (NCNC,
reverted to National Council of Nigerian Citizens, others
included two trade unions, two political parties (Democratic
Party and Young Democrats), four literary societies (for
example, the Youths' Literary Improvement circle), eight
professional associations (for example the National Herbal
institute of Medicine and the Society of Native
Therapeutists), eleven social clubs (for example, Zik's
Athletic Club and Merry Rose club,, and one hundred and one
"tribal unions (for example, the Ibo Union and the Ijebu
National Union, .3. Tne largest ^ ^ ^
Nigerian Union of Teachers (NUT,, held aloof.
Considering, the wide-range of organizations and ethnic
unions that affiliated to the NCNC at its early years of
existence, it could be adjudged to be nationalistic and
trans-ethnic in character. The question now is how and why
did it degenerate into an Igbo party?
Maduagwu notes that the deterioration of the NCNC into
Perhaps unplanned process" and he traces its remote cause to
the death of the party's first National President, Herbert
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Macaulay.32 He felt sick in Kano in 194 6 while the NCNC (he
led with two other leaders Zik and Michael Imoudu) was on
nationwide (pan-Nigerian) tour in order to obtain mandates
from different groups and Nigerians. This was designed to
facilitate the presentation of their counter proposals to
the Richard's Constitution and demanding the abrogation of
the "obnoxious Ordinances" contained therein.33 Due to the
sickness, he (Macaulay) returned to Lagos immediately and
urged the NCNC to continue the tour before he died at the
age of eighty-two. As expected, the party had obtained a
lot of written mandates before the conclusion of the tour
(24 in the North, 48 in the West, 81 in the East, and it
also raised the sum of £13,500.34
Zik succeeded Macaulay as the National President of the
NCNC when a fresh election was conducted to fill the vacant
post. The national delegation to London comprising the NCNC
representatives and other selected eminent personalities
from across the country were led by Zik in June, 1947.35




35Coleman, 293. The delegation which was indeed national
included Zik (Ibo) Adeleke Adedoyin (Ijebu Yoruba), Dr. Abu
Bakr Olorun-Nimbe (Ilorin Yoruba), Mallam Bukar Dipcharima
(Hausa), Chief Nyong Essien (Ibibio), P.M. Kale (Bakweri
Cameroonian), and Mrs. Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti (Yoruba).
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Colonies was rebuffed by the l.tt.r. After rejecting their
proposal, the Secretary advised then, to return to Nigeria
and cooperate with the Governor in order to make his
Constitution operational. Although this delegation was not
given a warm reception by the Secretary, it received
critical, favorable and reflective comments from the British
Press. Rejecting on this visit, the influential
endeavored to depict a lesson to be learned or drawn from
it: "But could not more be done in associating the colonial
people more directly with the responsibilities of
government,.... If lntelligent AfrlMns ^ ^ ^ ^
responsibility than they are at present, some counter-weight
of Zikism might be provided.... Could not there be less of
the...outward symbols of the British raj than irritate the
sensitive, educated Africans as much as they impress the
illiterates. "36
Unfortunately, controversy erupted in London between
the members of the delegation. The two ncnc officials, the
General Secretary (Adeleke Adedoyin, and the Treasurer ,Dr
A.B. Olorun-Nimie, alleged that Zik had single-handedly
drafted the memorandum and the proposals submitted in London
and had gone beyond what the delation had anticipated
This controversy continued and degenerated into such a
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degree that the Treasurer and the General Secretary, aiong
with the Vice-President of the NCNC, M.A.O. Williams, were
excised from the First Annual Assembly (Convention, of the
party, held in April 1948 in Kaduna.
Consequently, the controversial memoranda was adopted,
with amendments as the "NCNC Freedom Charter,- at the Kaduna
Convention, m addition, zi* was re-elected as the National
President of the party for a three-year tenure and was given
the power to appoint all the other officers of the party.»
This Kaduna convention seemed to ,ark the attainment of
the apogee of the NCNC's greatness as a national movement in
the nationalist struggle for independence. 2ik alluded to
this in his presidential address in the convention (April,
19«) when he maintained that the founders dream of unifying
various sections (elements, of the Nigerian society, "by
crystallizing and articulating their aspirations, and by
Preparing the nation for the struggle for emancipation', had
been successfully accomplished.- However, for three years
<»«-195l,, the NCNC as a national organization that had
earlier attracted members and associations all over the
country without regard to ethnic group, gender, creed, age
37Maduagwu, 12.
38See Coleman, 2 95.
or region, was said to have becon,e, as Coleman puts it,
"virtually moribund."39 m the meantime,
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This study cannot be more constructive and positive
about the period in Nigerian politics than to characterize
it as a transition period. The NCNC shed its national
outlook and centripetal tendencies and started to wear an
ethnic emblem with centrifugal propensities as soon as
Awolowo fashioned a political party (Action Group, out of
the remnants of NYM and th. Egbe Omo ^^ ^ ^
when they (NYM and Egbe Omo Oduduna, materialized or
metamorphosed into Action Group on March 21, 19S1 the
delicate Igbo .oruba composition of the NCNC was effectively
destroyed. The two leaders were pitted aga.nst each other
» the elections of 1951 under the Macpherson Constitution
The AG adopted and evoked ethnic sediments in its election
campaigns as a matter of pollcy-any support for the NCNC




41Quoted in Maduagwu, 15.
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The Formation of Action Group (AG)
The Action Group was established as a response to what
its leaders, especially Awolowo, perceived as Igbo
domination of the West. They foresaw the likelihood that
Igbo-led NCNC might come to power in the Western House of
Assembly if nothing was done to forestall it. In pursuit of
this objective, Awolowo initiated series of secret meetings
that eventually led to the development of the AG. For all
intents and purposes, AG was designed to serve as a Western
Regional political organization.
The important question at this juncture is why did
Awolowo decide to confine his political ambition to his
ethnic group in the West rather than seeking political
cooperation with Zik and other nationalists outside his
(Awo) base? Perhaps he (Awo) had not forgiven Zik deserting
and crippling the NYM. This seems to be far from his motive
because he could have ignored Zik and embraced other
individuals and organizations Zik did not belong or control.
Probably he (Awo) was afraid that the Yoruba would be in
subordinate positions or be playing a subordinate role in a
Yorubian-Igbo party.
Awolowo and AG's ethnic politics was not only a
retrogression of the national character ideal and approach
pursued by the earlier political parties but also molded a
destructive and dysfunctional political culture in Nigeria.
In other words, it contributed immensely in the
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regionalization and ethnicization of the Nigerian political
parties which polarized the body-politic.
The most influential foundation member apart from
Awolowo (president) was Barrister Bode Thomas (General
Secretary)42 and other members of the executive were Anthony
Enahoro and S.L. Akintola.43
The Foundation of the Northern People's Congress (NPC)
The formation of the Northern People's Congress (NPC)
could be traced to some cultural organizations formed in the
North in the mid-forties by a number of Western-educated
Northerners who had been awakened and stimulated by the
political activities in the South. Dr. R.A.B. Dikko (the
first medical officer of northern origin) and Mallam D.A.
Ragih formed what was supposed to be cultural organizations
in Zaria and Kaduna respectively but they later
metamorphosed and materialized into a political party
(Northern People's Congress) on October 1, 1950.44
42Bode Thomas was the first person to advocate
regionalized political parties in Nigeria in 1947, according
to Zik who additionally claimed that Thomas had proposed the
establishment of regional political parties to "deal
exclusively with matters affecting their respective zones.
The bodies may join at the top to form a council for Nigeria
which will be competent to tackle any matter that will
affect the country generally." Quoted in Sklar, 103.
43For details see Sklar, 106.
44Jamiyyar Mutanen arewa A Yau (The Association of
Northern People Today) was the name of Ragih group while the
Dikko group was called Jam'iyyar Jama' ar Arewa (first
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The founders of NPC advised and urged notable sons of
the region to form NPC branches throughout the North. The
Sokoto Youth Circle was among the groups that agreed to
affiliate to NPC. Over 3,000 delegates attended the
inaugural meeting held at Kaduna on June 26, 1949, where Dr.
R.A.B. Dikko was elected the first President.
Intriguingly, the NPC viewed itself initially as a
social and cultural organization or a movement and its
objectives as stated by the President was to combat
"ignorance, idleness and injustice" in the northern region.
The NPC leadership was not disposed at this time to
affiliate with the NCNC, but it seemed to have been
especially inspired by the Egbe Omo Oduduwa.45 Animu Kanu,
who was subsequently ejected from the Congress, attended the
first annual convention of the NPC held in Kano from
December 25-27, 1949. It will be noted that NPC at this
time was still a cultural organization not a political
party.
The first formally declared political party in the
North, the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) was
formed by a group of radical youth in Kanu in August 1950.
Some of its influential foundation members were Maitama
translated as Northern Nigerian Congress but subsequently as
Northern People's Congress). See Sklar, 91.
45Sklar, 93, note 15.
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Sule, who later decamped and took the membership of the NPC,
and M. Bello Ijumu, who later established a minority party
in the Middle Belt. Aminu Kanu, who gave an unflinging
support to NEPU, later resigned (before he was dismissed) to
join NEPU as Vice-President.46
The original intention of NEPU was to be the political
wing of NPC with little or no knowledge of the fact that the
Northern conservatives were not willing to accept NEPU's
radicalism. The NPC conservatives were so uncomfortable
that they adopted a resolution at Jos convention to the
effect that no NEPU member was eligible for NPC membership.
Consequently, NEPU broke with NPC.
By the time NPC announced its political metamorphosis
and conversion into a political party on October 1, 1950, in
preparation for the 1951 regional election envisaged by the
Macpherson Constitution, it had established 65 branches and
attracted over 6,000 members including the Sarduana of
Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello, who later became the undisputed
leader and the premier of the Northern Region, and Hon.
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa.47 Like its counterpart in the West,
the NPC was not a national party, rather it was established
as a political structure through which regional mobilization
46Aminu Kanu was a government employee (the Principal of




and integration could be realized in the North. As stated
in its motto: "One North, One People irrespective of
religion, rank or tribe."48 Due to constraints, other
minority political parties in the First Republic will not be
discussed and were part of the political equation that
diverged, stressed and pulled the Republic apart.
Reflection on the Political Parties in the Second Republic
(1979-1983)
It is true that a successful operation of best
constitutions and political institutions including political
parties are, to a large extent, dependent on the ability and
the willingness of the men (political class and actors) who
operate them, but it is a more fundamental truth that
choices of political institutions and frameworks matter a
lot in that they (institutions) establish the context and
environment in which the political activities, especially
policy-making, occur. Moreover, they create incentives and
disincentives for political class and actors, shape the
identities of both the actors and citizenry, and can enhance
or hinder the development and construction of democratic
regimes. As far as choices of political institutions are
concerned, especially during transition to democracy, none
is more important than the party system. This is followed
48For NPC Constitution, see B.J. Dudley Parties and
Politics in Northern Nigeria (London: Frank Cans 8 Co. Ltd.,
1968), 314.
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by the system of government: presidential,
semipresidential, parliamentary, or some hybrid. The two
competitive transition to civilian rule in Nigeria offered
the Nigerian military greater opportunities to design or
redesign the political institutions and reshape the
political values and norms of the Nigerian society.
Rather than strictly addressing the problems or
strengths of multi-party system in the First Republic, the
political designers of the Second Republic were obsessed
with how to win the 1979 elections and carve new political
dominion for themselves. They completely failed or refused
to pay genuine attention to the fact that multiparty
presidential democracies have a particularly poor
performance record. Although it is not within the scope of
this study to examine why presidentalism compounds the
difficulties caused by multipartism, giving a fair hearing
to it become unavoidable when the study discusses why
multipartism exacerbates the problems of presidentalism in a
multi-ethnic society like Nigeria.
Everyone was allowed to form a party if the conditions
were satisfied and an election of an independent candidate
was allowed during the First Republic. Although anyone
could still be said to be legally entitled to form a party
in the Second Republic, more stringent constitutional
conditions applied. In Second Republic, election as an
independent candidate was abolished by section 201 of the
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1979 Constitution which limited the conduct of certain
political activities to the membership of registered
political parties. The above section stipulates that "No
association other than a political party shall canvass for
votes for any candidate at any election...."49 In addition,
section 202 provides that "No association by whatever name
called shall function as a political party except under the
conditions provided thereunder."50
When the Federal Election Commission (FEDECO),
responsible for all national elections and recognition of
political parties was established as a federal non-partisan
organ in 1976, it was given the force of law by Decree no.
73 of December 29, 1977. The Decree spelled out, among
other things, the guidelines for the formation of political
parties. Decree no. 32 of 1978 effected some amendment on
the earlier Electoral Decree to the extent that the
demanding guidelines for the formation of political parties
were revolutionary when compared with that of the First
Republic. For example, an association could only be
recognized as a political party if: "its name, emblem or
motto has no ethnic connotation, and does not give the
appearance that the association's activities are confined to
49See Nigeria Constitution, (Nigeria, 1979), Section
201.
50Ibid., Section 202.
a part only of the geographical area of Nigeria »
Additionally, the composition of the executive committee of
the governing body of the party must reflect the federal
character of Nigeria. TMs Section 79 requirement is met
only if the members of that body come from at least two-
thirds of all the states of Nigeria Tho
geria. The san>e stringent
condition applied to the election of the president."
The question at this juncture is whether this
demographic set-up or geographical spread is the uitimate
Panacea to the Nigerian endemic problem, Mother important
question is whether the changes, the stringent conditions
and restrictions motivated by the failings of the First
Republic were the much-needed solutions for the Second
public to endure, Unfortunately, none of the answers to
the above questions is in affirmative because the emergence
Of more than fifty political assoclations immedlately ^
**n on the political party activities was lifted in mid-
Septem*er, 1978. and what happened during the political
campaigns and the elections in i979 were lndictive
solution is still elusive.
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79(c) ""igerian Electoral Degree No. 32 of 1978,
^^\^\^\^^\ resident, the
her candidates, but also in aV 9 eSt votes over all the
all the states in the Federation and^h?^ °f tw°-thirds of
five percent of the votes cast ?nS at least twenty-
See the 1979 Constitution, Section 203PreSidSntial election.
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The FEDECO's deadline for the parties to submit their
application for registration came on December 18, 1978, and
brought all this euphoria on the part of the founders of
political associations to an abrupt end. Only thirty-five
out of the announced fifty-three parties actually collected
registration forms from FEDECO and only nineteen processed
and submitted the completed forms.
On December 22, 1978, Chief Michael Ani, the FEDECO
chairman, announced that only five political parties that
met the stipulated conditions were recognized and permitted
to contest the 1979 elections. These were the National
Party of Nigeria (NPN), whose flag-bearer for the 1979 and
1983 presidential elections was Alhaji Shehu Shagari, the
Nigerian People's Party (NPP), whose flag-bearer for 1979
and 1983 presidential elections was Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the
Great Nigerian Peoples Party was headed by Athaji Waziri
Ibrahim, the People's Redemption Party was under the
leadership of Mallam Aminu Kano, and the Unity Party of
Nigeria (UPN) was led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo.
One can say without fear of being proven wrong that the
proliferation of political parties was a veritable
resurrection of the usual pattern of party politics
characterized by centrifugal and conflictual political
culture and definitive evidence of the fact that Nigerians
were still indomitable, unyielding, and indefatigable
political creatures despite the constitutional engineering
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to forestall a replication of the First Republic's ugly
episodes.
The FEDECO's decision to register and recognize only
five parties out of more than fifty political associations
seemed to be a landmark in the Nigerian political history
because it reduced the number of parties which had they been
allowed to continue, obviously would have complicated and
confused voters' choice and perhaps would have exploded the
centrifugal tendencies (both latent and manifest) in
monumental proportions. Additionally, they (parties) would
have hopelessly fragmented the fledgling political culture
which had not recovered from the First Republic's trauma.
This would have led to a political paralysis of monumental
proportions that would be capable of truncating the Second
Republic before it even took off.
The five political parties that emerged were mere
reincarnation of the political parties in the postcolonial
Nigerian state but NPN broadened its support base, unlike
NPC in the First Republic. Political actors who belonged to
parties of other ethnic groups were often seen as "traitors"
to their ethnic groups, and therefore deserved punishment.
However, William D. Graf observes that "This collection of
elitist groups, coupled with the party's trans-ethnic mass
appeal, distinguished the NPN from all the remaining parties
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with their centralized, personalized leaderships and limited
ethno-regional support base."53
The former supporters of banned Action Group
constituted the bulk of the UPN's membership and former AG
members and Awo's colleagues who abandoned him were those
who had disagreed with him on certain issues. Other AG
members who opted for NPN were those who belonged to
Akintola's faction of the AG, (NNDP). It should be noted
here that the new-found NPN supporters in the West, of which
R. Afani-Kayde is a good case in point, has started working
in close collaboration with the NPC prior to the 1966
military intervention. Unfortunately, UPN was unable to
penetrate significantly beyond the Western boundaries.
William Graf attributes this weakness to UPN's
Yorubacentricity, domination of its leadership by the
Yorubas, and the widespread anti-Awo feelings in other parts
of the country.54
The nucleus of what later became NPP and GNPP was the
tendentially progressive initially comprising Club 19, the
Progressives of Eastern Nigeria and Lagos and the Waziri's
NCUS.55 Graf observes that "a coalition of minorities could
53Graf, 80.
54Graf, 82.
55Oyeleye Oyediran, "Political Prties: Formation and
Candidate Selection" in Oyediran Oyele (ed.) The Nigerian
1979 Elections (Lagos: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1981), 54
150
counter traditional Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba dn Igbo domination
of political life. The predominant thinking within its
major founding group, the Club 19 (an assemblage of mainly
anti-Sharia MCAs, former NCNC politicians and other notables
in the South and East), was that a coalition of minorities
could not only constitute a parliamentary majority but would
be the guarantor of the survival of the liberal democracy in
Nigeria, since they could not form a homogeneous ethnic
bloc-party and would necessarily have to operate on the
basis of continuous intra-party compromises and a balancing
out process."56 Two members of the the CA, Soloman Lar and
Paul Unongo, were the leading figures of Club 19 which had
its base in Benue and Plateau states. This seems to be the
reincarnation of the old minority party of the Middle Belt
(UMBC) in the First Republic except that its former leading
member Joseph Tarka had then joined his former political
opponents in the far North. While R.B.K. Okafor and M.T.
Mbu were among members of the defunct NCNC, Adeniran
Ogunsanya, Olu Akinfosile, and T.D.S. Benson (all former
NCNC members) were the core members of the Lagos
Progressives.
The issue of the party's presidential candidate split
the party (NPP) leading to the birth of GNPP, led by Waziri.
56Graf, 82.
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The roots of NPN are traceable to the National Movement
of Nigeria founded by the people of the core Northern
states. Oyediran seems to suggest that the founders of NMN,
of whom were all members of CA might have been brought
together by the Sharia controversy in the CA.57 It is
interesting to observe that Amino Kano and S.G. Ikoku had
associated with the National Movement at its formative
stages before they withdrew on ideological grounds.58
The radical group and its leading members, Abubakar
Rimi and Balarabe Musa offered Aminu Kanu the leadership of
their organization which later became PRP. This offer was
made after he (Amino Kanu) has broken rank with the National
Movement and he then brought with him S.G. Ikoku into the
PRP.59
The question to ask at this juncture is: would the
Nigerian political culture reproduce the First Republic's
patterns of party formation and leadership in the Second
Republic despite the stringent electoral laws and
constitutional provisions on the formation of political
parties? The answer is almost certainly yes, because the
57Oyediran, 56.
58Although some of Aminu Kanu's admirers claim that he
withdrew on ideological grounds, some people attribute his
withdrawal to his inability to get a position in the
movement commensurate with his status. He was given the post
of Publicity Secretary. See Maduagwu, 31.
59Oyediran, 60.
Changes affected were not revolutionary enough to reverse
the centrifugal tendencies such as personaUzation of
leadership and destructive ethnicization of politics in the
Nigerian politicai culture. In essence/ ^ ^^^
Practices, attitudes, values, and norms regained unchanged
and provided an important part of the internal settlng ln
which ethnic group leaders make political interactions and
transactions. It must be noted that because it (political
culture, is a genera! phenomenon, it does not usually create
a specific politic.! decision or policy. Instead lt ,, apt
to exert political pressure or allow ethnic groups, leaders
to move or not to move in . glven direction. Jn ^ ^
Political culture was very impOrtant in the establishment of
the character of politics in the Second Republic and gave it
a historical consistency. At l0glcai level, lt ^
then, that by looWng for pattern of claims, ethnic
transactions, actions and reactions, one can begin to
understand the Kigerian past, current and, perhaps future
political trends.
The impact of electoral engineering in the Second
lic was not tangible even though it forced the founders
of parties to find means of satisfying the minimum legal
retirements for the formation of political parties rather
than pursuing the ideals of forming truly national or
Geological political parties. Therefore, it would not be
too simplistic an analysis to say that NPN, NPP, GNpp pRp
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and UPN were mere "incarnates" of First Republic's political
parties. In essence, these parties were the products of
functional convergence of social forces such as ethnicity,
sectional and to a certain degree, religious sentiments.
Consequently, the presence of these parties' organizational
efforts were hardly felt outside their regions of origin
(See Tables 1-6).
The personalization rather than institutionalization of
parties and lack of intensive organizational efforts on a
nationwide basis as demonstrated in the foregoing analysis
are linked functionally with pattern of public attitudes and
behavior. In Nigeria, the memory of the political campaign
violence and the roles played by the key political parties
are still fresh and will linger. The two-party framework
seemed to reverse the dangerous and destructive trends in
our political culture. A quick look at Tables 1-6 show that
National Assembly business was conducted on multi-party
basis while that of the state was on one-party basis with
few exceptions.
F.fhnicity and Parties: Hindrance in Positive National
Mobilization. Socialization and Homogenization of a
Heterogeneity of Values and Consciousness in Nigeria
It is obvious that there were no fundamental attitude
changes based on patterns of political mobilization and
socialization or on a program of political education in the
first and second republic.
Certainly, ethnicity has been a negative factor in the
e political mobiliZation of dlfferent ..nationalities"
« Nigeria and shift the. from parochial loyalties to a
Ni9erian national one. The pre-19s9 parties embodied and
-deed proved ethnic rivalry by editing regiona!
sentiments, tendencies, and constantly reminding the voters
that it was between ■„,. and -th«.. From a historlcal
Perspective, Omo Omoruyi observes in the
that
KtTSnlrnerS: SSI *?? ™" ^ided
it became impossibllfor JnuA T Easterners, and
politics outside aria in h ? tO Participate in
Efik resident in Ibldan h»5 ? "aS born- An
for an election Bet^en toll ^J10™ t0 stand
more attractive for anv Lh^? a"d 1959 lt: "as
at the region instL^T^T, &"£*£ £? »*
in a similar vein, Eskor Toyo notes that "Nigeria is a
These nationalities are usually called ethnlc groups
although the IjeSha in the Voruba nationality, for instance,
also ethnic group,., In agreelng ^
-ional question..,n the name of which an sorts of crimes
March
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have been perpetuated against the nation."" However
elicit, may be only an lntruslve ^^^ ^^ has ^
through socialization over time (colonial and post-
colonial, . « Furthermore,
plain^ It^nVtY^ needs to be
Independent varUMe S^raT'/* **** an
attempt to explain the ethnf? gangers attend an
Africa. First it m2 ethnic phenomenon in
sentiments "flame by brfna?^;" keepln3 ethni=
of the consciousness Z L'dil° the foref«nt
Most important of all is thp ?J i 9 P°Pula"on....
analysis to overexaqqerate th» "Cy Of such an
ethnicity in Afrlran ^ ?^f• importance of
diversion o? »«SS,iJSrtl a'wfv"? enCOU«^ the
more important variables." X m other and
level of ethnic consciousness injected into the
Nigerian political system seems to be an end-product of the
Political parties, activities. The Nigerian ethnic-based
Parties tend to convince the masses to belong to the parties
that represent their ethnic group.« „„_ ^ ^ ^
noted here that some aspects of ethnic consciousness have









Like class, ethnicity is not a satisfactory explanation
of politics in Nigeria in particular and Africa in general.
However, ethnicity is more noticeable in Nigeria politics.
The question now will be: why no party has successfully
confronted ethnic consciousness with "class consciousness?"
Part of the answer is the low level of industrialization and
active unionization of workers. This has given ethnic
politics an opportunity to escalate or widen the level of
false consciousness among the people. Some Marxists may
disagree. As Amikar Cabral notes,
You may be surprised to know that we consider the
contradictions between the tribes as a secondary
one.... Our struggle for national liberation and
the work done by our party have shown that this
contradiction is really not important; the
Portuguese counted on it a lot, but as soon as we
organized the liberation struggle properly the
contradictions between the tribes proved to be a
feeble secondary contradiction.66
There is no doubt that ethnicity is a very big burden
as far as national mobilization is concerned. In addition,
Nwabuzor's empirical study has since confirmed that
differences exist among the way ethnic groups perceive
things.67 IN his investigation in the Camerouns, he measured
ethnic value distances and confirmed that in ethnically
66Amikar Cabral, The Struggle in Guinea (Cambrdige,
Mass.: African Group Reprint, n.d.), 436.
67See Elone Nwabuzor, "Ethnic Value Distance in the
Cameroun," in John N. Paden (ed.) Values Identities and
National Integration: Empirical Research in Africa
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1980), 205-229,
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heterogeneous societies, different ethnic groups manifest
different value preferences at least on certain issues in
national bargaining.68 This is also applicable to Nigeria.
The question now is whether the mobilization efforts of
the parties, especially in First and Second Republics, were
positive enough to homogenize these heterogeneity of
primordial nationalities so that Nigeria would become the
object of the greatest loyalty among a substantial portion
of her population? To put it in another way: did they
succeed in the homogenization of a heterogeneity of values
and consciousness? The answer is no. For a detailed
analysis of how ethnicity intrudes into the Nigerian
political process, see Richard A. Joseph.69 A quick look at
election results (See Appendices 1-5) will reveal the
intensity of this problem.
Another important factor that deserves mentioning here
is religion. In spite of the adoption religious freedom as
a fundamental human right in Nigeria, it still intrudes into
Nigerian political process. A substantial number of people
in Nigerian population still has more loyalty to their
religion than the country. Sheik Mahmud Gumis immoderate
utterance in 1987 that the North would secede if a non-
68Ibid.
69Richard A. Joseph, Democracy and Prebendel Politics in
Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), chapters 4-8.
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Muslim won an election to rule Nigeria seems to strengthen
the above statement. However, it becomes problemmatic when
one wants to determine the percentage of the population or
the public opinion he represents.
Although it has been stated earlier that ethnicity is
the highest destabilizing factor in Nigerian politics, it
must be noted here that the cleavages on which many, if not
all, of the Nigerian political parties and party systems are
based presume the dominant salience of the traditional
materialist values. This appears to make the dominance of
class the primary basis of political conflict. What
vitiates the presumed primacy of class is the method with
which the Nigerian political actors adopt to achieve access
to the political structures and scarce resources of the
Nigerian society. This method (ethnicization of politics)
works to the majority of them to the extent that both their
manifest or stated goal (access to the opportunity
structures of the society) and latent or unstated goal
(block the development of class consciousness and enhance
the development of what Karl Marx calls false
consciousness). To a very great extent, this presumption is
especially true for the pre-independence and post-
independence (First and Second Republics) political parties,
whose fortunes depend on their ability to mobilize the
support of their ethnic groups (clientele).
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Hence, to the extent that materialist or meaningful
class-based parties or issues do not structure the Nigerian
political conflict, their vast potential clientele will only
be available for mobilization by ethnic-based parties. This
process of mobilization socializes people to ethnic loyalty,
political values, attitudes, and norms that do not promote
national integration and stability. So, instead of removing
the dysfunctional and centrifugal aspects of primordial
loyalties, it magnifies and strengthens them at the expense
of genuine nation building.
Undoubtedly, political parties have throughout the
history of Nigerian government and politics stood for
division, conflict, and opposition within the body politic.
Etymologically speaking, the word "party" is derived from
"part." Lipset and Rokkan observe that since party "first
appeared in political discourse in the late Middle Ages has
always retained this reference to one set of elements in
competition or in controversy with another set of elements
within some unified whole."70 They further assert that
whatever the structure of the polity, parties have
served as essential agencies of mobilization and
as such have helped to integrate local communities
into the nation or the broader federation. This
was true of the earlier competitive party systems,
70Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan "Cleavage
Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An
Introduction," in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rakkan (eds.)
Party Systems and Votp-r Al ianmpni-.g: Cro.q.q National
Perspectives (New York: Free Press, 1967), 3.
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and it is eminently true of the single party
nations of the post-colonial era.71
Their analysis of parties in the new nations of
twentieth century show that parties represented the first
successful efforts to pull Africans out of their local
community and state and to give them roles in the national
polity.72 Similarly Ruth Schachter has demonstrated how the
African leaders have used their single-party organizations
to "awaken a wider national sense of community" and
establish ties of communication and cooperation across
regional, local and ethnic populations.73
However, these views do not run parallel to the
realities of the First and Second Republics' party politics
as far as performance of this function or the integrative
function of parties is concerned. It was difficult for the
parties to perform this function because of lack of
willingness and genuine commitment to cut across existing
cleavages in order to create common fronts with potential
"enemies" and opponents. This was particularly true at the
early stage of embryonic party formations around cultural
and ethnic cliques despite the fact that the need for broad
71Ibid., 3-4
72Ibid., 4. See also W. Chambers, Parties in a New
Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 80.
73Ruth Schachter, "Single Party Systems in West Africa,"
American Political Science Review. 1961, no. 55, 301.
alliance and national character became nOre pronounce, with
the introduction of stlff constitutional requirements_
In the final analysis, ethnic-based poiitical parties
- the First and Second Republics were destabilizing a9ents
rather than instructs of national integration. They
reinforced a latent feeling of ethnic identification rather
than national, increased the "social distance" between the
federating units, above ail, they sharpened and magnified
non-antagonistic differences among different ethnic groups
Their inability to attract «*.„ as uell as VQters
the.r ethnic base has been an important lndlcator Qf ^
'•"«„ both as mass organizations and instruments of socia!
change, only parties can link leaders and masses Qf
di«erent ethnic groups in almost constant contact but
«9erian parties under muitiParty system did not achieve it
More politlcal partles offer ^ oppMtunity f^ ■
to9ether forces such as ideology (especially national
charisma, accountability to an increasingly larger
constituency, and organization that are capable of
establishing a viable political culture. Again, the
;;;;rian poiiticai ^««- - ^ ^ t0 d0 M
»ent as far as elevating, glOrifying and popularizlng
ethnicization of politics. No Nlgerlan ^^
especially in the Pirst Kepublic, adopted an ideology that
was ln tune with a viable democratic political culture




of either East, West and North or the Igbo, Yoruba and
Hausa/Fulani.
Babangida's Shortcut Methods to the Formation of Two
Political Parties (NRC and SDP) in Nigeria
A brief explanation of the trends in the Nigerian
politics prior to October 1989 when Babangida surpassed his
record of unpredictability and unorthodoxy and announced
that the two political parties would be formed by fiat is
necessary in order to have clearly in mind the political
culture and context within which the two parties were
decreed. Regrettably, it must be remembered that since
December 31, 1983, when the military overthrew the Shagari-
led civilian government, the political culture still
produces political associations and class that have not
undergone major "revolutions" in leadership style,
structure, and program. Personalized party politics was
still on the political scene, but it seemed to be modified
by a slightly greater accentuation on organizational
politics. There was resurgence of an "old-style" First and
Second Republic-style factionalism that was based on a
combination of personalities, geographical, ethnic and
religious differences and patronage. The expectation was
that its replacement with a "new style" factionalism would
gradually occur.
It will be recalled that politicians and public
officers of the Second Republic were banned under Decree 25
of ».7 whlch was a modification of he 1M6 Decreg wwch
^^ ^ -^iPating ^ Ponucs during transitiM
Additlonally< ,0(twohun
thousand naira or five-year prison term would
i»posed on tne violators) Babanglda
r;rthe iegai acti°nto abrogate the Decree."
On May 3, 1989, he <Babangida, unveiled
constltutlon and Ufted the ^ ^ pouticai
;;;.and eniist the suppo- °f "*•formation of political associations.»
So,e ot th. strlngent condUions
required to meet before applying t0 NEC
aS -""=- —s incite static clearly
=onCisely thelr positions on the foUowing l /







the relationship between the economy and politics; the rural
population in Nigerian politics, rural community
development, women, labor, youth, traditional rulers, the
armed forces in Nigeria politics, political parties, their
funding, formation, and administration, elections and
electoral processes, statism, nationality and citizenship,
creation of states, revenue allocation, the media,
bureaucracy, external relations, the evolution of a national
language, ethnicity and corruption in society/politics.77
The sudden proliferation of ethnic-based political
associations (forerunners of political parties) which
accompanied the Babangida's lifting of ban on politics on
May 3, 1989, showed undoubtedly that the past survived into
present and that the political culture had remained the same
or at most, slightly modified as a result of the electoral
requirements and social engineering. The sheer number and
permutations of these political associations established a
measure of difficulties involved in the creation of national
consensus out of the multiplicity of religious, ethnic and
sectional particularisms in Nigeria. While some of the so-
called political associations had an ephemeral existence,
many continued to spring up from all nooks and crannies.
This showed that the cycle of conflictual political culture
was not yet broken.
77The Guardian (Lagos), October 9, 1989.
One week after the ban was ilftedf twenty-three
Political associations had advertized in different



















True Party of Nigeria (TPN)
United Democratic Movement (UDM)
United Front of Nigeria (UFN)
United Nigeria Democratic Party (UNDP)
Wazobia Democratic Party (WDP)
Okoroji puts the number at eighty-eight and notes that
this created the impression that the Nigerian class was
"enjoying the exciting times provided by this singular act
of the government."78 Nevertheless, Babangida was convinced
that this would not last. "The government warned that they
would police the new political parties because they did not
want those politicians of the Second Republic who were
banned, the so-called old breed, from participating in the
new dispensation. They were supposed to be "political
virgins" not tainted with the wrongs of the previous
political experiments and who would be willing to serve
their people in an altruistic manner without expecting to
enrich themselves."79 In other words, Babangida did not want
old wine in a new bag. Instead, he seemed to be searching
for "new breeds" with angelic qualities who, in his own
words, "would not let down the country and would help lay
the foundation for the Third Republic."80
In the end, out of the 88 political associations, only




the NEC-imposed registration fee (fifty tnousand Ml
They are: All Nigeria's Peopie's Party (MPP) , Ideal
People's Party (IPP) , Liberal Convention
"nity Party (NUP) , Nigerian ^^
H.tion.1 Congress (NNC). Nigerian People,s Welfare
««»>. Patriotic Nigerian Party ,pnp, . People,s Front Qf
^eria (PFN) , People,s Patrlotlc par£y (ppp)> ^^^
Solidarity Party (PSP), Republican party Qf ^^
and United Nigerla Democratlc party (mDp)
Thereafter, the NBC engaged in verification exercise to
certain the genuineness „, these associations' membershiP
the geograpMcai spread of their .ranches. During an
go around the country and verify the associations'
-*ershiP si2es and organi.ationai strengths and spread
»«. that an the thirteen poiiticai associations
exaggerated their claims in an respects.«
The NEC,3 report tQ the Government caii^
the polltlcai association's frau.u.ent practices and
Charactered the situation as .'disturbing signposts for
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This report accentuated the dangers and disastrous
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associations, serVing as a sad remlnder the poHtics ot the
'** and second RepubMcs was stiu in existence.
In virtually every st-at-e
The implication of h he loser loses
so grave that one cannSt VieW °f Politics are
Portends of the deSr^- discern in it
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the 13 associations but also to take initiative by
establishing two new political parties on October 7, 1989.
The government decision to disqualify all the 13
associations was based on the fact that
all the 13 association (approved by the NEC) were
surrogates of the banned or disqualified
politicians" and in the words of Babangida, "we
will not serve our people yesterday's food in
glittering new dishes.... When I say that my
administration opted for a new political culture,
we mean new leadership not old political wolves in
new breed sheepskins.85
In view of this it was apparent that the stage was set
for the most innovative? daring? and conspirational?
democratic experiment in Nigeria (perhaps in black Africa)
by a military government.
During the announcement that established the NRC and
SDP, he (Babangida) repeatedly cited aspects of the all-
powerful NECs report which concluded that all of them
(associations vying for registration as parties) had failed
to meet the criteria laid down for registration as political
party.86 His involvement in the business of party formation
was also informed according to him, by the fact that "we do
not believe that the old political structures which failed
us in the past should form, or be allowed to form, the basis
85Quoted in Okoroji, 125.
86Quoted in Oyeleye Oyediran and Adigun Agbaje, 213. See
also The Guardian (Lagos), October 9, 1989, 4.
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for our new electoral competition, if we are serious about
creating a new social order."87
Unfortunately, in Nigeria one is faced with a situation
which exemplifies very well the French saying: Le plus ca
change, le plus c'est la meme chose (meaning the more things
change, the more they remain the same). IN 1989 people
though that the consensus the political bureau reached in
connection with party system, drastic changes in electoral
laws, lessons of history, and Babangida•s Mass Mobilization
for Social Justice, Economic Recovery and Self-Reliance
(MAMSE) had created a conducive environment to reduce
ethnicization and proliferation of political parties and
"politics as usual." yet, the dimensions of politics were
alarming. In fact, whether the number of political
associations in 1989 drastically exceeded those of First and
Second Republics or not, one had expected the Babangidas
two-party framework to compel people to form party on
Burkean principle or fashion. Edmund Burk■s idea of a
political party is that of "a body of men united for
promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest
upon some particular principle in which they are all
agreed."88 Whether this view is universally shared or not,
87ibid.
88Quoted in Nnmdi Azikiwe, "The Development of Political
Parties in Nigeria," in Rift: A Selectiop From tho Speeches
it presupposes that party members have a commonly agreed
Principle or ideology which holds them together and which
they have decided to enunciate and promote. However,
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nigh i not well-
that hundred poitca WOuld mean
population.•» ° ag5«gate the interests of the
The political bureau recognized that there must be a
"-it to the nu^er or parties but warned that two party
system was not necessarily fool-proof even when tampered
«th. m essence, it is not a guarantee for political
stability, given Nigerians' expertise and penchant for
bastardizing any well-intentioned poiitical formula.
Edging from Babangida's numerous broadcasts to the
nat.on, he seems to be moved by the concern to create a new
Platform for the emergence of a new politica! eiite and
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supervised the erection, installation of the necessary
administrative and "programmatic" infrastructure.
Babangida was aware of the role and consequences of the
rich in founding and funding of the earlier political
parties and was bent on eliminating the stranglehold of the
rich on parties. The negative influence of the rich on
parties in Nigeria is so strong that it restricts the free
actions that are capable of institutionalizing and
developing the parties. In essence, it helps to personalize
party and its leadership, thereby creating patron-client
relationship in which "authoritative" allocation of
positions and values is dominated by patron-client networks.
To nip this problem in the bud and prevent affluent
politicians from gaining undue advantages, especially during
the early stage, he provided funds and other logistics to
the two new parties.
Obviously, as far as Babangida was concerned, this was
not a political prescription for disaster, but a blueprint
to ensure that the new parties had no links with previous
political experiments. The implementation of his blueprint
involved a step-wise progression from the local to the
national level which was based on one-man, one-vote with
accentuation on the encouragement of community spirit,
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establishment of solid organizational structures, and
participant political culture at the local level.92
In summation, the Babangida regime's decision to
undertake the gigantic and unprecedented step in the
establishment of the two parties for the Third Republic
would:
(I) furnish a grassroots foundation for the development
of the two authorized parties and a mass platform for their
emerging leadership as well;
(ii) provide equal rights and access to the
opportunity, structures of the political process to all
Nigerians that wish to participate without regard to their
religion, wealth, professional endeavors, and political
backgrounds;
(iii) place less emphasize on the role of money in
politics;
(iv) diminish the element of violence in election to
its barest minimum;
(v) impede the re-enactment and development of
political alliances that characterized the First and Second
Republics in order to allow Nigerians to operate within the
new political structures;
(vi) provide the environment that ensures the emergence
and development of a more dedicated and genuine leadership
92Ibid., October 10, 1989, 6.
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cadre that would not be a mere proxy for old political
warlords;
(vii) create strong institutional structures to sustain
future governments and stand a test of time and a political
system that would be operated according to the letter and
spirit of the new Nigerian constitution.93
While the SDP was presumed to be leftist party (left of
center) or a little to the left, the NRC was presumed to be
rightist part (right of center or little to the right).
Both of them had centerist tendencies and also generally
endorsed the Babangida administration's major policy thrusts
such as structural adjustment.94 The outlines of the
constitutions and programs of the two parties were written
by the military regime with the advice of NEC and a number
of political scientists within and outside the Presidential
Advisory Council (Babangida's extra-ministerial think-tank.
However, they had "proviso that they would later be free, at
least within limits, to add flesh to the documents."95
93Ibid., 15. See also Oyeleye Oyediran and Adigun
Agbaje, 227.
94Directorate for Social Mobilization, Political Manual
of NRC (Containing the Manifesto and the Constitution of the
NRC) (Ibadan, 1989). See also Directorate for Social
Mobilization, Political Manual of SDP (Containing the
Manifesto and the Constitution of SDP) (Ibadan: Nigeria,
1989) .
95Oyeleye Oyediran and Adigun Agbaje, 228.
176
Basically, this work is of the view that the political
leaning of both parties is incorporeal and irrelevant
because the constitutions of both parties were written by
the government with virtually the same modus operandi. In
essence, it will be an accurate characterization if one says
that the 29-page constitutions of the two parties are
virtually similar in all regards. It is observed that "the
only relevant comparison is that between tweedledee and
tweedledum."96
The government of Babangida constructed party offices
in all local government headquarters, state capitals, and
Abuja the new Federal capital territory and appointed
secretaries at all levels. Later, it supervised their
replacement by elected officials. The Center for Democratic
Studies, established in 1989, organized training programs
for party officials at every stage of the Babangida's
transition program. The purpose of the training program was
to
seek out and identify sources and types of anti
democratic attitudes, beliefs and behavior in
Nigerians and devise measures to correct them
through our educational, bureaucratic and
political institutions.97
It seems to be difficult to measure and evaluate the
extent of Babangida's genuine commitment to a new viable
96Okoroji, 125.
97The Guardian (Lagos) October 1, 1989, 6.
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means adopted by the Babangida-led military regime for party
formation raises doubts in the mind of Richard Joseph about
its suitability and whether "it can eventually lead to the
creation of a stable and democratic political system."101
Apart from legal actions instituted against the decision
(formation of political parties) by some Nigerians,
Uwazurike maintains that it was likely to be a cog in the
wheel of the overall search for endurable and sustainable
democracy during the transition period and thereafter.102 In
a similar vein, it is opined that "the approach betrays a
lack of faith in the people by making it difficult for them
to learn the democratic rules of trial and error, and by
creating institutions not properly anchored by people
empowerment. "103
Initially, the critics nicknamed the two parties
"Northern" Republican Conversation (NRC) and the Southern
Democratic Party (SDP). However, as time went on,
especially after the publication of their membership and the
December 1990, election results, these nicknames became
round pegs in square holes. These were early indicators of
success and viability of the two-party framework. They (the
election results and the membership of the parties) proved
101Richard Joseph, "The Challenge of Democratization in
Africa," 18.
102Uwazurike, 65-66.
103Oyediran and Agbaje, 228.
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some critics wrong and allayed their fears vis-a-vis
crystallization and degeneration into North/South dichotomy.
To be precise, the parties became the first genuine Nigerian
political parties to cut across regional, ethnic and
religious groups.
It will be noted that the traces of the 13 previous
political groupings influence were evident in the two ready-
made parties but were not enough to hijack regionalize,
theocratize, personalize, ethnicize, or paralyze the
parties. In this sense, Babangida's aim of establishing the
two parties is accomplished. However, a dissenting view
claims that "activists" in both the Nigeria National
Congress (NNC) and the Republic Party of Nigeria (RPN)
appear to have become dominant in the NRC, while leaders of
the People's Solidarity Party and the People's Front of
Nigeria (PFN) have surfaced in the SDP. In short, the
pattern of voting and the membership statistics so far
available suggest that elements of subsisting interests and
old ties now reincarnated are to be found in NRC and SDP,
thereby defeating at least to some extent, Babangida's aim
of creating two entirely new political organizations.104 If
one looks at the spate of violence and destructive
factionalism witnessed in inter- and intra-party
interactions which rocked the First and Second Republics,
104Ibid, 233.
can conclude










the study that a:
(weak)
181
from 1963-1966, in many respects resembled the Second. To
be precise, the politics of the Second only rarely departed
from the First as a result of constitutional engineering.
The two parties that operated in the Third Republic had the
same ethnic composition.
CHAPTER IV
THE ANALYSES OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE
Responses
One of the methods this study adopts involves the
construction and administration of questionnaires. More
than 98 percent of the data for determining the impact of
the two-party framework are based on responses obtained from
the questionnaires.
Coding Categories
Twenty-nine key questions from the questionnaire are
selected for testing the propositions and answering the
research questions. The response of each respondent for
each question is coded according to a scale ranging from
agree (1), disagree (2), to no opinion (3) or remain the
same (4). The last question is open-ended, designed to get
the detailed views and opinions of the respondents on most
of the variables. Variable 1 (VI) is the impact of two-
party framework on ethnic politics in Nigeria. Variable 2
(V2) is on religious politics; Variable 3 (V3) is on
violence; Variable 4 (V4) is on consensus and coalition
building, and Variable 5 (V5) is on patriotism. The
questions on the questionnaire are represented on the Tables
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8-15 with their numbers. For example, Q12 represents
question number 12 on the questionnaire. Respondents whose
ages range from 20 years to 49 years are classified as young
while 50 years and above as old.
Results
Ethnic Politics in Nigeria,, 1989-1993 (VI)
On the statement that the two-party framework has
helped to improve inter-ethnic relations in Nigeria (VI,
Q12), 90 percent of the respondents agree, 2 percent
disagree, 5.5 percent do not have any opinion, 2.5 percent
say they remain the same (see Table 8). The thirty-percent
that agree are young males (28 years-49 years), while 22
percent are old men (50 years and above). The young and old
male respondents that disagree are .1 and .2 percent
respectively.
The young and old female respondents who agree are 20
and 18 percent respectively while the negative responses are
.7 and 1 percent. The figures are substantial as far as
supporting the idea or notion that the two-party framework
improved interethnic relations. Additionally, these tend to
suggest that age and gender make a difference (see Table 8).
The younger generation's greater affirmative responses seem
to suggest that they are more receptive to attitudinal
changes, new values, ideas, and social engineering.
There is no significant difference in the responses of
the five regions surveyed on VI, Q12. While the positive
TABLE8
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES IN THE ETHNIC POLITICS CATEGORIES
Ethnic Politics
improving inter-ethnic relations and under-
Handing in Nigeria. Q12
Would you suppmt the Nigerian government
if it if beaded by somebody from mother
ethnic group? Q42
Have to two parties (SDP end NRQ played a
mere active rob in reducing or mjihjfoing
the problem of ethnicity in Nigerian politics
today than the political parties in the 1950s,
1960s. 19701. and 1980.? Q13
The two parties (SDP and NRC) am emnic-
braed as in the Fnt and the Second
Republics. Q35
The political parties in the Rrst and Second
RepubUcs were more ethnic-based, parochial,
and divisive than the parties (SDP end NRQ
in the Third Republic. Q25
You would trust the government headed by
somebody from another ethnic group. Q43
The number of the political parties made
you von for a politician bom ■ particular
ethnic group you had never voted for in the
First and Second Republics. Q17
Would more political parties do a better job
in the Third Republic Q16
The two-party fruoBwoifc refluped your
political behavior. Q18
The two-party Cramework has made the job of
handling ethnic demands and Interests easier
than when Nigeria had many parties. Q34
The two-party system has changed me






































































































































































responses of the West, the Northern and Southern minorities
are in the 17 percent range, that of the North and the East
are 18 percent (see Table 9). The table shows that .3
percent of the North, .5 percent of the West, .3 percent of
the East, .4 percent of the Northern, and .5 percent of the
Southern minorities disagree (see Table 9).
On VI, Q42 (see Table 8), 79 percent of the respondents
agree that they would support the Nigerian government, even
if it is headed by somebody from another ethnic group. The
18 and 15 percent of young and old males agree respectively
and only 1 percent of young and 3 percent of old males
disagree. Out of the 79 percent that agree, 25.3 percent
are young females and 20.7 are old females. The total
percentage of males who disagree is 4 (1 percent young and 3
percent old). On the female side, 3 percent disagree (.8
percent are young and 2.2 percent are old). The 14 percent
of all the respondents do not have any opinion. Out of the
7 percent that disagree 2.5 percent are from the North, 3.1
percent from the West, .5 percent from the East, .9 and .2
percent from the Southern and the Northern minorities
respectively. The 14.2 percent of all the positive
responses are from the North, 13.1 from the West, 17.8 from
the East, and 15.9 and 18 percent are from the Northern and
Southern minorities respectively.
These results suggest that the East and the Southern
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people taught to master nature will resort more
readily to power and manipulation. They will seek
quick decisions overriding all doubts and
obstacles, disregarding the needs of dissenting
opinions, minorities, and the less obvious
consequences of their action. Such masters of
nature will win many triumphs in technology and
politics, but in their rush ahead they may leave a
trail of neglected vital problems such as eroded
soil, polluted air, careless wars, and ill-treated
minorities. Those who have learned to work with
nature—learning from her--may learn from their
dialogue with nature the art of working through
dialogues with their fellow men.2
Another important factor that affects and shapes
people's attitudes toward political reforms, economic
growth, how to meet the needs of old and young relates to
people's perception of the relative importance of the past,
the present, and the future.
A culture looking more to the past than to either
the present or the future may be better in
preserving monuments than in accelerating
innovations. It may enact laws for old-age
pensions many years before expanding large-scale
public higher education for the young.3
The East and the Southern minorities are not submissive
to their environment and tend to regard their members as
equals. (Their members are not divided into superiors and
subordinates and their societies are not hierarchically
divided in superiors/subordinates.) They are the most




It is important to note that in most post-independence
elections in Nigeria, the political parties from other parts
of the country had scored their highest votes outside their
ethnic bases among the Southern minorities and the Eastern
region.
On whether the two parties (SDP and NRC) have played a
more active role in reducing or minimizing the problem of
ethnicity in Nigeria today than the political parties in the
1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 1980s (VI, Q13), 90 percent of all
the respondents agree and only 4.5 percent disagree. Out of
the 48.8 percent of males that agree, 28 percent are young
and 20.8 percent are old. On the women side, out of the
41.2, 23 are young and 18.2 are old. While .1 of young and
.2 of old males disagree, 1 percent and 3.2 percent of old
females disagree and a total of 2.2 percent do not have any
opinion. The distribution of affirmative responses are 18
percent for the North, 13.2 percent for the West, 19.2
percent for the East, 19.3 percent and 20.1 percent for the
Northern and the Southern minorities respectively. Negative
responses are: 8 percent for the North, 2.9 percent for the
West, .3 percent for the East, .4 percent and .1 percent for
the Northern and Southern minorities respectively.
As far as age and gender are concerned, Table 8 shows a
very substantial difference in the responses of men and
women and a clear break between the generations under and
3Ibid., 207.
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over 49 years. Traditionally, Nigerian women seem to be
very strong and rigid in their primordial loyalty.
Therefore, their responses which show some change of
direction and attitude are not readily fathomable. However,
there are two possible explanations. First, the Nigerian
women who were more traumatized and victimized by the
violence of ethnic politics of the First and Second
Republics became more receptive to any political innovation
and social engineering that de-emphasized ethnicity and
deplored electioneering violence. Perhaps another
explanation of their political behavior is that the level of
their education and political awareness had risen under the
two-party framework from what it was during the multi-party
systems. Essentially, this has not only helped them to
measure, evaluate, and understand or recognize the relative
success of the Third Republic elections, but has exposed the
fatal weakness in the multi-party system. In the final
analysis, it is necessary to point out here that since the
Third Republic did not last long, any judgment that the
Nigerian women who were the most ardent or loyal supporters
of ethnic political parties and their politics and
traditional values have shed off their primordial sentiments
and conservative traditional values will be erroneous or
premature.
On whether the two parties (SDP and NRC) were ethnic-
based as in the First and Second Republics (VI, Q35), only 7
«-. - ., th 79 percent of the respondents
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Out of the 65 percent of respondents who agree that a
smaller number of parties has made them vote for a
politician from a particular ethnic group they had never or
would never have voted for in the First and Second
Republics. 12.2 percent are the Northerners, 8.3 percent
are the Westerners, 15.7 percent are the Easterners, 14.7
and 14.1 percent are the Northern and the Southern
minorities respectively. The 21 percent that disagree are
as follows: 4.2 percent are from the North, 5.1 percent from
the West, 3.1 percent from the East, 3.7 and 4.9 percent
from the Northern and the Southern minorities respectively.
The positive responses above (VI, Q17) show that the West is
the most unwilling region to vote for politicians from other
ethnic groups. In view of this, it becomes ironical that
the region which had almost succeeded in electing Azikiwe,
an Ibo, as its premier in 1951 turns out to be the most
ethnic conscious in voting. The data seem to suggest that
the East, the Northern and Southern minorities are the most
receptive of the reforms.
Inter-ethnic trust is very important for democracy,
because it has an impact on the process of interest
articulation and other inter-ethnic transactions. A high
level of inter-ethnic trust makes the job of interest
articulation easier. In the Nigerian-type two-party
framework, a great deal of interest articulation took place
within the two parties rather than through coalition of
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that more political parties would have done a better job,
only 23.5 percent and 18.5 percent of males and females of
older age cohorts disagree. Although the idea that younger
age cohorts are more receptive to social engineering has
been expressed elsewhere (at the beginning of this chapter),
suffice it to add that VI, Q16 shows more strength among the
younger voters than among the older ones who had been
socialized into the traditional values and norms established
by the multi-partism before the contraption of the two-party
framework by Babangida. Out of the 2 percent that agree
with VI, Q16, .1 percent are young males, .5 percent are old
males, .2 percent are young females and 1.2 percent are old
females. Six percent of both men and women do not have any
opinion.
Tables 8 and 9 which give a breakdown of the responses
by gender, age, cohorts, and regions have made the pattern
clear. The pattern of response distribution is now becoming
familiar: the North and the West are more traditional than
other regions of the country. However, in VI, Q16, the
column for regional distribution of responses does not show
any significant differences in both negative and positive
responses in all the regions.
On whether two-party framework has reshaped the
political behavior of the electorate VI, Q18), 25 percent of
the young males, 20 percent of the old males, 22 percent of
the young females and 18 percent of the old females agree.
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Only 1 percent of the young males, 1.9 percent of the old
males, 2 percent of the young females, and 3.1 percent of
the old females disagree.
The regional distribution column for VI, Q18 (see Table
2) shows that 17.2 percent of the North, 15.2 percent of the
West, 17.1 percent of the East, 17.6 percent and 17.8
percent of the Northern and the Southern minorities
respectively disagree. Thirty percent do not have any
opinion.
The positive responses of people from the West are 2
percent lower than the national average of the people from
the other four regions of the country. This is contrary to
the opinions of the majority of the people of Southern
Nigeria that the North is the most traditional and
conservative of the regions. Other figures so far tend to
suggest that the West is the most ethnic conscious as far as
voting is concerned.
Fifty-eight percent of the respondents agree that the
two-party framework makes the task of handling ethnic
demands and interests easier than when Nigeria had many
parties (VI, Q34). Nineteen percent are young males, 11
percent are old males, 18 percent are young females, and 10
percent are old females. Out of the 12 percent that
disagree, 1.8 percent are young men, 3.9 percent are old
men, 2 percent are young women, and 4.3 percent are old
women. The percentages of the respondents that agree are:
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North 11.8, West 10.4, East 11.6, Northern and Southern
minorities 11.9 and 12.2 respectively. Out of the 12
percent that disagree, 2.5 percent are the Northerners, 3.1
percent are the Westerners, 2.3 are the Easterners and 2.2
percent and 1.9 percent are the Northern and the Southern
minorities respectively.
As shown on the table, 24 percent of the young males,
21 percent of the old males, 21 percent of the young females
and 19 percent of the old females agree that the two-party
framework has changed the way people look at political
parties. These figures are very substantial when they are
compared with 1.1 percent of young males, 1.9 percent of the
old males, 2.3 percent of the young females, and 2.7 percent
of the old females who disagree. The regional distribution
of responses shows that 17.1 percent of the Northerners,
14.4 of the Westerners, 17.8 percent of the Easterners, 17.5
percent and 18.2 percent of the Northern and Southern
minorities respectively agree while 2.5 percent of the
Northerners, 3.1 percent of the Westerners, 2.3 percent of
the Easterners, 2.1 percent and 1.9 percent of the Northern
and Southern minorities respectively disagree.
As has been shown in the aforementioned analyses, the
overwhelming positive and favorable responses to Babangida's
mechanical contrivance (two-party framework) support the
proponents of the two-partyism and discredit the argument
for reintroduction of multi-party system into the Nigerian
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constitution by the Constitutional National Conference. In
essence, the data on VI, especially VI, Qs 18 and 40, show
that political structures such as political parties and
party systems play an important role in the dissemination of
political information reflecting political values and norms.
These values and norms, whether widely shared or not, can be
desirable or undesirable depending on the orientation of the
party leadership and the type of party system. It (the
party system) creates incentives and disincentives for both
the electorates and the political actors, shapes their
identity, and creates the context in which interest
articulation and policy-making take place. Therefore, it
affects the pattern of political mobilization and
socialization which in turn helps in the construction
(creation) or destruction of democratic regimes.
The party configuration created by the two-party
framework places Nigeria in Sartoris category of "moderate
pluralism" in which "competition remains centripetal," which
is conducive to moderate politics and which in its operation
is essentially bipolar.4
4Giovani Sartiori, Parties and Party System: A
Framework for Analysisr VI (Cambridge: Cambridge University
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DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES IN THE REUGIOUS POLITICS CATEGORIES
Religious Politics
Do you think that the two political panics
(SDP and NRC) emphasize religions sentiments
as was the case in the First and the Second
Republics? Q10
Have your religious leaden ever invited a
candidate or a politician to your church,
mosque or other to campaign? Q21
If your religion supports a candidate for an
election, would you vote for that candidate?
Q19
You would vote for that candidate even if the
other competing candidate is more qualified.
Q20

































































































On V2, Q21, 2.9 percent of the young males, 3.1 percent
cf the old males, 3.8 percent of the young females, and 4.2
percent of the old females agree that their religious
leaders have at one time or another invited a candidate or a
politician to their church, mosque, or other to campaign.
On the contrary, 15.1 percent of the young males, 14.9
percent of old males, 19.4 percent of young females, and
21.6 percent of old females disagree. The 15 percent of
both males and females do not have any opinion.
Out of the 14 percent of all the respondents that
agree, 4.1 percent are Northerners, 3.9 percent are
Westerners, 1.8 percent are Easterners, 2.6 percent and 1.6
percent are Northern and Southern minorities respectively.
Conversely, 13.3 percent of the North, 13.6 percent of the
West, 14.8 percent of the East, 14.2 percent and 14.9
percent of the Northern and the Southern minorities
respectively disagree that their religious leaders have ever
invited a candidate or a politician to their church, mosque
or other to campaign. The results show a deviation from the
practice that was in vogue in the First and Second
Republics' political campaigns. This is a very big stride
and a positive development in Nigerian politics.
On V2, Q19, 51 percent agree to support and vote for a
candidate if their religion supports that candidate for an
election. Out of these, 7.4 percent are young males, 14.6
percent are old males, 9 percent are young females, and 20
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percent are old females. The distribution of the 40 percent
that disagree is 17 percent young males, 9 percent old
males, 9.1 percent young females, and 4.9 percent old
females. Nine percent do not have an opinion.
The affirmative responses according to the regions are:
the North 11.4 percent, the West 11.1 percent, the East 9.3
percent, 10.1 percent and 9.1 percent for the Northern and
the Southern minorities respectively. A significant
percentage disagree. Out of the 40 percent that disagree,
7.1 percent are Northerners, 7.3 percent are Westerners, 8.9
are Easterners, 8.2 percent and 8.3 percent are Northern and
Southern minorities respectively.
On V2, Q20, only 5 percent of the respondents agree
that they would vote for a candidate endorsed by religious
group to which they belong even if other competing
candidates are more qualified. A breakdown of the figure
shows that .5 percent are young males, 1.4 percent are old
males, .8 percent are young females, and 2.3 percent are old
females. On the other hand, out of the significant 87
percent that disagree, 28.1 percent are young males, 15
percent are old males, 26 percent are young females, and
17.9 are old females. Eight percent do not have an opinion
The regional distribution of the responses shows that
1.2 percent of the North, 1.1 percent of the West, .9
percent of the East, 1 percent of the Northern and .8
percent of Southern minorities agree while the significant
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The geographical distribution shows that 1.4 percent of
the North, 1.9 percent of the West, 1.5 percent of the East,
1.8 percent and 1.4 percent of the Northern and the Southern
minorities respectively agree that the two parties have
degenerated and dichotomized into Christian versus Muslim
affairs. However, 72 percent disagree. Out of these, 14.7
percent are Northerners, 14.1 are Westerners, 14.4 percent
are Easterners, 14.7 percent and 14.1 percent are Northern
and Southern minorities respectively.
So far, the survey responses here consistently
contradicted a pervasive belief that religion and ethnicity
would dichotomize the parties. To them (respondents), the
parties' support did not run along ethnic and religious
lines. The responses for V2, Q19 and V2, Q20 show that the
Nigerian electorate is now ready to support and vote for the
person they think is best qualified regardless of his or her
religion. Nigerian attitudes towards political parties and
politics have been frequently criticized by democratic
observers as deficient in political tolerance. It will be
recalled that the two-party framework was consciously
adopted in light of tumultuous democratic experience in the
First and Second Republics. In essence, it was established
to accomplish what the multi-partyism had failed to achieve.
Judging from the above two tables, the two-party framework
has not failed to achieve its expected potentialities such
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DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES INTHE CATEGORIES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE
Political Violence V3
Political violence, thuggery, and
intimidation are not rampant in the
Third Republic. Q22
The introduction of the two political
parties has helped to reduce die above
violence. Q23
The formation of more political parties in
Nigeria will increase political violence,
thuggery, and intimidation of political
opponents. Q24
Do you feel safer during the political campaigns
and elections in the Third Republic than you
did in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s? Q31
Politicians campaign in stiles other than
their states of origin with little or no
molestation today than in the 1960s, 1970s,
and 1980s. Q32
The present two-party framework has minimized
the oner- and intra-squabbles that caused a lot










































































































while 1.5 percent of the North, 2.1 percent of the West, .7
percent of the East, 1.2 percent and .9 percent of the
Northern and Southern minorities respectively disagree (see
Table 13). This shows that when juxtaposed with the scale
of political violence in the previous republics, especially
the First Republic, it becomes empirically justified to
reach the inference that the two-party framework was a
success.
On whether it is right to say that the introduction of
the two-party framework has helped to reduce the incidence
of political violence, intimidation, and thuggery (V3, Q23) ,
7 6 percent agree. Out of these, 22 percent are young men,
18 percent are old men, 20 percent young women, and 10
percent old women. The breakdown of the 12 percent that
disagree shows the 2.1 percent are young men, 2.9 percent
are old men, 3 percent are young women while 4 percent are
old women. Twelve percent of all the respondents have not
formed any opinion on whether the two political parties were
responsible for the reduction of political violence,
thuggery and the intimidation of political opponents.
However, logical and empirical images and reasonings permit
favorable inferences or high probability that two-party
framework was responsible. In other words, it is possible
to draw a reasonable inference based on probability that the
reduction of these incidences of political violence is
attributable to the two-party experiment.
TABLE 13
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES IN THE CATEGORIES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE
Political Violence V3
Political violence, thuggery, and
intimidation are not rampant in the
Turd Republic. Q22
The introduction of the two political
parties has helped to reduce the above
politic*! violence. Q23
The formation of more political panics in
Nigeria will increase political violence,
thuggery, and intimidation of political
opponents. Q24
and elections in the Third Republic than you
did in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s? Q31
Politicians campaign in states other than
their states of origin with little or no
molestation today than in the 1960s, 1970s,
and 1980s. Q32
The present two-party framework has minimized
the inter- and intra-squabbles that caused a lot
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disagree, 1.8 percent are Northerners, 1.9 percent are
Westerners, 1.8 percent are Easterners, 1.8 percent and 1.7
percent are Northern and Southern minorities respectively.
This column of the table shows a strong showing for the West
which has consistently nursed some reservations about the
salutory political development the two-partyism has
occasioned in Nigeria. A strong score in both positive and
negative responses by the West almost reverse the familiar
pattern so far. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that
although the West scored a relatively heavy point on this
question (V3, Q32), its strength here is not greater than
that of other regions.
On V3, Q38, 75 percent agree that the two-party
framework has minimized the inter- and intra-party squabbles
that caused a lot of problems in the 1960s, 1970s, and
1980s. While 22 percent of young men, 17 percent of old
men, 20 percent of young women, and 16 percent of old women
agree, 1.7 percent of young men, 2.3 percent of old men, 2.1
percent of young women and 2.9 percent of old women
disagree. Fifteen percent do not have any opinion. Out of
the 75 percent of the positive responses, 15.1 percent are
from the North, 12.5 percent from the West, 15 percent are
from the East, 15.4 percent and 16.1 percent are from the
Northern and the Southern minorities respectively. A
breakdown of the 10 percent negative responses gives 1.8
percent, 2.9 percent, 1.9 percent, 1.8 percent, 1.6 percent
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to the North, the West, the East, the Northern and the
Southern minorities respectively.
Although the West has the lowest percentage of positive
responses (12.5 percent) when compared with other regions,
it signifies a significant stride in Nigeria's search for a
suitable party system for political stability. It will be
noted that the level of political violence was so high in
the West during the First and Second Republics that it
earned the notorious nickname, "the sick child of the
country." However, the whole picture was different in the
Third Republic. Political violence was at its lowest ebb in
Nigeria during the Third Republic.
Consensus and Coalition Building
On consensus and coalition building the results are
strongly in favor of the two-party framework. On V4, Q28,
70 percent of the respondents agree that the presence of
only two parties makes reaching consensus easier, 10 percent
disagree while a large proportion of the respondents (20
percent) do not have any opinion (see Table 14 for a
breakdown of the figures). Consensus is very important in
interest aggregation and stability of any democratic
political system. The regional distribution table gives
14.1 percent of the positive responses to the North, 10.6
percent to the West, 14.4 to the East, 15.1 percent and 15.8
percent to the Northern and Southern minorities
respectively. On the other hand, 2.1 percent of the
TABLE 14
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES IN THE CATEGORIES OF CONSENSUS AND COALITION BUILDING
Consensus and Coalition Building V4
The presence of only two parties makes
reaching consensus easier. Q28
Coalition governments as in Nigeria's First
and Second Republics were fragile. Q29
The existence of only two parties has
reduced the chances of a coalition
government. Q30
The greater the intensity of disagreement
among the political parties, the greater the
threat to the Nigerian stability. Q39
The two-party system offers a stronger
medium through which ethnic conflicts are
resolved than the multi-party system in the
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REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES IN THE CATEGORIES OF CONSENSUS AND COALITION BUILDING
Consensus and Coalition Building V4
The presence of only two panics makes
reaching consensus easier. Q28
Coalition governments as in Nigeria^ First
and Second Republics were fragile. Q29
The existence of only two parties has
reduced the chances of a coalition
government. Q30
The greater the intensity of disagreement
among the political panics, the greater the
threat to the Nigerian stability. Q39
The two-party system offers a stronger
medium through which ethnic conflicts are
resolved than the multi-party system in the






















































































Q39). A breakdown of the positive responses shows that
young males score 24.1 percent, old males 20.9 percent,
young females 22 percent, and old females 17 percent. On
the other hand, only 6 percent of the respondents disagree,
out of which .8 percent are young males, 1.6 percent are old
males, 1.2 percent are young females, and 2.4 percent are
old females. Ten percent do not have any opinion. The
regional distribution for positive responses gives the North
16.9 percent, the West 16.7 percent, the East 16.6 percent,
the Northern and the Southern minorities 17 percent and 16.8
percent respectively. Out of the 6 percent that disagree,
1.2 percent are Northerners, 1.1 percent are Westerners, 1.1
are Easterners, 1.4 percent and 1.2 percent are Northern and
Southern minorities respectively.
Seventy percent agree that the two-party framework
offers a stronger medium through which ethnic conflicts are
resolved than the multi-party system in the 1960s, 1970s,
and 1980s (V4, Q37). A breakdown of the responses shows
that young males score 21 percent, old males 15 percent,
young females 19.8 percent, and old females 14.2 percent,
while 2.2 percent of young males, 3.8 percent of the old
males, 3.3 percent of the young females, and 4.7 of the old
females disagree. Sixteen percent do not have any opinion.
The positive responses for the regions show that the North
has 14.2 percent, the West 14.1, the East 14.3 percent, the
Northern and the Southern minorities 13.6 percent and 13.8
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percent respectively, while 2.6 percent of Northerners, 2.5
percent of Westerners, 2.7 percent of Easterners, 3.1
percent and 3.1 percent of Northern and Southern minorities
respectively disagree.
Taking a cursory look at the statistics, conclusion
could therefore be safely drawn that propensity of
democratic growth and stability was higher in the Third
Republic than what had obtained in the First and Second
Republics. To be precise, these favorable responses for the
Babangida's two-party framework are seals of approval. The
responses show a drastic reduction in political violence,
regional/ethnic politics, religious politics, inter- and
intra-party antagonisms.
CHAPTER V
THE IMPACT OF THE TWO-PARTY FRAMEWORK (1989-1993)
Before delving into analysis of the differences and the
performance of the party systems in Nigeria, it is necessary
to point out that the circumstances under which parties were
founded and funded in the First, the Second, and the Third
Republics were not identical. However, the political
culture remained fundamentally the same except for minor
changes occasioned by constitutional tinkering and social
engineering. When juxtaposed with the parties in the First
and Second Republics, the SDP and the NRC of the Third
Republic were unique in their origin, national
comprehensiveness and balance and they seemed to avoid the
fatal flaws that shook and disrupted the previous two
republics.
The emergence of the SDP and the NRC was neither a
result of the cleavage within the Constituent Assembly nor
from any polarization of attitudes and values on specific
public issues.1 Contrary to the perceptions of some
critics, the SDP and the NRC cannot be characterized as
essence, the party foundation and membership were
neither conditioned by sectional interests nor by explicit
doctrinal issues but rather by the contest for presidency
and other available political positions.
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solely representing a revival of a new form of the pre
existing party alignment or as a reincarnation of the
parties of the previous republics.
In view of this, it becomes somewhat ironical to see
chances of electoral success at all levels rather than
ethnic and religious considerations playing an important
role in determining party alignments and identification.2
Irony or no irony, the important thing is that it was a
positive sign and the net result was that successive
electoral contests between various candidates had started to
create the party system and the political culture that had
remarkably reduced ethnic and regional bias. Moreover, the
SDP and the NRC were competitive and balanced in most states
and regions throughout the transition period (1989-1993).
Curiously, these Babangida contrivances (SDP and NRC) were
the first in the political history of Nigeria to be truly
national in scope. Whether the particular circumstances
associated with their creation made them seem "artificial"
or resemble government parastatals or not, the important
thing is that they were peculiar and produced a balanced
party system in nearly every region and state.
Consequently, the de facto "one-party" regions that existed
2It has been observed elsewhere that in the Nigeria-
type political culture, strong regional sentiments and
ethnic consciousness shape the values and the behavior of
the electorate.
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in the First and Second Republics became a thing of the
past.
The period 1989-1993 was too short for any meaningful
analysis of the question of institutionalization of the
parties. Suffice it to say that the absence of
personalization of the parties and the nation-wide
organizational efforts of the parties were linked
functionally with the patterns of public attitudes and
behavior in the Nigerian transition period. More precisely,
the SDP and the NRC played the role of surrogates for the
society in the establishment of a viable and "modern"
(consensual) political culture. It would be premature to
assert that the political culture has gone into a period of
arrested development as a result of the annulment of the
June 12, 1993, presidential election.
The analysis of the sample survey and voting statistics
shows that political party affiliation and the voting
behavior of both the elite and the masses changed
fundamentally in the Third Republic. The transformation of
cleavages was also significant. Experience has shown that
the proliferation of political parties in the previous
Republics undoubtedly led to the politically dysfunctional
pattern of mobilization and polarization of the electorate
along ethnic/regional and religious lines. Consequently,
this pattern created the attitude and electoral behavior
that strained the political system. However, the survey
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data in this study show that the two-party framework has
brought about a positive transformation of the political
orientations with little strain on the political process.
It is undoubtedly true and obvious that the two-party
political resocialization of the citizenry of Nigeria has
had greater positive effects than the consequences of long-
term exposure to the multiparty system. Therefore, party
systems and their pattern of political socialization,
mobilization, campaign, and party organization are the key
variables in molding and maintaining political attitudes and
opinions.
In essence, the existence of only two national
political parties created an incentive for the political
elite class to abandon any ambition of forming narrow-based
or ethnic-based parties. When they (political elites) came
together in the two parties (SDP and NRC), it became very
difficult for them to appeal to ethnic sentiments.
Moreover, it created some political ties that connected
individuals and communities and increased their shared
interests. All these combined to limit the severity of
overt conflict, and enhance the resolution of political
disputes or conflicts.
Ultimately this affected the political cultural values
and norms, which in turn affected Nigerian political
attitudes. All these translated into a positive political
223






















in which the last
political campaigns
and elections occured
Fig. 2. Stages of Behavioral Process of Two Partyism
The survey data show that Nigerian ethnic relations
were at their best during the electioneering campaigns and
elections in the Third Republic. In the First and the
second Kepublics, some poIitical









The analysis of the survey responses indicates that
there is little doubt in the minds of the respondents that
the two-party framework helped in improving inter ethnic
relations and minimizing the effects of ethnicity on party
formation and support in elections [see chapter 5, VI Qs 42
and 13]. This brought about a change in the nature of
political campaigning which in turn affected values, norms,
and consequently the pattern of voting.
However, an important factor that can challenge or even
weaken the achievements of the two-party framework stems
from the fact that the two party experiment came at the time
when the threat to individual freedom and the interest of
the civilian political class was very obvious and enormous.
Perhaps that was what caused or forced the civilian elite
class to play by the rules in order to ease out the
military. The former (civilian elite) was aware that the
latter (military) was looking for the slightest excuse to
tighten its grip on power.
Whatever happens, this study has produced some data
with which to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the
Babangida's version of two-partyism. Moreover, the analysis
will enable the critics or the opponents of the two party
experiment to think about two-party politics qualitatively
in terms of what it has offered the electorate rather than
quantitatively represented by proliferation of parties and
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petroleum resources in the Babangida administration reached
the same conclusion.5
Religion and Politics
Judging from the survey responses, one may reach the
conclusion that the two-party framework succeeded in
bringing Christians and Muslims together. The survey data
indicate that 71 percent of the respondents disagree with
the idea that the two political parties have religious
affiliations and reflect religious sentiments as was the
case in the First and the Second Republics. Additionally, a
comparable percentage (72 percent) disagree that the two
political parties degenerated into a Christian/Muslim
affair. This tends to suggest that the two-party framework
was not a good forum for Christian crusaders and jihadists
to express or execute their religious agenda. The fact that
Abiola, the presumed winner of the June 12, 1993,
presidential election received overwhelming support from
Christian voters regardless of his decision to select
Kingibe, a Muslim as his running mate. This shows that bi-
partyism helped to produce or was in the process of evolving
a culture of religious tolerance. The survey evidence
consistently points to a pervasive belief that religion was
hardly considered essential or relevant by the Nigerian
public, especially the elite class. For example, the survey
5The Difficult Combination," Comparative Political
Studies 26, no. 2 (July 1993): 198-228.
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results indicate that 87 percent of the respondents agree
that they would vote for the people they think, are the best
regardless of what religion they belong to. In sum, the
two-party framework reflected the criss-crossing of the
fundamental religious-ideological and social cleavages of
Nigerian society. In other words, the experiment fostered
criss-crossing affiliations and loyalties and militated
against religious bigotry.
The findings of this study demonstrate that the high
level of variation in religious and political tolerance in
the First, Second, and Third Republics was, to some extent,
unrelated to the historical experiences and biases of the
respondents. The implication is that the events and the
activities of the parties during the Babangida's transition
program were the primary determinants of religious and
political tolerance. In essence, this study is again
suggesting that this tolerance was a function of
resocialization to democratic values and norms during the
period of democratization under the two-partyism.
Political Violence
Political campaigns and elections in the First and
Second Republics were marred by widespread violence. Thugs
were recruited to intimidate political opponents and the
electorate. Some prominent politicians formed and supported
quasi-military organizations which made life insecure for
the people in general. The political campaign periods in
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Nigeria before the advent of the two-partyism were
comparable to the state of nature as described by political
philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes. Parties and their
supporters on campaign trails were attacked by opposition
parties and their supporters. These threatening conditions
of violence and chaos were directly or indirectly created by
the party leaders' campaign rhetoric and speeches that
appealed to ethnic and religious sentiments.
All these seemed to change in the Third Republic.
There was no widespread political violence and destruction
of lives and property. Survey evidence indicates that 83
percent of the respondents believe that political violence,
thuggery, and intimidation of political opponents were not
rampant in the Third Republic as in the previous Republics.
Additionally, 7 6 percent agree that the two-party framework
was responsible for the decrease in such acts of violence.
The existence of more political parties, according to 69
percent of the respondents, will increase political
violence, thuggery, and the intimidation of political
opponents. On people's safety during political campaigns
and elections, 80 percent of the people polled agreed that
they felt safer in the Third Republic.
The two-party framework also minimized the inter- and
intra-party squabbles that contributed to the demise of the
previous Republics. The two-party framework in Nigeria
blocked the proliferation of political parties and forced
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factions and groups to negotiate issues. This helped to
resolve inter- and intra-party conflicts that would have
erupted and escalated into political violence. It will be
recalled that the crisis in the West began partially as
personal disagreement between the two major political actors
in the West, Awolowo and Akintola. The multi-party system
provided the opportunity for Akintola to form his own party
instead of settling his differences with Awolowo. This
intensified the conflict rather than insulate it. In order
to win and control power, both actors resorted to readily
available tools—violence and intimidation of political
opponents. However, under the two-party framework, large-
scale physical violence had somehow been avoided.
The coalition governments in the Nigerian First and
Second Republics were fragile, dicey and more often than not
the disputes that erupted and metamorphosed into
administrative paralysis. The two-party framework reduced
the need for a coalition government to its barest minimum.
The multi-party system in Nigeria, especially under a
presidential system of government furnished the conditions
for the formation of coalitions and the incentives for
breaking them as well. Oftentimes, the party leaders
generally felt the need to distance themselves from the
president in office, especially when the next presidential
elections appeared on the horizon. The party leaders had
the unsatisfactory option of remaining silent partners in
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the governing coalition. However, they were hesitant to
take this line of action because they feared that while the
president would reap the benefits of the coalition
government, they would lose their own identity and share
blame for any mistakes the government might make. In
Nigeria, the coalition partners feared that Shagari would
enjoy the benefits while they would bear the brunt of the
electoral costs usually associated with incumbency. It must
be pointed out here that this logic does not strictly apply
to a multiparty cabinet system where the composition of the
government is determined by party strength in elections.
Survey evidence shows that 70 percent of the
respondents agree that the operation of only the two parties
makes reaching consensus easier. The importance of
consensus in interest articulation for the stability of
Nigeria is not in dispute. Judging by this high percentage
of affirmative responses, one may be tempted to say that the
two-party experiment would have achieved one of its goals of
creating a consensual political culture.
It must be noted here that the findings of this study
do not suggest the absence of strained relations among the
diverse groups in Nigeria. The restriction placed on the
number of parties forced moderation and flexibility down the
throats of the politicians. This made reaching a consensus
and the inclusion of different groups in the party

















mobilization. In essence, this study is suggesting that
political tolerance in the Third Republic resulted from
resocialization to democratic values during the
democratization exercise under the two-party framework
introduced by Babangida.
Summary
Lijphart may disagree with the assertion that
multipartism was the fatal flaw that introduced the pattern
of destructive political campaign and the political culture
that emphasized what divides Nigerians rather than what
unites them. Inevitably, these two things undermined
democracy in Nigeria in the First and the Second Republics.
In the Third Republic, the parties (SDP and NRC) were
moderate and centerist and the political system and culture
benefitted from it. However, the ability of the parties to
offer a clear choice between alternative programs was
reduced. Their programs were both close to the political
center and very similar in major respects.
The previous chapters have found strong links and
relationships between party systems, pattern of political
socialization, and culture, on the one hand, and the
political culture and political behavior on the other.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION























a stable democracy in Nigeria is concerned. Conversely, the
finding lends credence to the views of numerous scholars
(such as Duverger, 1954, pp. 206-280, Hermens, 1941, and
others) who argued that two-party systems were more
favorable to democracy than multiparty systems that tended
to create unstable democracies. Duverger and other
proponents of two-party systems (see literature review) were
impressed with the success and stability of democracies in
Britain and the United States and its breakdown in Germany
and Italy during and shortly after the World War II. They
seem to ignore the fact that there are some consensual
multiparty system (generally with limited number of parties)
that seem to be successful. However, the particularly
significant contribution of Lijphart (1968, 1977, 1984)
changed the tide of discussion. In sharp contrast to
Duverger's argument on "dualism" and party systems, Lijphart
noted in 1968, 1977 and 1984 that many multiparty
democracies had achieved stability for a long period of time
in smaller European democracies (countries) such as Sweden
and Denmark.1 Furthermore, he argued that multiparty
systems could be more propitious in promoting stable
1A. Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems"
Comparative Political Studies. 1968. See also A. Lijphart,
Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977). See also Arend
Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and
Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1984), 111.
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democracy in plural societies with sharp cultural, ethnic,
religious, or linguistic cleavages.2 Significant minorities
might be permanent "outs" in a two-party system, thereby
creating a situation that could reduce their willingness to
abide by the rules of the game. On the contrary, a
multiparty system could help these minorities attain
meaningful representation and participate in coalition
governments.
This study has certainly not resolved this issue.
However, the findings do not support Lijphart's argument at
all. In fact, they widen the academic or theoretical
distance between Duverger and Lijphart. The indicators and
the survey data suggest that multipartyism in Nigeria was
centrifugal and destabalizing, while the two-party framework
is centripetal and stabalizing. This conclusion is very
easy to reach by taking a critical look at the aggregate
data. However, it must be noted and conceded that most
recent analysts, such as Sani & Sartori (1983)3, as well as
Sanders & Herman (1977) have sided with Lijphart.4 One
could argue that the validity of Lijphart's position depends
2Ibid.
3G. Sani and Sartori, "Polarization, Fragmentation and
Competition in Western Democracies" in H. Daalder and P.
Mair (eds.), Western Party Systems: Continuity and Change
(Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983), 307-340.



















decrease national consciousness and integration. The
multiparty system tends to destroy or limit the development
of national political parties. It also creates
opportunities for politicians to form ethnic based political
parties, thereby forcing the would-be national figures to
recede to their ethnic cocoons resort to ethnicity as a
trump card in order to secure the maximum votes and support
of their ethnic group. In such dispensation, any party that
fails to play by the "rule" (ethnic politics) loses as soon
as another ethnic-based party emerges from that group.
The reason for the above pattern is informed by the
particular logic and experience of Nigerian political
culture and thinking. Nigerians associate a party with a
cause or causes (ethnic chauvinism and domination).
Therefore, parties are conceived and built as the vehicle
for ethnic purpose (ethnic domination). To live up to these
expectations, it is natural for Nigerians to join or form
ethnic-based parties. Politicians float new parties and
coin new names for parties as new political ideas evolve out
of the general body of their political thought which is
embedded or woven in the web of the political culture.
Consequently, parties can only live, grow and die with the
causes which they were designed and created to bear or
promote.
Prior to President Babangida's involvement in the
formation of the SDP and the NRC in 1989, the most prominent
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characteristic of the Nigerian political system was that it
was a multiple party rather than a two-party system. It
will be noted here that the political history of Nigeria
since 1950 is liberally strewn and littered with the
wreckage of attempts to found and develop two broad-based
parties in order to win elections or govern more
effectively. Nevertheless, none of them had ever survived
very long or functionally succeeded. All these boil down to
one thing: that heritage shapes the Nigerian political
system. This heritage and its impacts have been very
negative and destructive in the Nigerian search for
political stability. Fortunately, Babangida's contraption
seems to reverse or reform that heritage. To be precise, he
(Babangida) coined the precept that a political party not
only can be but in fact should go beyond a particular case
and be more durable and institutionalized. However, events
after the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential
election, make it very problematic to say that Babangida,
through social engineering had perfected or attempted to
perfect a party framework which would have lived or
continued irrespective of the fate of its founder and causes
(reasons for founding it). In other words it is difficult
to say that this experiment would have succeeded in its
quest of institutionalizing democracy and political
stability, irrespective of its author and reasons for
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only influences the party system but can be influenced in
turn by the output and performance of the system.
Compared with the party politics of the First and
Second Republics, it is clear that Nigerian political
culture underwent a significant degree of reformation. The
SDP and the NRC emphasized the symbols and tactics that
appealed to as wide a range of voters as possible and
discouraged social conflict and political mobilization along
ethnic, religious and regional lines. There was no campaign
slogan like "One North, One People." This study has shown
that the ethnic factor or commitment of the two parties is
negligible under the two-party experiment. This fact
convinced the bulk of the voters to vote for parties on non-
ethnic basis. In essence, the two parties' campaign appeals
shaped the character and the political culture of the Third
Republic. The effects of the two party framework and its
pattern of political campaign appeals were reflected on the
attitude and the electoral behavior of the electorate. This
strengthens the view that there is a reciprocal model of
relationship between political culture and political
structure. This supports Verba•s idea that "Political
culture forms an important link between the events of
politics and the behavior of individuals in reaction to
those events; for, although the political behavior of
individuals and groups is of course affected by acts of
government officials, wars, election campaigns, and the
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Source: Richard A. Joseph, Democracy and Prebendel Politics in
Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of Second Republic (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987), 125.
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Source: Richard A. Joseph, Democracy and Prebendel Politics in
Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of Second Republic (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987), 125.
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Percent 10.0 29.2 33.8 10.3 16.7
Source: Richard A. Joseph, Democracy and Prebendel Politics in
Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of Second Republic (Cambridge:




13. The two political parties play a more active role in reducing or minimizing the
problem of ethnicity in Nigerian politics today than the political parties in the 1950s,
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s
(a) Yes (b) No (c) No opinion (d) The same.
14. Religion and ethnicity are more important in Nigerian politics today than in the First
and Second Republics (a) Yes (b) No (c) The same.
15. What is responsible for diminishing influence of religion and ethnicity in Politics?
(a) Party-system and education (b) Maturity of the people and education
(c) Lack of interest in Nigerian politics (d) a and b
(e) Money (f) No opinion.
16. More parties (4-7) would do a better job in the Third Republic,
(a) Yes (b) No (c) No opinion.
17. The number of political parties has made you vote for a politician from a particular
ethnic group you had never voted for in 1st and 2nd Republics.
(a) Yes (b) No (c) No opinion.
18. The two-party system has reshaped your political behavior.
(a) Yes (b) No (c) No opinion
19. If your religion supports a candidate for an election would you vote for that
candidate? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Don't know.
20. Would you vote for that candidate even if the other competing candidate is more
qualified? (a) Yes (b) No.
21. Did your religious leaders ever invite a candidate or a politician to the church or
mosque to campaign? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Don't know.
22. Political violence, thuggery, intimidation, and lack of trust are not rampant in the
3rd Republic, (a) Agree (b) Disagree (c) No opinion.
23. Is it right to say that the introduction of two political parties has helped to reduce the
above incidences of violence? (a) Agree (b) Disagree (c) No opinion.
24. The formation of more political parties in Nigeria will increase political violence,
thuggery, and assassination of political opponents? (a) Agree (b) Disagree
(c) No opinion.
25. The political parties in 1st and 2nd Republics were more ethnic based, parochial,
and divisive than the two political parties in the 3rd Republic, (a) Agree
(b) Disagree (c) No opinion.
26. Respect should be shown to the Nigerian flag, (a) Agree (b) Disagree
(c) No opinion.
27. Allegiance should be shown or pledged to Nigerian State rather than ethnic group,
(a) Agree (b) Disagree (c) No opinion.
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28. Presence of only two parties makes reaching consensus easier,
(a) Agree (b) Disagree (c) No opinion.
29. Coalition governments as in Nigeria's 1st and 2nd Republics were fragile,
(a) Agree (b) Disagree (c) No opinion.
30. Existence of only two parties has reduced the chances of a coalition government,
(a) Agree (b) Disagree (c) No opinion.
31. Do you feel safer during political campaigns and elections in the 3rd Republic (in
the past 3 years) than you did in 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s?
(a) Yes (b) No (c) Don't know.
32. Do politicians campaign in states other than their state of origin with little or no
molestation today than in 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s?
(a) Yes (b) No (c) No opinion.
33. Do you think your behavior can influence government and vice versa?
(a) Yes (b) No (c) No opinion.
Please make any comment concerning the two party system, the new political culture and
stability.
34. The present two party framework makes the job of handling ethnic demands and
interests easier than when Nigeria had many parties, (a) Agree (b) Disagree
(c) No opinion.
35. Are the two parties ethnic based as in the 1 st and 2nd Republics?
(a) Yes (b) No (c) No opinion.
36. The two parties have degenerated into Christian/Moslem affair,
(a) Yes (b) No (c) No opinion.
37. The two-party system offers a stronger medium through which ethnic conflicts are
resolved than the multi-party system in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.
(a) Yes (b) No (c) No opinion.
38. The present two-party system has minimized the inter-party and intra-party
squabbles that caused a lot of problems in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s,
(a) Agree (b) Disagree (c) No opinion.
39. The greater the intensity of the disagreement among political parties, the greater
the threat to Nigerian stability, (a) Yes (b)No (c) No opinion.
40. Do you think that the two-party system has changed the way people look at political
parties? (a) Yes (b) No (c) No opinion.
41. Make some comments on the two-party experiment.
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42. Would you support Nigerian government if it is headed by somebody from another
ethnic group? (a) Yes (b) No (c) No opinion.
43. Would you trust govemment headed by somebody from another ethnic group?
(a) Yes (b) No (c) No opinion.
44. Do you have confidence and trust in the Nigerian government especially the civilian
government as far as the provision of socio-economic amenities are concerned?
(a) Yes (b) No
45. Do you take positions on political issues? (a) Yes (b) No (c) No opinion.
Thank you for the time you have spared to fill out this questionnaire.
Please make your comments on extra paper regarding how two-party system can promote
or hamper Nigeria's political stability.
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